like rule in Wisconsin

2024There, the Court stated that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24-25 .

2009Ill. 2006), aff'd, 466 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2006) (preclusion issues are to be decided by an arbitrator); see also, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.) Once the trial court determined the suit was brought on an issue referable to arbitration under the arbitration provision of the Agent's Agreement, it should have inquired no further into questions not properly before the court and granted Country's motion to compel arbitration. 7 *254 CONCLUSION ¶ 19.

1979We are not persuaded that consideration of this issue is necessary to the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. *330 “With the current tremendous increase of appeals, this court does not have the time or inclination to spend time considering objections resulting from finecombing the record and second thoughts which might have been raised in the trial court but were waived excepting in most im-usual circumstances which go directly to the issue of guilt.” (Emphasis added.) Day v. State, 52 Wis.2d 122, 125 , 187 N.W.2d 790 (1971).

1979We are not persuaded that consideration of this issue is necessary to the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. *330 “With the current tremendous increase of appeals, this court does not have the time or inclination to spend time considering objections resulting from finecombing the record and second thoughts which might have been raised in the trial court but were waived excepting in most im-usual circumstances which go directly to the issue of guilt.” (Emphasis added.) Day v. State, 52 Wis.2d 122, 125 , 187 N.W.2d 790 (1971).

1979Relying upon earlier cases, 3 Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514 , 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) lists this court’s exclusive means for cutting off liability where breach of a legal duty has been proven as a substantial factor in causing injury: “Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on grounds of *324 public policy because (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the neg

1979Relying upon earlier cases, 3 Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514 , 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) lists this court’s exclusive means for cutting off liability where breach of a legal duty has been proven as a substantial factor in causing injury: “Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on grounds of *324 public policy because (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the neg

1969If the question is an open one in this state at all, no good reason is apparent why, after a claim is properly presented to a municipal corporation and payment is duly demanded, such claim should not draw interest if interest would be allowable on a like claim against an individual.” Only five years later, this court in Wilcox v. Forth (1913), 154 Wis. 422 , 143 N. W. 165 , came to what appears to be the opposite conclusion to that arrived at in the Appleton Case, although it cited that case as authority.

1969If the question is an open one in this state at all, no good reason is apparent why, after a claim is properly presented to a municipal corporation and payment is duly demanded, such claim should not draw interest if interest would be allowable on a like claim against an individual.” Only five years later, this court in Wilcox v. Forth (1913), 154 Wis. 422 , 143 N. W. 165 , came to what appears to be the opposite conclusion to that arrived at in the Appleton Case, although it cited that case as authority.

1952Quoting from 48 Harvard Law Review, 1299, the court says: “If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government,’ it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.” A similar case resulting in a similar conclusion is Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78 , 20 Atl. (2d) 455, where, in reliance upon .the advice of the administrator of the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act, the plaintiff bank had omitted to deduct from its employees’ wages their contri

1945Coyle v. Franklin State Bank, 213 Wis. 601 , 252 N. W. 361 .

1945Coyle v. Franklin State Bank, 213 Wis. 601 , 252 N. W. 361 .

1940Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 221 , 113 N. E. 727 ; Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 , 57 Atl. 114 ; *74 Walsh v. Walsh, 13 Ohio App. 315 .

1940Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 221 , 113 N. E. 727 ; Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 , 57 Atl. 114 ; *74 Walsh v. Walsh, 13 Ohio App. 315 .

1940Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 221 , 113 N. E. 727 ; Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 , 57 Atl. 114 ; *74 Walsh v. Walsh, 13 Ohio App. 315 .

1940Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 221 , 113 N. E. 727 ; Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 , 57 Atl. 114 ; *74 Walsh v. Walsh, 13 Ohio App. 315 .

1940Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 221 , 113 N. E. 727 ; Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 , 57 Atl. 114 ; *74 Walsh v. Walsh, 13 Ohio App. 315 .

1933R. 276, 106 Kan. 804 , 189 Pac. 926 , it was held under a like clause that default of payment of interest when due rendered a note due at the time of the default and a subsequent payment of interest and a part of the principal did not postpone the due date to the date of original maturity or a new default.

1933R. 276, 106 Kan. 804 , 189 Pac. 926 , it was held under a like clause that default of payment of interest when due rendered a note due at the time of the default and a subsequent payment of interest and a part of the principal did not postpone the due date to the date of original maturity or a new default.

1932A like instruction was approved in People v. Seeley, 139 Cal. 118 , 72 Pac. 834 , under a constitutional provision to the precise effect of ours.

1932A like instruction was approved in People v. Seeley, 139 Cal. 118 , 72 Pac. 834 , under a constitutional provision to the precise effect of ours.

1912In support of the like rule see Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 , and Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621 , 32 N. E. 626 , and the Patterson Case has been cited with approval in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 ; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; and other New York cases noted in Silvernail’s Citations.

1912In support of the like rule see Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 , and Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621 , 32 N. E. 626 , and the Patterson Case has been cited with approval in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 ; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; and other New York cases noted in Silvernail’s Citations.

1912Other cases bolding a like doctrine are Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356; Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336 ; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89 ; Board of Comm’rs v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603 ; Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J.

1912In support of the like rule see Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 , and Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621 , 32 N. E. 626 , and the Patterson Case has been cited with approval in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 ; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; and other New York cases noted in Silvernail’s Citations.

1912In support of the like rule see Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 , and Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621 , 32 N. E. 626 , and the Patterson Case has been cited with approval in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 ; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; and other New York cases noted in Silvernail’s Citations.

1912Other cases bolding a like doctrine are Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356; Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336 ; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89 ; Board of Comm’rs v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603 ; Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J.

1912It may be that accurate analysis would disclose that there is no substantial difference between the contract in Fanning v. Murphy, supra, and Jilson v. Gilbert, supra. But if that be so, we refuse to extend the rule of Fanning v. Murphy to cases like this and Jilson v. Gilbert.

1912In support of the like rule see Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 , and Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y. 621 , 32 N. E. 626 , and the Patterson Case has been cited with approval in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 ; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; and other New York cases noted in Silvernail’s Citations.

1912Other cases bolding a like doctrine are Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356; Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336 ; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89 ; Board of Comm’rs v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603 ; Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J.

1908The defendant claims error because of the refusal of the court to give the following requested instruction: “The plaintiff in this action is an interested party, and in considering the weight which should be given to his testimony you should consider the fact of such interest, and the t motive which he has to testify to such statement of facts as will be favorable to himself, and a like test should be applied to the evidence of any other interested witness.” This instruction seems to be in substantial compliance with the rule laid down by this court in Kavanaugh v. Wausau, 120 Wis. 611 , 98 N.

1908The defendant claims error because of the refusal of the court to give the following requested instruction: “The plaintiff in this action is an interested party, and in considering the weight which should be given to his testimony you should consider the fact of such interest, and the t motive which he has to testify to such statement of facts as will be favorable to himself, and a like test should be applied to the evidence of any other interested witness.” This instruction seems to be in substantial compliance with the rule laid down by this court in Kavanaugh v. Wausau, 120 Wis. 611 , 98 N.