like defense in Kentucky

2020Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. explains, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” 460 U.S. 1 , 24–25 (1983).

2008Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). ("So, too, the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”) (quotation marks omitted.). 17 .

1930A like rule was laid down in the case of Strong v. Sonken-Galamba Iron & Metal Co., 109 Kan. 117 , 198 P. 182 , 18 A. L.

1930A like rule was laid down in the case of Strong v. Sonken-Galamba Iron & Metal Co., 109 Kan. 117 , 198 P. 182 , 18 A. L.

2024Emergency Medical Services, 237 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401 ).

2008Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81 , 123 S.Ct. 588 . ("This case focuses upon an arbitration rule of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).

2008Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81 , 123 S.Ct. 588 . ("This case focuses upon an arbitration rule of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).

1943Further it is said in the Bader opinion, supra [ 274 Ky. 486 , 119 S. W. (2d) 872 ]: “The liability of a county for the payment of compensation for the ‘taking’ of private property for or in the construction of a state highway is by virtue of the statute [section 4356t-7, KS.

1941Section 574 of the Civil Code of Practice; Whittaker v. Prater, 239 Ky. 173 , 39 S. W. (2d) 248 .

1941Section 574 of the Civil Code of Practice; Whittaker v. Prater, 239 Ky. 173 , 39 S. W. (2d) 248 .

1939A like instruction was given, but in the commonwealth’s brief we find the statement that “appellant is making no objection to the instructions. ’ ’ However this may be, in the recent case of Botnick v. Com., 266 Ky. 419 , 99 S. W. (2d) 188, 189 , the question here presented was squarely decided, and while not in words overruling the obiter in the Sizemore case, its effect is to nullify that portion to which we adverted, supra. In the Botnick case accused was being tried *437 under Section 1199, Kentucky Statutes, denouncing the offense of knowingly receiving stolen property.

1939A like instruction was given, but in the commonwealth’s brief we find the statement that “appellant is making no objection to the instructions. ’ ’ However this may be, in the recent case of Botnick v. Com., 266 Ky. 419 , 99 S. W. (2d) 188, 189 , the question here presented was squarely decided, and while not in words overruling the obiter in the Sizemore case, its effect is to nullify that portion to which we adverted, supra. In the Botnick case accused was being tried *437 under Section 1199, Kentucky Statutes, denouncing the offense of knowingly receiving stolen property.

1938The form of instruction No. 1 is criticized in the case of Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Bryant, 260 *130 Ky. 452, 86 S. W. (2d) 88, 90 , where it was said, in discussing a like instruction, that: “It was entirely unnecessary to define the statutory duties of the operators of the vehicles, since the presence and the manner of operation of each was known to the driver of the other. * * * “The law of the road required the driver of the Consolidated Coach Corporation’s bus, if it was its bus, to keep to the right of the' center of the highway, yet the mere driving or the presence of the bus o

1938Peterson v. Pallis, 103 Wash. 180 , 173 P. 1021 . ‘The only time when, the occupancy of the wrong side of the highway becomes important in a case such as this is when it interferes with, or imperils, those who are rightfully there.’ ” However, in this connection it is to be noted that instructions Nos. 1 (defining the duty imposed on all persons operating motor vehicles (section 2739g-39, Kentucky Statutes) and 2 imposed upon the defendants’ truck driver, when meeting the Coleman automobile and attempting to pass it, both the statutory duty of keeping on the right side of the road so as to giv

1938Peterson v. Pallis, 103 Wash. 180 , 173 P. 1021 . ‘The only time when, the occupancy of the wrong side of the highway becomes important in a case such as this is when it interferes with, or imperils, those who are rightfully there.’ ” However, in this connection it is to be noted that instructions Nos. 1 (defining the duty imposed on all persons operating motor vehicles (section 2739g-39, Kentucky Statutes) and 2 imposed upon the defendants’ truck driver, when meeting the Coleman automobile and attempting to pass it, both the statutory duty of keeping on the right side of the road so as to giv

1934Inasmuch as both the facts and legal questions involved upon the appeal of this case are identical with those found and presented in the case of Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S. W. (2d) 502 , opinion handed down January 19, 1934, which there decided adversely a like claim to that of contestee here made, that the circuit court, in which a candidate’s suit was filed, was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, we are, therefore, of the opinion, for the reasons recited in and upon the authority of this analogous case of Lyttle v. Wilson, supra, that the judgment of the tria

1934Inasmuch as both the facts and legal questions involved upon the appeal of this case are identical with those found and presented in the case of Lyttle v. Wilson, 252 Ky. 392 , 67 S. W. (2d) 502 , opinion handed down January 19, 1934, which there decided adversely a like claim to that of contestee here made, that the circuit court, in which a candidate’s suit was filed, was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, we are, therefore, of the opinion, for the reasons recited in and upon the authority of this analogous case of Lyttle v. Wilson, supra, that the judgment of the tria

1934In the case of Elkhorn Star Coal Co. v. Hall, 222 Ky. 348 , 300 S. W. 864, 865 , where a like clause of a coal lease was before the court as found in article 12 of the-present lease, but wherein the bad condition of the coal market was there relied on to excuse it from payment of royalties, the court said: “But this clause refers to delay in getting the. coal out or getting it to market; it does not refer to troubles in selling the coal.

1934Again, in the case of Livermore v. Middlesborough Town-Lands Co., 106 Ky. 140 , 50 S. W. 6, 13 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1704 , the court, in considering that character of misrepresentations which constituted actionable fraud, entitling one to rescission of contract, said that the doctrine deducible from the Kentucky decisions is that, to establish actionable fraud, “it must appear that the misrepresentation was of a matter of material fact, as distinguished from opinion, at the time or previously existing, and not a mere promise for the future; must be relied upon by the person whose action is intend

1934Again, in the case of Livermore v. Middlesborough Town-Lands Co., 106 Ky. 140 , 50 S. W. 6, 13 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1704 , the court, in considering that character of misrepresentations which constituted actionable fraud, entitling one to rescission of contract, said that the doctrine deducible from the Kentucky decisions is that, to establish actionable fraud, “it must appear that the misrepresentation was of a matter of material fact, as distinguished from opinion, at the time or previously existing, and not a mere promise for the future; must be relied upon by the person whose action is intend

1932“We must therefore treat the decision in the Kelly Case as conclusive of the questions here raised, and hold that appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction sufficiently challenged the plaintiff’s right to further proceed under the state law, and that the practice under the state law required the plaintiff to amend his petition to conform to the proof in order to have the case which he proved submitted to the jury, under proper instructions.” In accord therewith, further see Hines, Director General of Railroads, v. Burns’ Administratrix, 189 Ky. 761 , 226 S. W. 109, 111 , where the like r

1932“We must therefore treat the decision in the Kelly Case as conclusive of the questions here raised, and hold that appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction sufficiently challenged the plaintiff’s right to further proceed under the state law, and that the practice under the state law required the plaintiff to amend his petition to conform to the proof in order to have the case which he proved submitted to the jury, under proper instructions.” In accord therewith, further see Hines, Director General of Railroads, v. Burns’ Administratrix, 189 Ky. 761 , 226 S. W. 109, 111 , where the like r

1930In Wortham v. Grayson County Court, 13 Bush (76 Ky.) 57, where Wortham was presenting certain claims and there was no law authorizing their payment by the fiscal court, the court rejecting the claim said: “It is a sufficient answer to state that the state and county governments of this country never • become debtors, by implication, to any of their agents, and that in order to hold them, or any of *730 them, responsible for a claim, the claimant must show a legal obligation on their part to pay it. ’ ’ Following this case in Davis v. Norman, Auditor, 101 Ky. 599 , 42 S. W. 108 , 19 Ky. Law Rep

1930In Wortham v. Grayson County Court, 13 Bush (76 Ky.) 57, where Wortham was presenting certain claims and there was no law authorizing their payment by the fiscal court, the court rejecting the claim said: “It is a sufficient answer to state that the state and county governments of this country never • become debtors, by implication, to any of their agents, and that in order to hold them, or any of *730 them, responsible for a claim, the claimant must show a legal obligation on their part to pay it. ’ ’ Following this case in Davis v. Norman, Auditor, 101 Ky. 599 , 42 S. W. 108 , 19 Ky. Law Rep

1930The question of the liability of the state for costs has been legislated on in several instances, and, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the state on the same footing with individuals as to costs not specifically named, it would seem that such provision would have been specifically enacted. ’ ’ To the same effect, see Elliott v. Com., 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S. W. 300 , and Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S. W. 514 .

1930The question of the liability of the state for costs has been legislated on in several instances, and, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the state on the same footing with individuals as to costs not specifically named, it would seem that such provision would have been specifically enacted. ’ ’ To the same effect, see Elliott v. Com., 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S. W. 300 , and Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S. W. 514 .

1930The question of the liability of the state for costs has been legislated on in several instances, and, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the state on the same footing with individuals as to costs not specifically named, it would seem that such provision would have been specifically enacted. ’ ’ To the same effect, see Elliott v. Com., 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S. W. 300 , and Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S. W. 514 .

1930The question of the liability of the state for costs has been legislated on in several instances, and, if it had been the intention of the legislature to place the state on the same footing with individuals as to costs not specifically named, it would seem that such provision would have been specifically enacted. ’ ’ To the same effect, see Elliott v. Com., 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S. W. 300 , and Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S. W. 514 .

1928Co., 111 Neb. 801 , 197 N. W. 946 . *614 In Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Cooper, 137 Ky. 544 , 126 S. W. 111 , where a like defense was relied on, the court, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, thus stated the facts: “The first question made on the appeal is that the plaintiffs did not furnish the company proofs of loss as required by the^polioy.

1928Co., 111 Neb. 801 , 197 N. W. 946 . *614 In Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Cooper, 137 Ky. 544 , 126 S. W. 111 , where a like defense was relied on, the court, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, thus stated the facts: “The first question made on the appeal is that the plaintiffs did not furnish the company proofs of loss as required by the^polioy.

1928In McCarty v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 620 , 71 S.W. 656 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1427 , a like instruction was asked by the appellant, and this court stated the law to be as follows: “If defendant’s mind was ‘free from disease, then no impulse to shoot’ the deceased, ‘no matter how violent, and no matter how completely it dominated his will, was unsoundness of mind,’ so as to excuse the homicide.” In the case of Howard v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1056 , decided April 27, 1928, a like instruction was requested for the defendant where no testimony had been offered concerning the insanity

1928In McCarty v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 620 , 71 S.W. 656 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1427 , a like instruction was asked by the appellant, and this court stated the law to be as follows: “If defendant’s mind was ‘free from disease, then no impulse to shoot’ the deceased, ‘no matter how violent, and no matter how completely it dominated his will, was unsoundness of mind,’ so as to excuse the homicide.” In the case of Howard v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1056 , decided April 27, 1928, a like instruction was requested for the defendant where no testimony had been offered concerning the insanity

1928In McCarty v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 620 , 71 S.W. 656 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1427 , a like instruction was asked by the appellant, and this court stated the law to be as follows: “If defendant’s mind was ‘free from disease, then no impulse to shoot’ the deceased, ‘no matter how violent, and no matter how completely it dominated his will, was unsoundness of mind,’ so as to excuse the homicide.” In the case of Howard v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1056 , decided April 27, 1928, a like instruction was requested for the defendant where no testimony had been offered concerning the insanity

1928In McCarty v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 620 , 71 S.W. 656 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1427 , a like instruction was asked by the appellant, and this court stated the law to be as follows: “If defendant’s mind was ‘free from disease, then no impulse to shoot’ the deceased, ‘no matter how violent, and no matter how completely it dominated his will, was unsoundness of mind,’ so as to excuse the homicide.” In the case of Howard v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1056 , decided April 27, 1928, a like instruction was requested for the defendant where no testimony had been offered concerning the insanity

1928Co., 111 Neb. 801 , 197 N. W. 946 . *614 In Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Cooper, 137 Ky. 544 , 126 S. W. 111 , where a like defense was relied on, the court, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, thus stated the facts: “The first question made on the appeal is that the plaintiffs did not furnish the company proofs of loss as required by the^polioy.

1928Co., 111 Neb. 801 , 197 N. W. 946 . *614 In Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Cooper, 137 Ky. 544 , 126 S. W. 111 , where a like defense was relied on, the court, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, thus stated the facts: “The first question made on the appeal is that the plaintiffs did not furnish the company proofs of loss as required by the^polioy.