like doctrine in Indiana

1900Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 , 26 L.

1900Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 , 26 L.

1889Thus, it was said in State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 , that “Appointments to office, by whomsoever made, are intrinsically executive acts.” But if we wei’e to accept this doctrine as correct, and give it full application, then it would completely destroy the claim of the defendants, for if the right to appoint can never be anything else than an executive act, the attempt of the Legislature to appoint the claimants was utterly abortive.

1889Thus, it was said in State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76 , that ‘Appointments to office, by whomsoever made, are intrinsically executive acts.’ But if we were to accept this doctrine as correct, and give it full application, then it would completely destroy the claim of the defendants, for if the right to appoint can never be anything else than an executive act, the attempt of the Legislature to appoint the claimants was utterly abortive.

1881Priest v. Wheelock, 58 Ill. 114 .

1881Illinois has adopted and enforced a like doctrine— Priest v. Wheelock, 58 Ill. 114 .

2013“The United States Supreme Court has stated, in light of this policy, that ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitra-bility.’ ” Id. (quoting Moses H.

1989Co. (1976), 55 A.D.2d 695 , 388 N.Y.S.2d 732 .

1989Co. (1976), 55 A.D.2d 695 , 388 N.Y.S.2d 732 .

1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 .

1982Perez v. United States Steel Corp., (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 ; see also, Kunz v. Waterman, (1972) 258 Ind. 573 , 283 N.E.2d 371 ; Whispering Pines Home for Senior Citizens v. Nicalek, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 324 .

1951Rokvic v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 450 , 143 N. E. 357 .

1951Rokvic v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 450 , 143 N. E. 357 .

1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism.

1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism.

1941The last pronouncement on the subject is found in Landreth v. State (1930), 201 Ind. 691 , 171 N. E. 192 , 72 A. L.

1941The last pronouncement on the subject is found in Landreth v. State (1930), 201 Ind. 691 , 171 N. E. 192 , 72 A. L.

1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism.

1941The instruction was again condemned in Wolf v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 261 , 151 N. E. 731 , but the giving of it was held to be harmless, in view of the fact that the instructions taken as a whole were more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to have them; and in Lehr v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 280 , 157 N. E. 98 , the court cited the Hubbard case, supra, and held that no question was presented as to a like instruction, although the court said that the use of the word weigh instead of consider therein was subject to criticism.

1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou

1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou

1922Our statute says that no judgment shall be reversed ‘where it shall appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined in the court below.’ ” And in Nelson v. Cottingham (1899), 152 Ind. 135 , 53 N. E. 702 , it is said: “If a judgment is rendered in accordance with the special finding, but contrary to the conclusions of law, they being erroneous, the action of the court would render harmless the error in the conclusions of law, and would furnish no grounds for reversal, since the ultimate judgment would be correct upon the facts found.” A like rule was annou

1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut.

1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut.

1920Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §104; 1 Thompson, Trials §1370; Claflin v. Continental Works (1890), 85 Ga. 27 , 11 S. E. 721 ; Richmond, etc., Co. v. Farquar (1846), 8 Blackf. 89 ; Michigan Mut.

1920The Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Williams v. Preferred, etc., Assn. (1893), 91 Ga. 698 , 17 S. E. 982 , had under consideration a like clause in a policy of accident insurance, and the court there said: “It was contended that the word ‘immediately,’ as used in the policy now under consideration, did not mean immediately in point of time, but immediately in point of causation.

1920The Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Williams v. Preferred, etc., Assn. (1893), 91 Ga. 698 , 17 S. E. 982 , had under consideration a like clause in a policy of accident insurance, and the court there said: “It was contended that the word ‘immediately,’ as used in the policy now under consideration, did not mean immediately in point of time, but immediately in point of causation.

1920Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 329 , 64 N. W. 1039 , the court had under consideration a like clause in a policy of insurance.

1920Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 329 , 64 N. W. 1039 , the court had under consideration a like clause in a policy of insurance.

1916Co. v. Pomeroy (1887), 67 Tex. 498 , 3 S. W. 722 , to the effect that if when the road was being built extraordinary inundations had occurred within the memory of men then living, their reoccurrence should be anticipated, and provision made against the danger likely to result therefrom, should a reoccurrence of the flood take place.

1916Co. v. Pomeroy (1887), 67 Tex. 498 , 3 S. W. 722 , to the effect that if when the road was being built extraordinary inundations had occurred within the memory of men then living, their reoccurrence should be anticipated, and provision made against the danger likely to result therefrom, should a reoccurrence of the flood take place.

1916Whatever confusion exists respecting the question under consideration, and whatever false impression has gained lodgment, possibly grow out of certain language used in Summers v. Tarney (1890), 123 Ind. 560 , 24 N. E. 678 where the interrogatories were delivered to the jury sealed, and with a like instruction as in the Gretzinger case.

1916Whatever confusion exists respecting the question under consideration, and whatever false impression has gained lodgment, possibly grow out of certain language used in Summers v. Tarney (1890), 123 Ind. 560 , 24 N. E. 678 where the interrogatories were delivered to the jury sealed, and with a like instruction as in the Gretzinger case.

1916Ed. 919 , it was said: “It would seem on general principles that if the party who actually causes the injury is free from all civil and criminal liability therefor, his employer must also be entitled to a like immunity.” In Doremus v. Root (1901), 23 Wash. 710 , 63 Pac. 572 , 54 L.

1916Ed. 919 , it was said: “It would seem on general principles that if the party who actually causes the injury is free from all civil and criminal liability therefor, his employer must also be entitled to a like immunity.” In Doremus v. Root (1901), 23 Wash. 710 , 63 Pac. 572 , 54 L.

1914Co. (1913), 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 , 43 L.

1914Co. (1913), 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 , 43 L.

1910Co. v. O’Conner (1909), 171 Ind. 686 , and as to that point, the cases of American Strawboard Co. v. Foust, supra, and Pittsburgh, etc., R.

1910Co. v. O’Conner (1909), 171 Ind. 686 , and as to that point, the cases of American Strawboard Co. v. Foust, supra, and Pittsburgh, etc., R.

1904The same view was taken by the supreme court of Iowa in Winters v. Winters (1897), 102 Iowa 53 , 71 N. W. 184 , 63 Am.

1904The same view was taken by the supreme court of Iowa in Winters v. Winters (1897), 102 Iowa 53 , 71 N. W. 184 , 63 Am.

1904Ray v. Western, etc., Gas Co. (1891), 138 Pa. St. 576, 20 Atl. 1065 , 21 Am.

1898Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 .