44 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentinagreen2 sentences2023Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (emphasis added); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34- 35 (2014) (explaining that courts presume that parties intend for arbitrators, not courts, to decide “procedural matters includ[ing] waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations omitted); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (recognizing the presumption that “the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); Lumbermens Mut. 2016See, e.g., BG Group, PLC v. Rep. of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207 (2014) (holding that courts presume—even in the absence of a delegation clause—that arbitrators should resolve disputes about procedural preconditions for arbitration, including waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability). 4 Neff has also argued that it is unconscionable to require the arbitration to take place in California. | 2 | 2 |
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.green1 sentence2023Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (emphasis added); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34- 35 (2014) (explaining that courts presume that parties intend for arbitrators, not courts, to decide “procedural matters includ[ing] waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations omitted); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (recognizing the presumption that “the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); Lumbermens Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.green1 sentence2023Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (emphasis added); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 , 34- 35 (2014) (explaining that courts presume that parties intend for arbitrators, not courts, to decide “procedural matters includ[ing] waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations omitted); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (recognizing the presumption that “the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); Lumbermens Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Kunz v. Watermangreen2 sentences1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 . 1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Webber v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1900Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 , 26 L. 1900Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 , 26 L. | 2 | 1888–1900 |
State ex rel. Coogan v. Barbour
green
2 sentences1889Thus, it was said in State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 , that “Appointments to office, by whomsoever made, are intrinsically executive acts.” But if we wei’e to accept this doctrine as correct, and give it full application, then it would completely destroy the claim of the defendants, for if the right to appoint can never be anything else than an executive act, the attempt of the Legislature to appoint the claimants was utterly abortive. 1889Thus, it was said in State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 , that ‘Appointments to office, by whomsoever made, are intrinsically executive acts.’ But if we were to accept this doctrine as correct, and give it full application, then it would completely destroy the claim of the defendants, for if the right to appoint can never be anything else than an executive act, the attempt of the Legislature to appoint the claimants was utterly abortive. | 2 | 1889–1889 |
Priest v. Wheelock
neutral
2 sentences1881Priest v. Wheelock, 58 Ill. 114 . 1881Illinois has adopted and enforced a like doctrine— Priest v. Wheelock, 58 Ill. 114 . | 2 | 1881–1881 |
Welty Building Company, LTD. and Ohio Farmers Insurance Company v. Indy Fedreau Company, LLC
green
1 sentence2013“The United States Supreme Court has stated, in light of this policy, that ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitra-bility.’ ” Id. (quoting Moses H. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
McCarter v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Co. (1976), 55 A.D.2d 695 , 388 N.Y.S.2d 732 . 1989Co. (1976), 55 A.D.2d 695 , 388 N.Y.S.2d 732 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Perez v. United States Steel Corp.
green
1 sentence1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek
green
1 sentence1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Rokvic v. State
green
2 sentences1951Rokvic v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 450 , 143 N. E. 357 . 1951Rokvic v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 450 , 143 N. E. 357 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Lehr v. State
neutral
2 sentences1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism. 1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Landreth v. State
neutral
2 sentences1941The last pronouncement on the subject is found in Landreth v. State (1930), 201 Ind. 691 , 171 N. E. 192 , 72 A. L. 1941The last pronouncement on the subject is found in Landreth v. State (1930), 201 Ind. 691 , 171 N. E. 192 , 72 A. L. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Wolf v. State
neutral
2 sentences1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism. 1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Nelson v. Cottingham
green
1 sentence1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Biddle v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou 1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Claflin & Co. v. Continental Jersey Works
green
2 sentences1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut. 1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Richmond Trading & Manufacturing Co. v. Farquar
neutral
1 sentence1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Doremus v. Root
green
2 sentences1916Ed. 919 , it was said: “It would seem on general principles that if the party who actually causes the injury is free from all civil and criminal liability therefor, his employer must also be entitled to a like immunity.” In Doremus v. Root (1901), 23 Wash. 710 , 63 Pac. 572 , 54 L. 1916Ed. 919 , it was said: “It would seem on general principles that if the party who actually causes the injury is free from all civil and criminal liability therefor, his employer must also be entitled to a like immunity.” In Doremus v. Root (1901), 23 Wash. 710 , 63 Pac. 572 , 54 L. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Pomeroy
green
2 sentences1916Co. v. Pomeroy (1887), 67 Tex. 498 , 3 S. W. 722 , to the effect that if when the road was being built extraordinary inundations had occurred within the memory of men then living, their reoccurrence should be anticipated, and provision made against the danger likely to result therefrom, should a reoccurrence of the flood take place. 1916Co. v. Pomeroy (1887), 67 Tex. 498 , 3 S. W. 722 , to the effect that if when the road was being built extraordinary inundations had occurred within the memory of men then living, their reoccurrence should be anticipated, and provision made against the danger likely to result therefrom, should a reoccurrence of the flood take place. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Summers v. Tarney
green
2 sentences1916Whatever confusion exists respecting the question under consideration, and whatever false impression has gained lodgment, possibly grow out of certain language used in Summers v. Tarney (1890), 123 Ind. 560 , 24 N. E. 678 where the interrogatories were delivered to the jury sealed, and with a like instruction as in the Gretzinger case. 1916Whatever confusion exists respecting the question under consideration, and whatever false impression has gained lodgment, possibly grow out of certain language used in Summers v. Tarney (1890), 123 Ind. 560 , 24 N. E. 678 where the interrogatories were delivered to the jury sealed, and with a like instruction as in the Gretzinger case. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Barker v. Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1914Co. (1913), 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 , 43 L. 1914Co. (1913), 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 , 43 L. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. O'Conner
green
1 sentence1910Co. v. O’Conner (1909), 171 Ind. 686 , and as to that point, the cases of American Strawboard Co. v. Foust, supra, and Pittsburgh, etc., R. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
American Strawboard Co. v. Foust
neutral
1 sentence1910Co. v. O’Conner (1909), 171 Ind. 686 , and as to that point, the cases of American Strawboard Co. v. Foust, supra, and Pittsburgh, etc., R. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Ray v. West. Penna. N. Gas Co.
green
1 sentence1904Ray v. Western, etc., Gas Co. (1891), 138 Pa. St. 576, 20 Atl. 1065 , 21 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Winters v. Winters
green
2 sentences1904The same view was taken by the supreme court of Iowa in Winters v. Winters (1897), 102 Iowa 53 , 71 N. W. 184 , 63 Am. 1904The same view was taken by the supreme court of Iowa in Winters v. Winters (1897), 102 Iowa 53 , 71 N. W. 184 , 63 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Stephens v. Stephens
neutral
1 sentence1898Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 . | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Indiana Car Co. v. Parker
green
1 sentence1896Had such duty been carelessly and negligently performed, even by a competent inspector, the master would still be liable.” The like rule was maintained in the Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 , where the subject of inspection by the employer is very fully treated, and the authorities are cited and discussed, and the court concludes that, “The rule is supported by sound principle.” The petition is overruled. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| M'kee v. . the People neutral | 1 | 1890–1890 |
| People v. Dennis green | 1 | 1890–1890 |
People v. Bumberger
neutral
1 sentence1890People v. Bumberger, 45 Cal. 650 ; People v. Dennis, 39 Cal. 625 ; Sellick’s Case, 1 City Hall Rec. 185; McKee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113 . | 1 | 1890–1890 |
| Stephens v. Cady green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Stevens v. Gladding green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Patterson v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Ensign v. Harney neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Cook v. Bean neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Mather v. Scoles green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Smith v. Turner green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Sowle v. Holdridge neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Overly v. Tipton neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Bailey v. Sanger green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Hochstedler v. Hochstedler neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| United States v. Perez green | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.