like rule in New York

2024Defendant here does not argue that it suffered any prejudice as a result of claimant serving the claim three days beyond the court-imposed deadline. [FN2] However, notwithstanding the general availability of relief from court-imposed deadlines, the Court cannot extend the time to file and serve a late claim beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to a like claim against a citizen of the state under the provisions of CPLR article 2 ( see CCA § 10 [6]; Canales , 51 Misc 3d at 651 , citing Miles v City Univ. of NY , 126 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2015], Roberts v City Univ. of NY ,

2013The Second Department reversed in both cases, holding that “[o]nce the applicable limitations period expired . . . , the court was without authority either to entertain a subsequent motion to extend the time to file a late claim, or, sua sponte, to grant such relief’ (Roberts, 41 AD3d at 826 ; see also Crum & Foster, 25 AD3d at 644 [“a motion for leave to serve a late claim may not be entertained after the statute of limitations for a like claim against a citizen of the state has expired” (internal quotation marks omitted)]).

1914The principle which these decisions have established is that a person coming into such an unfamiliar situation, where a condition of darkness renders the use of his eyesight ineffective to define his surroundings, is not justified, in the absence of any special stress of circumstances, in proceeding further without first finding out where he is going and what may be the obstruction to his safe progress.” In Kenney v. Rhinelander, 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 , and in Brown v. Wittner, 43 App. Div. 135 , the First Department held that it was not contributory negligence, as a matter o

1909In Kenney v. Rhinelander ( 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 ) and in Brown v. Wittner ( 43 App. Div. 135 ), the First Department held that it was nqt cqntrfbutory negligence, as a matter of law, for a ■plaintiff to use stairways and halls of a semi-public character in the absence of a light, even where they knew of defects in the carpets or mattings; :and a like doctrine was held by this court in Lee v. Ingraham ( 106 App. Div. 167 ), Mr. Justice Bartlett writing.

1914The principle which these decisions have established is that a person coming into such an unfamiliar situation, where a condition of darkness renders the use of his eyesight ineffective to define his surroundings, is not justified, in the absence of any special stress of circumstances, in proceeding further without first finding out where he is going and what may be the obstruction to his safe progress.” In Kenney v. Rhinelander, 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 , and in Brown v. Wittner, 43 App. Div. 135 , the First Department held that it was not contributory negligence, as a matter o

1909In Kenney v. Rhinelander ( 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 ) and in Brown v. Wittner ( 43 App. Div. 135 ), the First Department held that it was nqt cqntrfbutory negligence, as a matter of law, for a ■plaintiff to use stairways and halls of a semi-public character in the absence of a light, even where they knew of defects in the carpets or mattings; :and a like doctrine was held by this court in Lee v. Ingraham ( 106 App. Div. 167 ), Mr. Justice Bartlett writing.

1914The principle which these decisions have established is that a person coming into such an unfamiliar situation, where a condition of darkness renders the use of his eyesight ineffective to define his surroundings, is not justified, in the absence of any special stress of circumstances, in proceeding further without first finding out where he is going and what may be the obstruction to his safe progress.” In Kenney v. Rhinelander, 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 , and in Brown v. Wittner, 43 App. Div. 135 , the First Department held that it was not contributory negligence, as a matter o

1909In Kenney v. Rhinelander ( 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 ) and in Brown v. Wittner ( 43 App. Div. 135 ), the First Department held that it was nqt cqntrfbutory negligence, as a matter of law, for a ■plaintiff to use stairways and halls of a semi-public character in the absence of a light, even where they knew of defects in the carpets or mattings; :and a like doctrine was held by this court in Lee v. Ingraham ( 106 App. Div. 167 ), Mr. Justice Bartlett writing.

1914The principle which these decisions have established is that a person coming into such an unfamiliar situation, where a condition of darkness renders the use of his eyesight ineffective to define his surroundings, is not justified, in the absence of any special stress of circumstances, in proceeding further without first finding out where he is going and what may be the obstruction to his safe progress.” In Kenney v. Rhinelander, 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 , and in Brown v. Wittner, 43 App. Div. 135 , the First Department held that it was not contributory negligence, as a matter o

1909In Kenney v. Rhinelander ( 28 App. Div. 246 ; affd., 163 N. Y. 576 ) and in Brown v. Wittner ( 43 App. Div. 135 ), the First Department held that it was nqt cqntrfbutory negligence, as a matter of law, for a ■plaintiff to use stairways and halls of a semi-public character in the absence of a light, even where they knew of defects in the carpets or mattings; :and a like doctrine was held by this court in Lee v. Ingraham ( 106 App. Div. 167 ), Mr. Justice Bartlett writing.

1914This appears to have been the construction put upon a like exception in the case of Collins v. McArthur, 32 Misc.

1903This appears to have been the construction put upon a like exception in the case of Collins v. McArthur, 32 Misc.

1898This operated as an acceptance.” The like doctrine is asserted in the case of Wiles v. Provost, 6 App. Div. 1 , 39 N. Y.

1898This operated as an acceptance.” The like doctrine is asserted in the case of Wiles v. Provost, 6 App. Div. 1 , 39 N. Y.

1898This operated as an acceptance.” The like doctrine is asserted in the case of Wiles v. Provost ( 6 App. Div. 1 ), where the court say that “ The vendee is entitled to a reasonable time for examination, but if. he intends to reject the article furnished as not in compliance with the contract, he must not, after such examination and after discovering its true condition, do anything inconsistent with the vendor’s ownership.” “ He would,” say the court in the case of Brown v. Foster ( 108 N. Y. 387 ), “ in such a case as the present, be entitled to a reasonable time for examination; long enough to

1898Supp. 461 , where the court say that: “The vendee is entitled to a reasonable time for examination, but, if he intends to reject the article furnished as not in compliance with the contract, he must not, after such examination, and after discovering its true condition, do anything inconsistent with the vendor’s ownership.” “He would,” say the court in the case of Brown v. Foster, 108 N. Y. 387 , 15 N. E. 608 , “in such a case as the present, be entitled to a reasonable time for examination,—long enough to put the machinery in motion, and see it operate,—and he might for that purpose do with it

1896The defendants argue that in no event would the village have been liable to the plaintiff. “ Municipal corporations, engaged in the performance of works of a public nature authorized by law, are not liable for consequential damages occasioned thereby to others, where private property is not directly encroached upon, unless such damages are caused by misconduct, negligence or unskillfulness.” (Atwater v. Trustees, etc., 124 N. Y. 602 .) A like principle was applied in Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co. ( 134 N. Y. 156 ), and Booth v. R., W. & O.

1896A like principle was applied in Benner v. Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156 , 31 N. E. 328 , and Booth v. Railroad Co., 140 N. Y. 267 , 35 N. E. 592 .

1896(Donnelly v. City of Brooklyn, 121 N. Y. 9 ; Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 id. 296; S. C., 94 id. 645; Baldwin v. City of Oswego, 1 Abb.

1896Donnelly v. City of Brooklyn, 121 N. Y. 9 , 24 N. E. 17 ; Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296 , 1 N. E. 777 ; Id., 94 N. Y. 645 ; Baldwin v. City of Oswego, 1 Abb.

1896As was said by Judge Strong in Huttemeier v. Albro (supra): “ If the alley was to be abandoned and no longer exist, it would hardly be made a part of the description of the land, to aid in identifying it, not merely at the time of giving the deed but in future.” A like rule is adopted in Michigan.

1896As we said by Judge Strong in Huttemeier v. Albro, supra : “ If the alley was to be abandoned, and no longer exist, it would hardly be made a part of the description of the land, to aid in identifying it, not merely at the time of giving the deed, but in the future.” A like rule is adopted in Michigan.

1896(Smith v. Lock, 18 Mich. 56 .) This rulo is in harmony with that laid down. by Mr. Justice Storey in United States v. Appleton ( 1 Sumn. 492 ), that every grant of a .thing necessarily imparts a grant of it as it actually exists unless it be otherwise provided.

1896Smith v. Lock, 18 Mich. 56 .

2024Defendant here does not argue that it suffered any prejudice as a result of claimant serving the claim three days beyond the court-imposed deadline. [FN2] However, notwithstanding the general availability of relief from court-imposed deadlines, the Court cannot extend the time to file and serve a late claim beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to a like claim against a citizen of the state under the provisions of CPLR article 2 ( see CCA § 10 [6]; Canales , 51 Misc 3d at 651 , citing Miles v City Univ. of NY , 126 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2015], Roberts v City Univ. of NY ,

2024As such, "there exists no jurisdictional impediment to extending the court-imposed deadline in this case" ( Canales , 51 Misc 3d at 651 ).

2024Defendant here does not argue that it suffered any prejudice as a result of claimant serving the claim three days beyond the court-imposed deadline. [FN2] However, notwithstanding the general availability of relief from court-imposed deadlines, the Court cannot extend the time to file and serve a late claim beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to a like claim against a citizen of the state under the provisions of CPLR article 2 ( see CCA § 10 [6]; Canales , 51 Misc 3d at 651 , citing Miles v City Univ. of NY , 126 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2015], Roberts v City Univ. of NY ,

1996MOTION TO DISMISS — LACK OF STANDING General Rules The general rules establishing "standing” are historically defined, summarized and justified in Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk ( 77 NY2d 761 ).

1995It was, no doubt, in light of the obvious injustice and futility counte nanced by strict adherence to the common-law rule followed so reluctantly in Hazzard (supra) that the Legislature almost 60 years ago enacted Real Property Law § 126 requiring indenture trustees appointed in connection with "mortgage investments” (see, Real Property Law §§ 124, 125), "[i]n the case of an event of default (as such term is defined in such instrument), to exercise such of the rights and powers vested in the trustee by such instrument, and to use the same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent

1994(Singer v Jeffries & Co., 78 NY2d 76, 81 [1991].) The FAA is enforceable in State court (Flanagan v Prudential-Bache Sec., 67 NY2d 500, 506 , cert denied 479 US 931 [1986]) and requires that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Moses H.

1994(Singer v Jeffries & Co., 78 NY2d 76, 81 [1991].) The FAA is enforceable in State court (Flanagan v Prudential-Bache Sec., 67 NY2d 500, 506 , cert denied 479 US 931 [1986]) and requires that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Moses H.

1991Corp., (supra, at 24-25): "[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (See also, Rush v Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F2d 885; Brener v Becker Paribas, 628 F Supp 442 .) The United States Supreme Court has never considered under what circumstances a party may be be said to have waived the right to have an arbitration agreement enfo

1980We are also cognizant of the fact that subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act was meant to be "remedial” in nature (Kelly v State of New York, 57 AD2d 320 ) and that "if a case is within the beneficial intention of a remedial act it is deemed within the statute, though actually it is not within the letter of the law.” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 321.) It is our opinion, however, that the remedial applicability of the section expired when the time for "asserting a like claim against a citizen of the state” (Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd 6) expired.

1978The controlling circumstance is not the character of the consequence, but its proximity or remoteness in the thought and purpose of the actor.” (Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY 236, 239-240 ; citations omitted; see, also, Thorne v Deas, 4 Johns 84, 96.) The Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed this rule (White v Guarente, 43 NY2d 356, 362-363 ; see, also, Restatement, Torts 2d, § 324 A; Prosser, Torts [4th ed], pp 707-709; cf. Parvi v City of Kingston, 41 NY2d 553 , 559).

1978Co. v New York Seven-Up Bottling Co., 18 AD2d 36, 38 ; Insurance Law, § 185) and a like rule applies to stabilization reserve fund charges.

1978Furthermore, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, of which defendant was convicted, is not an inclusory concurrent count of manslaughter in the first degree and therefore need not be dismissed (see People v Perez, 45 NY2d 204 ).