like rule in Oregon

2006Those issues include “ ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition,” John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 US 543, 557 , 84 S Ct 909 , 11 L Ed 2d 898 (1964), as well as “allegation [s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,” Moses H.

2006Those issues include “ ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition,” John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 US 543, 557 , 84 S Ct 909 , 11 L Ed 2d 898 (1964), as well as “allegation [s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,” Moses H.

2006Cone, 460 US at 25 .

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1965), cert. den., 382 U.S. 910 , 86 S.Ct. 250 , 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 235 , 24 L.Ed.2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1965), cert. den., 382 U.S. 910 , 86 S.Ct. 250 , 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 235 , 24 L.Ed.2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1965), cert. den., 382 U.S. 910 , 86 S.Ct. 250 , 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 235 , 24 L.Ed.2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F2d 875 (2d Cir 1965), cert den, 382 US 910 , 86 S Ct 250 , 15 L Ed2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F2d 69 (10th Cir 1969), cert den, 396 US 915 , 90 S Ct 235 , 24 L Ed2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1965), cert. den., 382 U.S. 910 , 86 S.Ct. 250 , 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 235 , 24 L.Ed.2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1984The judge in Woodruff then cited two appellate decisions, in which he found that the court had rejected a like claim of privilege: United States v. Hall, 346 F2d 875 (2d Cir 1965), cert den, 382 US 910 , 86 S Ct 250 , 15 L Ed2d 161 (1965), and United States v. Bourassa, 411 F2d 69 (10th Cir 1969), cert den, 396 US 915 , 90 S Ct 235 , 24 L Ed2d 192 (1969), to which I shall turn my attention presently.

1969State v. Sack, 210 Or 552 , 300 P2d 427 (1956), cert den 353 US 962 , 77 S Ct 1048 , 1 L Ed 2d 912 (1957).

1969State v. Sack, 210 Or 552 , 300 P2d 427 (1956), cert den 353 US 962 , 77 S Ct 1048 , 1 L Ed 2d 912 (1957).

1969State v. Sack, 210 Or 552 , 300 P2d 427 (1956), cert den 353 US 962 , 77 S Ct 1048 , 1 L Ed 2d 912 (1957).

1969State v. Sack, 210 Or 552 , 300 P2d 427 (1956), cert den 353 US 962 , 77 S Ct 1048 , 1 L Ed 2d 912 (1957).

1969State v. Sack, 210 Or 552 , 300 P2d 427 (1956), cert den 353 US 962 , 77 S Ct 1048 , 1 L Ed 2d 912 (1957).

1960See, in particular, page 171, where it is said: “It is quite generally considered that where the constitution lays down specific eligibility require *52 ments for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional specification in that regard is exclusive and the legislature (except where expressly authorized to do so) has no power to require additional or different qualifications for such constitutional office.” A like principle was applied by this court in Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or 175 , 285 P 205 (1930).

1960See, in particular, page 171, where it is said: “It is quite generally considered that where the constitution lays down specific eligibility require *52 ments for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional specification in that regard is exclusive and the legislature (except where expressly authorized to do so) has no power to require additional or different qualifications for such constitutional office.” A like principle was applied by this court in Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or 175 , 285 P 205 (1930).

1959We find no fault with the legal propositions asserted in McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz 15, 291 P2d 791 ; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 US 441 , 67 L Ed 340 , 43 S Ct 190 , 28 ALR 979 ; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 US 620 , 90 L Ed 358 , 66 S Ct 445 .

1959We find no fault with the legal propositions asserted in McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz 15, 291 P2d 791 ; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 US 441 , 67 L Ed 340 , 43 S Ct 190 , 28 ALR 979 ; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 US 620 , 90 L Ed 358 , 66 S Ct 445 .

1959We find no fault with the legal propositions asserted in McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz 15, 291 P2d 791 ; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 US 441 , 67 L Ed 340 , 43 S Ct 190 , 28 ALR 979 ; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 US 620 , 90 L Ed 358 , 66 S Ct 445 .

1959We find no fault with the legal propositions asserted in McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz 15, 291 P2d 791 ; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 US 441 , 67 L Ed 340 , 43 S Ct 190 , 28 ALR 979 ; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 US 620 , 90 L Ed 358 , 66 S Ct 445 .

1959We find no fault with the legal propositions asserted in McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz 15, 291 P2d 791 ; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 US 441 , 67 L Ed 340 , 43 S Ct 190 , 28 ALR 979 ; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 US 620 , 90 L Ed 358 , 66 S Ct 445 .

1959It would be a rare case in which undervaluation in a few tracts could not be pointed out.” In Birch v. County of Orange, 88 Cal App 82, 262 P 788 at page 789, it was held that a like rule applied even though a few other properties were so much lower assessed as to show at least constructive fraud.

1926A like principle governs Kendall v. Travelers’ Protective Association, 87 Or. 179 ( 169 Pac. 751 ).

1926A like principle governs Kendall v. Travelers’ Protective Association, 87 Or. 179 ( 169 Pac. 751 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916When called upon in a proper case, courts of equity are always ready to protect the rights of those who hold such equities as against the judgment lien and to confine the latter to the actual interest of the judgment debtor.” A like doctrine is taught in Laurent v. Lanning, 32 Or. 11 ( 51 Pac. 80 ), Dimmick v. Rosenfeld, 34 Or. 101 ( 55 Pac. 100 ), and Smith v. Farmers & Merchants’ National Bank, 57 Or. 82 ( 110 Pac. 410 ).

1916The analogy is followed in Gladstone Lumber Co. v. Kelly, 64 Or. 163 ( 129 Pac. 763 ), where the argument is summed up with the statement that, “the judgment debtor having put nothing into the property, his creditors can take nothing out of it.” The creditor cannot reap where his debtor has not sown.

1916The analogy is followed in Gladstone Lumber Co. v. Kelly, 64 Or. 163 ( 129 Pac. 763 ), where the argument is summed up with the statement that, “the judgment debtor having put nothing into the property, his creditors can take nothing out of it.” The creditor cannot reap where his debtor has not sown.

1905Ed. 491 ), where the principal rule is announced and applied: "If the name of Joseph Cloud appeared as a co-surety on the face of this bond, the estoppel would not apply, for the reason that the incompleteness of the instrument would have been brought to the notice of the agent of the government, who would have been put on inquiry to ascertain why Cloud did not execute it, and the pursuit of this inquiry would have disclosed to him the exact condition of things.” Many cases announce a like principle: McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244 ; State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 ( 12 N. W. 301 ); Hagler v.

1905Ed. 491 ), where the principal rule is announced and applied: "If the name of Joseph Cloud appeared as a co-surety on the face of this bond, the estoppel would not apply, for the reason that the incompleteness of the instrument would have been brought to the notice of the agent of the government, who would have been put on inquiry to ascertain why Cloud did not execute it, and the pursuit of this inquiry would have disclosed to him the exact condition of things.” Many cases announce a like principle: McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244 ; State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 ( 12 N. W. 301 ); Hagler v.

1905Ed. 491 ), where the principal rule is announced and applied: "If the name of Joseph Cloud appeared as a co-surety on the face of this bond, the estoppel would not apply, for the reason that the incompleteness of the instrument would have been brought to the notice of the agent of the government, who would have been put on inquiry to ascertain why Cloud did not execute it, and the pursuit of this inquiry would have disclosed to him the exact condition of things.” Many cases announce a like principle: McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244 ; State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 ( 12 N. W. 301 ); Hagler v.

1905Ed. 491 ), where the principal rule is announced and applied: "If the name of Joseph Cloud appeared as a co-surety on the face of this bond, the estoppel would not apply, for the reason that the incompleteness of the instrument would have been brought to the notice of the agent of the government, who would have been put on inquiry to ascertain why Cloud did not execute it, and the pursuit of this inquiry would have disclosed to him the exact condition of things.” Many cases announce a like principle: McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244 ; State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 ( 12 N. W. 301 ); Hagler v.

1905Ed. 491 ), where the principal rule is announced and applied: "If the name of Joseph Cloud appeared as a co-surety on the face of this bond, the estoppel would not apply, for the reason that the incompleteness of the instrument would have been brought to the notice of the agent of the government, who would have been put on inquiry to ascertain why Cloud did not execute it, and the pursuit of this inquiry would have disclosed to him the exact condition of things.” Many cases announce a like principle: McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244 ; State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 ( 12 N. W. 301 ); Hagler v.

1903It has been suggested, however, that the case of Smith v. Kelly, 24 Or. 464 ( 33 Pac. 642 ), and other authorities announcing a like principle, might afford a solution of the problem favorable to the appellants.

1903It has been suggested, however, that the case of Smith v. Kelly, 24 Or. 464 ( 33 Pac. 642 ), and other authorities announcing a like principle, might afford a solution of the problem favorable to the appellants.

1899And again, under a like requirement, where a member, desiring to' change his beneficiary, gave a written notice thereof to the officers of the subordinate lodge, saying that he surrendered the former certificate, but did not do so, it was held that the original beneficiary was entitled to the fund, because the adoption of a particular method of changing a benefit certificate under the powers and within the limitations of the charter of the benevolent society is exclusive of all other methods : Coleman v. Supreme Lodge, 18 Mo. App. 189 .

1898A like principle was applied in Illingsworth v. Boston Electric Light Co., 161 Mass. 583 (25 L.

1898A like doctrine was held in Crane v. Bennington School Dist., 61 Mich. 299 ( 28 N. W. 105 ); and, as, the case bears much analogy to the one at bar, we may be pardoned if we quote somewhat at length from the opinion of the court, speaking through Morse, J., who says: ‘ ‘ When it was admitted without any dispute that the plaintiff taught under this contract for ten weeks, with the sanction and consent of the officers, and that orders were drawn by the proper officers for his pay as such teacher, and cashed by the assessor, who did not sign the contract, without any objection, it became entirely

1898A like doctrine was held in Crane v. Bennington School Dist., 61 Mich. 299 ( 28 N. W. 105 ); and, as, the case bears much analogy to the one at bar, we may be pardoned if we quote somewhat at length from the opinion of the court, speaking through Morse, J., who says: ‘ ‘ When it was admitted without any dispute that the plaintiff taught under this contract for ten weeks, with the sanction and consent of the officers, and that orders were drawn by the proper officers for his pay as such teacher, and cashed by the assessor, who did not sign the contract, without any objection, it became entirely