like defense in Louisiana

2005This construction is applicable "whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at 25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 .

2005This construction is applicable "whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at 25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 .

1966An oft-cited statement of a like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts, is found in the Kansas case of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 , 98 P. 281 [20 L.R.A.,N.S., 361] (1908).

1966An oft-cited statement of a like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts, is found in the Kansas case of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 , 98 P. 281 [20 L.R.A.,N.S., 361] (1908).

2022App. lst Cir. 7/25/07), 965 So.2d 455 , 461 {citing International River Center v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 2002-3060, (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 139 ); see also Florida Gas Transmission Co., LLC, 285 So.3d at 1099-1100; (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (“the presumption is that the arbitrator should decide ‘allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability’”)).

2012For example of an affirmative answer, see Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir.2004).

2007Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-763 , 89 S.Ct. at 2040 .

2007Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-763 , 89 S.Ct. at 2040 .

2004Consequently, “in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to' the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted).

2004Consequently, “in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard must be given to' the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted).

2004While United States Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law in cases involving transactions which affect commerce, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 , 115 S.Ct. 834 , 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995), Louisiana's legislation on the subject is styled similarly to the FAA.

2004While United States Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law in cases involving transactions which affect commerce, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 , 115 S.Ct. 834 , 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995), Louisiana's legislation on the subject is styled similarly to the FAA.

2004The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Emphasis added.) Questions of arbi-trability — that is, whether the parties agreed to submit their particular dispute to arbitration — “must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” id. at 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ; but, in determining whether the pa

2004The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Emphasis added.) Questions of arbi-trability — that is, whether the parties agreed to submit their particular dispute to arbitration — “must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” id. at 24 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ; but, in determining whether the pa

1996Likewise, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-9 , 104 S.Ct. 852, 856-57 , 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), the Supreme Court was concerned with a situation where the California State Supreme Court denied enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the basis that it was contrary to California law.

1996Likewise, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-9 , 104 S.Ct. 852, 856-57 , 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), the Supreme Court was concerned with a situation where the California State Supreme Court denied enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the basis that it was contrary to California law.

1964At the outset of the discussion the court observed of the Alabama law of libel: “ * * * Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight. * * * ” (Italics here and elsewhere are ours.) Again, the court stated: “ * * * a defense for erroneous statements honestly made is no less essential here than was the requirement of proof of guilty knowledge which, in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed.2d 205 , we held indispensable to a valid con *755 viction of a b

1964At the outset of the discussion the court observed of the Alabama law of libel: “ * * * Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight. * * * ” (Italics here and elsewhere are ours.) Again, the court stated: “ * * * a defense for erroneous statements honestly made is no less essential here than was the requirement of proof of guilty knowledge which, in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed.2d 205 , we held indispensable to a valid con *755 viction of a b

1954“In the case of Vincent v. Bullock, 192 "La. 1, 187 So. 35 , and which is a very learned discussion of the mineral rights and has clarified the law as to mineral rights and royalty reservations, the Court says: ‘it is immaterial what term is used in characterizing the interest reserved by the plaintiffs, because they have, by clear and unmistakable language, described the interest reserved by them * * *7 “Taking the contract as a whole and conceding that the words ‘provided' however’ qualify, limit, restrict and explain the antecedent sentence, we come to the construe tion of the contract as a

1954"In the case of Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1 , 187 So. 35 , and which is a very learned discussion of the mineral rights and has clarified the law as to mineral rights and royalty reservations, the Court says: `it is immaterial what term is used in characterizing the interest reserved by the plaintiffs, because they have, by clear and unmistakable language, described the interest reserved by them * * *.' "Taking the contract as a whole and conceding that the words `provided however' qualify, limit, restrict and explain the antecedent sentence, we come to the construction of the contract as a

1939This being true, the record in this case, as now made up, discloses no cause or right of action against these defendants, and the exception of no right or cause of action filed in this court in this case should be sustained, and the judgment of the lower court, sustaining a like exception and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit at their costs, should be affirmed. ' Counsel for plaintiffs urge in their supplemental brief that the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal, as reported in Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust Co., 189 La. 245 , 179 So. 303 , is res adjudicata of the points presented

1939This being true, the record in this case, as now made up, discloses no cause or right of action against these defendants, and the exception of no right or cause of action filed in this court in this case should be sustained, and the judgment of the lower court, sustaining a like exception and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit at their costs, should be affirmed. ' Counsel for plaintiffs urge in their supplemental brief that the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal, as reported in Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust Co., 189 La. 245 , 179 So. 303 , is res adjudicata of the points presented

1932R. 1194, and Castile v. Richard, 157 La. 274 , 102 So. 398 , 37 A. L.

1932R. 1194, and Castile v. Richard, 157 La. 274 , 102 So. 398 , 37 A. L.

1932And the Supreme Court of the state has announced a like doctrine in Southall v. Smith, 151 La. 967 , 92 So. 402 , 27 A. L.

1932And the Supreme Court of the state has announced a like doctrine in Southall v. Smith, 151 La. 967 , 92 So. 402 , 27 A. L.

1913Equally vain is the reliance placed on the language of article 250, requiring that changes of parish seats shall be ‘adopted by a majority of votes cast at said election.’ A like requirement is clearly implied in every election ordained by the Constitution, viz., that the officer shall be chosen by a majority of votes over any other candidate; and if this does not authorize judicial inquiry into the question of the majority vel non, without statutory authority, in the case of an officer, why should it in the case of the parish seat?” In State v. Foster, 111 La. 1087 , 36 South. 200 , it was he

1913Equally vain is the reliance placed on the language of article 250, requiring that changes of parish seats shall be ‘adopted by a majority of votes cast at said election.’ A like requirement is clearly implied in every election ordained by the Constitution, viz., that the officer shall be chosen by a majority of votes over any other candidate; and if this does not authorize judicial inquiry into the question of the majority vel non, without statutory authority, in the case of an officer, why should it in the case of the parish seat?” In State v. Foster, 111 La. 1087 , 36 South. 200 , it was he

1913The question belongs to the political department of the government.” In Hagens v. Police Jury, 121 La. 634 , 46 South. 676 , it was held that the right of au individual to contest an election is not a civil or political right, within the meaning of article 109 of the Constitution, and that the courts are without jurisdiction quoad such contest, save as specially authorized by statute; but that the question, whether an election has or has not been legally ordered, is one that may be inquired into.

1913The question belongs to the political department of the government.” In Hagens v. Police Jury, 121 La. 634 , 46 South. 676 , it was held that the right of au individual to contest an election is not a civil or political right, within the meaning of article 109 of the Constitution, and that the courts are without jurisdiction quoad such contest, save as specially authorized by statute; but that the question, whether an election has or has not been legally ordered, is one that may be inquired into.