like violation in Massachusetts

2005For that reason, where a contract contains an arbitration clause, “there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Local No. 1710, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 421 (1999) (citation omitted); see Carpenter v. Pomerantz, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 627, 633 (1994) (generally, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved

2003Generally, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Carpenter v. Pomerantz, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 627, 633 (1994), quoting Moses H.

2025Just as whether a statute treats certain conduct as a felony or misdemeanor is "not necessarily determinative" of what constitutes a like violation, see Becker, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 86 , so too, differences in postconviction collateral 5 Under the New York Sex Offender Registration Act as in effect at the time of Doe's sentencing, a person convicted of forcible touching, N.Y.

2013See Commonwealth v. Becker, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-89 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 933 (2008). (i) “Like violation.” In this Commonwealth, a “sex offender” includes any resident who has been convicted of a “sex offense,” which is defined as either a violation of a Massachusetts statute enumerated in the sex offender registry law, or “a like violation of the laws of another state.” G.

2015Id. at 84 .

2014More recently, the Supreme Court moved the line drawn in First Options by deciding that under federal law “the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide ‘allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ ” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002), quoting Moses H.

2025See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 776 (2006) ("procedural safeguards entitling most offenders to a hearing and a determination as to whether registration is required satisfy procedural due process").

2023An illegal sentence is one that is "in some way contrary to the applicable statute." See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 505 (2014), quoting Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2008). 42 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), which governs sentencing for a conviction of OUI, second offense, provides: "If the defendant has been previously convicted . . . by a court of the Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction because of a like violation preceding the date of the commission of the offense for which [the defendant] has been convi

2023An illegal sentence is one that is "in some way contrary to the applicable statute." See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 505 (2014), quoting Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2008). 42 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), which governs sentencing for a conviction of OUI, second offense, provides: "If the defendant has been previously convicted . . . by a court of the Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction because of a like violation preceding the date of the commission of the offense for which [the defendant] has been convi

2020See also State Bd. of Ret. v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 179-80 (2006) (holding that federal convictions could trigger G.L. c. 32, § 15(4), which does not enumerate any specific crimes, but requires public -13- employees to forfeit pension "after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position").

2015The judge found that the plaintiff’s conviction under art. 134, a “non-specific” provision of the code, could not be a like violation under the elements-based test required by Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564). 6 For the reasons *558 explained below, we conclude that the judge’s ruling was erroneous.

2013Courts must follow unambiguous statutory language “unless ‘following the Legislature’s literal command would lead to an absurd result, or one contrary to the Legislature’s manifest intention.’ ” Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009), quoting from White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 253 (1998).

2013Courts must follow unambiguous statutory language “unless ‘following the Legislature’s literal command would lead to an absurd result, or one contrary to the Legislature’s manifest intention.’ ” Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009), quoting from White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 253 (1998).

2008See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 424 (2001).

2006“Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.” PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1996).

2005For that reason, where a contract contains an arbitration clause, “there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Local No. 1710, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417, 421 (1999) (citation omitted); see Carpenter v. Pomerantz, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 627, 633 (1994) (generally, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved

1999“When an ambiguity exists in the language of a criminal statute, we construe the statute strictly and resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Lupo, 394 Mass. 644, 649 (1985).

1998Nevertheless, the FAA does not contain any express preemptive provision, “nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989). “[T]he federal courts’ jurisdiction to enforce the Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the [Sjtate courts.” Moses H.

1995Justice Sea lia in his dissent in Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting), states that the double jeopardy clause merely prohibits multiple prosecutions and not multiple punishments.

1995L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (2) (1994 ed.), which provides: “Where the license or the right to operate of a person has been revoked under paragraph (b) and such person has been previously convicted of or assigned to an alcohol or controlled substance education, treatment or rehabilitation program by a court of the commonwealth or any other jurisdiction because of a like violation within a period of ten years preceding the date of the commission of the offense for which such person has been convicted, the registrar shall not restore the license or reinstate the right to operate of such person unless