like rule in Nebraska

2000There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 395 U.S. at 762-63 .

1966In Schroll v. City of Beatrice, 169 Neb. 162 , 98 N. W. 2d 790 , in construing these statutes, we said: “It is a familiar rule that a legislative act is limited in its scope and operation by its title, and a like rule is applicable to a law adopted by the initiative method.” We quote the title to the act as far as pertinent here: “An Act relating to cities, villages, and public electric light and power districts engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution, purchase and/or sale of electrical energy for lighting, heating and power purposes; to provide for the extension, by any city, vi

1966In Schroll v. City of Beatrice, 169 Neb. 162 , 98 N. W. 2d 790 , in construing these statutes, we said: “It is a familiar rule that a legislative act is limited in its scope and operation by its title, and a like rule is applicable to a law adopted by the initiative method.” We quote the title to the act as far as pertinent here: “An Act relating to cities, villages, and public electric light and power districts engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution, purchase and/or sale of electrical energy for lighting, heating and power purposes; to provide for the extension, by any city, vi

1956In disposing of such contention, that court cited Phalen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 8 How. 163 , 12 L.

1956In disposing of such contention, that court cited Phalen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 8 How. 163 , 12 L.

1949Therein, after citing and quoting from Frye v. United States, supra, it was said: “We are not satisfied that this instrument, during the ten years that have elapsed since the decision in the Frye Case, has progressed from the experimental to the demonstrable stage. * * * While it may have some utility at present and may ultimately "be of great value in the administration of justice, it must.not be overlooked that a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of its development may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed to have.” In People v. Fo

1949Therein, after citing and quoting from Frye v. United States, supra, it was said: “We are not satisfied that this instrument, during the ten years that have elapsed since the decision in the Frye Case, has progressed from the experimental to the demonstrable stage. * * * While it may have some utility at present and may ultimately "be of great value in the administration of justice, it must.not be overlooked that a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of its development may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed to have.” In People v. Fo

1949Therein, after citing and quoting from Frye v. United States, supra, it was said: “We are not satisfied that this instrument, during the ten years that have elapsed since the decision in the Frye Case, has progressed from the experimental to the demonstrable stage. * * * While it may have some utility at present and may ultimately "be of great value in the administration of justice, it must.not be overlooked that a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of its development may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed to have.” In People v. Fo

1948S. Supp., 1947, which provides in part: “No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle, * * * sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act.” The plaintiff in Mock v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305 , 62 N. E. 2d 172 , a replevin action to recover a stolen automobile, made a like claim.

1948S. Supp., 1947, which provides in part: “No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle, * * * sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act.” The plaintiff in Mock v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305 , 62 N. E. 2d 172 , a replevin action to recover a stolen automobile, made a like claim.

1947In Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88 , 15 N. W. 2d 323 , this court, independent of statute, said: “If a prosecution is based upon the correctness or incorrectness of certain records, such as is ofttimes the case in a prosecution for embezzlement, the examination of such records by the defendant should be granted.” This rule is reasonable but discretionary and should be enforced when the ends of justice require it.

1947In Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88 , 15 N. W. 2d 323 , this court, independent of statute, said: “If a prosecution is based upon the correctness or incorrectness of certain records, such as is ofttimes the case in a prosecution for embezzlement, the examination of such records by the defendant should be granted.” This rule is reasonable but discretionary and should be enforced when the ends of justice require it.

1946In Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 91 Neb. 93 , 135 N. W. 429 , in the following language, a like rule was declared as to mortgages: “A prior unrecorded mortgage on real estate, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence of a title derived by virtue of a sale under attachment or execution, if such mortgage is placed on record before the sheriff’s deed based upon such proceedings is recorded.” The rules stated in Harral v. Gray, supra, and Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, supra, were approved in Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639 , 204 N. W. 398 .

1946In Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 91 Neb. 93 , 135 N. W. 429 , in the following language, a like rule was declared as to mortgages: “A prior unrecorded mortgage on real estate, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence of a title derived by virtue of a sale under attachment or execution, if such mortgage is placed on record before the sheriff’s deed based upon such proceedings is recorded.” The rules stated in Harral v. Gray, supra, and Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, supra, were approved in Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639 , 204 N. W. 398 .

1946In Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 91 Neb. 93 , 135 N. W. 429 , in the following language, a like rule was declared as to mortgages: “A prior unrecorded mortgage on real estate, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence of a title derived by virtue of a sale under attachment or execution, if such mortgage is placed on record before the sheriff’s deed based upon such proceedings is recorded.” The rules stated in Harral v. Gray, supra, and Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, supra, were approved in Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639 , 204 N. W. 398 .

1946In Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 91 Neb. 93 , 135 N. W. 429 , in the following language, a like rule was declared as to mortgages: “A prior unrecorded mortgage on real estate, made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, will take precedence of a title derived by virtue of a sale under attachment or execution, if such mortgage is placed on record before the sheriff’s deed based upon such proceedings is recorded.” The rules stated in Harral v. Gray, supra, and Minor Lumber Co. v. Thompson, supra, were approved in Stocker v. Church, 113 Neb. 639 , 204 N. W. 398 .

1937Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279 ; Andrews Bros.

1929The rule in New York follows: “A law imposing an assessment for a local improvement without notice to, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be-heard, on the part of the owner of the property to be-assessed, has the effect to deprive him of his property without ‘due process of law,’ and is unconstitutional. * * *• So, also, it is immaterial that the assessment has been infant fairly apportioned, the constitutional validity of the-act is to be tested, not by what has been, but by what maybe done under it.” Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 .

1926Cas. 991, the rule is stated in this language: “Where the facts and equities call for it, a chancellor is required to give relief by injunction; but such injunction should never go beyond the requirements-of the particular case; and under no circumstances should a decree be entered the apparent practical effect of which will be to close an industrial plant, if it is possible to frame another form of decree which will give such relief as the plaintiff is entitled to.” A like rule is announced in Faucher v. Grass, 60 Ia. 505 , and in Lorenzi v. Star Market Co., 19 Idaho 674 .

1926Cas. 991, the rule is stated in this language: “Where the facts and equities call for it, a chancellor is required to give relief by injunction; but such injunction should never go beyond the requirements-of the particular case; and under no circumstances should a decree be entered the apparent practical effect of which will be to close an industrial plant, if it is possible to frame another form of decree which will give such relief as the plaintiff is entitled to.” A like rule is announced in Faucher v. Grass, 60 Ia. 505 , and in Lorenzi v. Star Market Co., 19 Idaho 674 .

1924In Mann v. Independent School District, 52 Ia. 130 , with reference to a like claim, Day, J., remarked: “The position of plaintiff seems to be that, notwithstanding the written contract for two months, the plaintiff may show that there was a parol contract for eight months.

1922In Peterson v. State, 84 Neb. 76 , in which case the judgment was reversed for prejudicial error in another respect, it was said that such an instruction gave undue prominence to the fact that defendant’s interest might induce him to testify falsely, and the instruction, with others, was criticised, but the court said: “We are not inclined to reverse the case because of such errors alone.” The court seems to have based its strictures upon the instruction in the case of Burk v. State, 79 Neb. 241 , but it is pointed out in that case that the statement criticised was referred to in three instruc

1922In Peterson v. State, 84 Neb. 76 , in which case the judgment was reversed for prejudicial error in another respect, it was said that such an instruction gave undue prominence to the fact that defendant’s interest might induce him to testify falsely, and the instruction, with others, was criticised, but the court said: “We are not inclined to reverse the case because of such errors alone.” The court seems to have based its strictures upon the instruction in the case of Burk v. State, 79 Neb. 241 , but it is pointed out in that case that the statement criticised was referred to in three instruc

1913A like instruction was given by the court in Nightingale v. State, 62 Neb. 371 , Avhere it was said: “This instruction, we think, is not subject to any just criticism.” There was evidence in the instant case tending to shoAV an alibi, and the court properly put the question before the jury by the instruction complained of.

1909The court, speaking by Nobval, J., said: “While parol testimony cannot be received to contradict the terms of the note, it was clearly admissible to show the true consideration for which it was given.” A like principle was announced by Maxwell, J., in the early case of Collingwood v. Merchants Bank, 15 Neb. 118 .

1909To the same effect are the following: Cortelyou, Ege & Vanzandt v. Hiatt, 36 Neb. 584 ; Norman v. Waite, 30 Neb. 302 .

1909To the same effect are the following: Cortelyou, Ege & Vanzandt v. Hiatt, 36 Neb. 584 ; Norman v. Waite, 30 Neb. 302 .

1909The following cases announce a like principle: State v. Higby, 60 Neb. 765 ; Swift & Co. v. Koutsky, 73 Neb. 730 ; Fauber v. Keim, ante, p. 167.

1909The following cases announce a like principle: State v. Higby, 60 Neb. 765 ; Swift & Co. v. Koutsky, 73 Neb. 730 ; Fauber v. Keim, ante, p. 167.

1908In Gandy v. Jolly, 35 Neb. 711 , it is held: “If there is any irregularity in the manner of service on the defendant of valid process, he must take advantage of such irregularity by motion or other proceeding in the court where the action is pending.” But in that case, and in other cases holding to a like doctrine, it appears that there was an attempt at service which reached the defendant.

1908It is true Ave condemned a like instruction in Blair v. State, 72 Neb. 368; not because the instruction aauis incorrect as a proposition of laAv, but because there Avas no evidence in that case upon Avhich to predicate it.

1905Co. v. Village of Ogalalla, supra, in disposing of a like claim, Mr. Justice Post said: “If a contract is invalid when made, because in violation of some mandatory requirement of statute, it will be deemed ultra vires, and can be ratified only upon the conditions essential to a valid agreement in the first instance,” citing a long list of cases in support of his position.

1897Co., 50 Ia., 680 .) A like doctrine has been announced in Illinois, without statutory provision.

1893They cannot hold such officers and agents liable upon the ■contracts between them and the city.” The case of Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 46 Conn., 24 , was upon a like claim for damages with that above considered, and Park, Ch.

1881In the latter ease, a like principle was imputed to a decision of this court in Stafford v. Low, 16 Johns., 67 .