like defense in Mississippi

2022Ford Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (¶11) (Miss. 2002)). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, . . . [including] waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. (quoting Moses H.

2022Ford Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (¶11) (Miss. 2002)). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, . . . [including] waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. (quoting Moses H.

2022Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 9 Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). ¶13.

2003Cone Memorial Hospital, supra, at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927 .

2009Under well-settled law, “possession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen.” Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss.2006) (citing Knox v. State, 805 So.2d 527, 531-32 (Miss.2002)); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, ... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.”).

2009Under well-settled law, "possession of a deceased's property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen." Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss.2006) (citing Knox v. State, 805 So.2d 527, 531-32 (Miss.2002)); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) ("Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and,... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.").

2016As we reiterated in Goff, 14 So.3d at 647 , “[P]ossession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen.” (Quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by O'Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390 (Miss. 2013); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and ... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.”).

2016As we reiterated in Goff, 14 So.3d at 647 , “[P]ossession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen.” (Quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by O'Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390 (Miss. 2013); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and ... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.”).

2016As we reiterated in Goff, 14 So.3d at 647 , “[P]ossession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen.” (Quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by O'Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390 (Miss. 2013); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and ... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.”).

2009Under well-settled law, “possession of a deceased’s property creates a reasonable inference that the property was stolen.” Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 312 (Miss.2006) (citing Knox v. State, 805 So.2d 527, 531-32 (Miss.2002)); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, ... that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery.”).

2005However, when the scope of an arbitration clause is in question, the court should construe the clause in favor of arbitration because the "FAA establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability." City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527-28 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Moses H.

2004However, when the scope of an arbitration clause is in question, the court should construe the clause in favor of arbitration because the “FAA establishes that, as a matter of 13 federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.” City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Moses H.

2003Cf. Howsam, 123 S.Ct. at 592 ("the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide `allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability'"); Necchi Sewing Mach.

2000Cf. Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 592 (“the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide ‘allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability’ ”); Necchi Sewing Mach.

2003Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir.1986)) (emphasis added); Taylor, 826 So.2d at 713 ("as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability") (quoting Moses H.

2000Co., 781 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added); Taylor, 826 So. 2d at 713 (“as a matter of 60 federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (quoting Moses H.

2003Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F.Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y.1966) (distinguishing waiver in terms of delay, which court may decide, from "failure to comply with procedural requirements of the arbitration clause," which arbitrator decides).

2000Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (distinguishing waiver in terms of delay, which court may decide, from “failure to comply with procedural requirements of the arbitration clause,” which arbitrator decides).

1991See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. at 979-80 , 231 S.W.2d at 821-22 ; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d at 545-47 ; see also, Simonich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 424-25 , 417 P.2d 139, 145 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers, § 32.4, Reporter’s Note 4(b) (Tent.

1991See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. at 979-80 , 231 S.W.2d at 821-22 ; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d at 545-47 ; see also, Simonich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 424-25 , 417 P.2d 139, 145 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers, § 32.4, Reporter’s Note 4(b) (Tent.

1991See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. at 979-80 , 231 S.W.2d at 821-22 ; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d at 545-47 ; see also, Simonich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 424-25 , 417 P.2d 139, 145 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers, § 32.4, Reporter’s Note 4(b) (Tent.

1991See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. at 979-80 , 231 S.W.2d at 821-22 ; Connor v. Temm, 270 S.W.2d at 545-47 ; see also, Simonich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 424-25 , 417 P.2d 139, 145 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers, § 32.4, Reporter’s Note 4(b) (Tent.

2023Mallory Cmty. Health Ctr., 189 So. 3d at 713-14 (¶20) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, and other emphasis omitted).11 Based on Howsam, we reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case to the circuit court to compel arbitration. ¶42.

2008Rule 9.04(I) follows the procedure set forth in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 23 (Miss.1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring), and states as follows in pertinent part: If at any time prior to trial it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

1989Byrd v. McGill, 478 So.2d 302, 305 (Miss. 1985).

1989Byrd v. McGill, 478 So.2d 302 , 305 (Miss. 1985).

1966In Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 265-266 , 165 So.2d 345, 351 (1964) this Court, in considering a like instruction relating to a defendant's interest, quoted with approval the language found in Buckley v. State, 62 Miss. 705 (1885) as follows: "A defendant has the right to submit his testimony to the jury to be judged by it, uninfluenced by any suggestions of its probable falsity or an authorization to the jury to throw it aside as unworthy of belief because of the strong temptation to the defendant to swear falsely.

1966In Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 265-266 , 165 So.2d 345, 351 (1964) this Court, in considering a like instruction relating to a defendant's interest, quoted with approval the language found in Buckley v. State, 62 Miss. 705 (1885) as follows: "A defendant has the right to submit his testimony to the jury to be judged by it, uninfluenced by any suggestions of its probable falsity or an authorization to the jury to throw it aside as unworthy of belief because of the strong temptation to the defendant to swear falsely.