like rule in California

2014(Howsam, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 84 , citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston (1964) 376 U.S. 543, 557 (John Wiley & Sons) [whether claimant completed first two steps of grievance procedure is procedural question for arbitrator when steps are prerequisite to arbitration].) Similarly, the Class Arbitration Question is not analogous to whether the statute of limitations bars a party’s claim or “‘allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,’” all of which the Supreme Court has found to be procedural matters.

2013Second, three of the circuit courts have examined the context of the “waiver, delay, or a like defense” language in Howsam, supra, 537 U.S. at page 84 .

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ]: 'We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises.' In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623, 108 .

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

1944At page 549, the court simply said, quoting from Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 [ 54 S.Ct. 138 , 78 L.Ed. 358 ] : ‘We see no token of a purpose to extend a like immunity to permanent investments or the fruits of business enterprises. ’ In this respect it is interesting to observe changes in the statute as noted in Culp v. Webster, 25 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759 [ 70 P.2d 273 ] and Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 [ 57 S.Ct. 443 , 81 L.Ed. 623 , 108 A.L.R. 1102 ].) “In Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 [ 36 S.Ct. 114 , 60 L.Ed. 327 ], the court determined. that territorial .schemes of govern

2015Agnes).) “Although a court may deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground of waiver [citation] waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.” (Ibid.; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 375 .) “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Moses H.

2015Agnes).) “Although a court may deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground of waiver [citation] waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.” (Ibid.; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 375 .) “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Moses H.

2014(See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, supra, 569 U.S. at p. ___ [ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2068, fn. 2 ] [“this Court has not yet decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability” and “this case gives us no opportunity to do so”].) In Bazzle, supra, 539 U.S. 444 a plurality of four justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded that, where the parties to an arbitration agreement agree to submit to the arbitrator “‘all disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract,’” the arbit

2014(See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, supra, 569 U.S. at p. ___ [ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2068, fn. 2 ] [“this Court has not yet decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability” and “this case gives us no opportunity to do so”].) In Bazzle, supra, 539 U.S. 444 a plurality of four justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded that, where the parties to an arbitration agreement agree to submit to the arbitrator “‘all disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract,’” the arbit

2006Any regulation with a like requirement is also ineffective. ( In re Johnny S., supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 978 .) The juvenile court erred by concluding that an ICPC report was required before placing John with Dewayne. *Page 1576 In its petition for rehearing, the Agency has set forth numerous situations well beyond the facts and holding of this case.

2006(In re Johnny S., supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 978 .) The juvenile court erred by concluding that an ICPC report was required before placing John with Dewayne.

1992Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 [ 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 785-786 , 103 S.Ct. 927 ]; Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, supra, 35 Cal.3d 312, 323 .) Respondents, like other Sutro clients, were bound by the provisions of the client agreement regardless of whether they read it or were aware of the arbitration clause when they signed the document.

1988The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” (Italics added.) Our state court, in Ericksen, also declared that “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, supra, 35 Cal.3d 312, 323 .) One major exception to

1987(UnitedFarm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268,273 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 ] (declaratory relief unavailable when issue could be raised in ALRB proceeding); cf. Morton v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ] (police officers’ suit over terms of employment precluded by failure to resort to grievance procedure).)” (San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 12.) 8 In the proceeding before this court, PERB has conceded the interference claim based on Bates’s statement to McPherson was not adequately addressed in its decision and has reques

1987(UnitedFarm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268,273 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 87 ] (declaratory relief unavailable when issue could be raised in ALRB proceeding); cf. Morton v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 533 ] (police officers’ suit over terms of employment precluded by failure to resort to grievance procedure).)” (San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 12.) 8 In the proceeding before this court, PERB has conceded the interference claim based on Bates’s statement to McPherson was not adequately addressed in its decision and has reques

1982Similar `comity' with foreign countries has no meaning when dealing with [the sharing of tax revenues].'" ( Estate of Mears, supra, 90 Cal. App.3d 885 , 890, quoting Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (1973) 363 Mass. 235 [ 293 N.E.2d 862, 873-874 ].) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the classification resulting from the section 13880 exemption from inheritance tax of benefits *549 from any public retirement system without extending a like exception to benefits under a private pension plan is not palpably arbitrary and is not violative of the equal protection guarantee

1982Similar ‘comity’ with foreign countries has no meaning when dealing with [the sharing of tax revenues].”’ (Estate of Mears, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 885 , 890, quoting Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (1973) 363 Mass. 235 [ 293 N.E.2d 862, 873-874 ].) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the classification resulting from the section 13880 exemption from inheritance tax of benefits from any public retirement system without extending a like exception to benefits under a private pension plan is not palpably arbitrary and is not violative of the equal protection guarantees of th

1982Similar ‘comity’ with foreign countries has no meaning when dealing with [the sharing of tax revenues].”’ (Estate of Mears, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 885 , 890, quoting Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (1973) 363 Mass. 235 [ 293 N.E.2d 862, 873-874 ].) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the classification resulting from the section 13880 exemption from inheritance tax of benefits from any public retirement system without extending a like exception to benefits under a private pension plan is not palpably arbitrary and is not violative of the equal protection guarantees of th

1982Similar ‘comity’ with foreign countries has no meaning when dealing with [the sharing of tax revenues].”’ (Estate of Mears, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 885 , 890, quoting Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation (1973) 363 Mass. 235 [ 293 N.E.2d 862, 873-874 ].) For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the classification resulting from the section 13880 exemption from inheritance tax of benefits from any public retirement system without extending a like exception to benefits under a private pension plan is not palpably arbitrary and is not violative of the equal protection guarantees of th

2026(See People v. Bruhn (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1195 , 1199–1200 (Bruhn); People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825 , 836–837 (Panozo).) What those statutes have in common with section 1170(b)(6) is that they are instances in which the Legislature determined that courts must consider specific factors that may reduce a defendant’s culpability or otherwise warrant a reduced sentence.

2025Robbery “begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety,” and “[i]t is sufficient ... that [defendant] used force to prevent the ... retaking [of] the property and to facilitate his escape.” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 , 12 28.) A like rule applies to carjacking. “[M]ere vehicle theft becomes carjacking if the perpetrator, having gained possession of the motor vehicle without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while driving off with the vehicle.” (People v. O'Neil (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131 .) In this case, howeve

2025Robbery “begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety,” and “[i]t is sufficient ... that [defendant] used force to prevent the ... retaking [of] the property and to facilitate his escape.” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 , 12 28.) A like rule applies to carjacking. “[M]ere vehicle theft becomes carjacking if the perpetrator, having gained possession of the motor vehicle without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while driving off with the vehicle.” (People v. O'Neil (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131 .) In this case, howeve