Strickland test in Ohio

2025“A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing Strickland at 697 . 13 {¶28} Mr. Ellis asserts that “based on [his] history and [D.G.’s] conduct, the outcome would have been different.” He has not, however, developed any argument explaining why a voluntary-manslaughter instruction would have resulted in a different outcome in this case.

2025“A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing Strickland at 697 . 13 {¶28} Mr. Ellis asserts that “based on [his] history and [D.G.’s] conduct, the outcome would have been different.” He has not, however, developed any argument explaining why a voluntary-manslaughter instruction would have resulted in a different outcome in this case.

2026Id. at 688 . {¶ 19} If the defendant shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, then the second prong of the Strickland test requires that the defendant prove prejudice to prevail.

2026Id. at 688 . {¶ 19} If the defendant shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, then the second prong of the Strickland test requires that the defendant prove prejudice to prevail.

2026“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989), quoting Strickland at 689 . {¶ 22} Sweet urges us to reject the Strickland test in evaluating trial counsel’s performance, and instead used a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.

2026“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989), quoting Strickland at 689 . {¶ 22} Sweet urges us to reject the Strickland test in evaluating trial counsel’s performance, and instead used a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.

2009See, also, State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160 , for Ohio's adoption of the Strickland test. {¶ 22} Judges in a bench trial are presumed to rely only upon relevant, material and competent evidence.

2009See, also, State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160 , for Ohio's adoption of the Strickland test. {¶ 22} Judges in a bench trial are presumed to rely only upon relevant, material and competent evidence.

2006Additionally, we must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's actions based on the facts of the case and "`"viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."'" Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Colon, supra at ¶ 49 (quoting Strickland, supra at 690 )). {¶ 7} "An appellate court may analyze the second prong of the Strickland test alone if such analysis will dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that the defendant did not suffer sufficient prejudice." Id. (citing State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61 , 83 , 641 N.E.2d 1082 ).

2006Additionally, we must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's actions based on the facts of the case and "`"viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."'" Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Colon, supra at ¶ 49 (quoting Strickland, supra at 690 )). {¶ 7} "An appellate court may analyze the second prong of the Strickland test alone if such analysis will dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that the defendant did not suffer sufficient prejudice." Id. (citing State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61 , 83 , 641 N.E.2d 1082 ).

2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies when a defendant challenges the effectiveness of counsel in connection with a guilty plea). {¶5} A defendant who has pleaded guilty must demonstrate prejudice by showing “‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70 , 2006-Ohio-5283 , ¶ 89, quoting Lockhart at 59 .

2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies when a defendant challenges the effectiveness of counsel in connection with a guilty plea). {¶5} A defendant who has pleaded guilty must demonstrate prejudice by showing “‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70 , 2006-Ohio-5283 , ¶ 89, quoting Lockhart at 59 .

2022Under the Strickland standard, the applicant must show that “(1) appellate counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, [Strickland] at 687, and (2) there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Strickland] at 694.” Leyh at ¶ 18 , citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-286 , 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Strickland at 694 .

2022Under the Strickland standard, the applicant must show that “(1) appellate counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, [Strickland] at 687, and (2) there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Strickland] at 694.” Leyh at ¶ 18 , citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-286 , 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Strickland at 694 .

2026A failure to “satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49 . {¶66} An appellant “‘must show that the attorney made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and . . . that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance.’” Story at ¶ 49 , quoting State v. Batich, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.).

2026A failure to “satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49 . {¶66} An appellant “‘must show that the attorney made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and . . . that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance.’” Story at ¶ 49 , quoting State v. Batich, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.).

2026A failure to “satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49 . {¶66} An appellant “‘must show that the attorney made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and . . . that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance.’” Story at ¶ 49 , quoting State v. Batich, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.).

2026A failure to “satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49 . {¶66} An appellant “‘must show that the attorney made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and . . . that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance.’” Story at ¶ 49 , quoting State v. Batich, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.).

2026In opposing appellant's motion, the State argued the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland did not apply. ("The State believes that this is not a Strickland v. Washington test" and "[w]ith respect to the standard again, the State would argue that this is not a Strickland standard at this stage of the proceedings.") The State contended the court should analyze the merits of appellant's motion under the standard governing a presentence motion to withdraw a plea made under Crim.R. 32.1, as set forth in State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992), and by considering the nin

2026In opposing appellant's motion, the State argued the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland did not apply. ("The State believes that this is not a Strickland v. Washington test" and "[w]ith respect to the standard again, the State would argue that this is not a Strickland standard at this stage of the proceedings.") The State contended the court should analyze the merits of appellant's motion under the standard governing a presentence motion to withdraw a plea made under Crim.R. 32.1, as set forth in State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992), and by considering the nin

2018“A reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel which can be considered matters of trial strategy.” Conley at ¶ 56 , citing State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98 , 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). {¶41} To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, -29- Case No. 5-17-19 the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2018“A reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel which can be considered matters of trial strategy.” Conley at ¶ 56 , citing State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98 , 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). {¶41} To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, -29- Case No. 5-17-19 the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2008Id. {¶ 49} Application of the Strickland test to this case shows that Mr. Hadden did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

2008Id. {¶ 49} Application of the Strickland test to this case shows that Mr. Hadden did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

2004To establish prejudice, the appellant must prove that "there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452 , 457 .

2004To establish prejudice, the appellant must prove that "there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452 , 457 .

2026“This Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Ray, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶25} During a break in the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised the prospect of requesting an alternative jury instruction on aggravated assault.

2026“This Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Ray, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶25} During a break in the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised the prospect of requesting an alternative jury instruction on aggravated assault.

2025Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (finding that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of the effects of a guilty plea on the defendant's immigration status constituted incompetent counsel under the performance prong of the Strickland test).

2025Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (finding that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of the effects of a guilty plea on the defendant's immigration status constituted incompetent counsel under the performance prong of the Strickland test).

2026Moreover, given that “[a]n ineffective- assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial,” courts must apply “the Strickland standard . . . with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; accord State v. Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, ¶ 35 . {¶21} Parents facing the permanent termination of their parental rights are guaranteed the right to the

2026Moreover, given that “[a]n ineffective- assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial,” courts must apply “the Strickland standard . . . with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; accord State v. Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, ¶ 35 . {¶21} Parents facing the permanent termination of their parental rights are guaranteed the right to the

2005State v. Smith (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 98 ; Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299 . {¶ 56} Upon review, we find that appellant has failed to prove either prong of the Strickland test and, thus, failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. {¶ 57} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 58} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues as follows: {¶ 59} "The sentence imposed against Mr. Williams, which involved sentencing enhancements, not found by a jury, is unconstitutional under the holding of the United States Supreme Court i

2005State v. Smith (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 98 ; Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299 . {¶ 56} Upon review, we find that appellant has failed to prove either prong of the Strickland test and, thus, failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. {¶ 57} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 58} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues as follows: {¶ 59} "The sentence imposed against Mr. Williams, which involved sentencing enhancements, not found by a jury, is unconstitutional under the holding of the United States Supreme Court i

2002The two-part Strickland test “is the appropriate standard to assess a defense request for reopening under App.R. 26(B)(5).” State v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25 , 701 N.E.2d 696, 697 .

2002The two-part Strickland test “is the appropriate standard to assess a defense request for reopening under App.R. 26(B)(5).” State v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25 , 701 N.E.2d 696, 697 .

2026“This Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Ray, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶25} During a break in the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised the prospect of requesting an alternative jury instruction on aggravated assault.

2026“This Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the appellant fails to satisfy either prong.” State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Ray, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). {¶25} During a break in the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised the prospect of requesting an alternative jury instruction on aggravated assault.

2023Due to the challenges of reviewing an attorney’s performance at trial, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id., quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). {¶ 31} The second part of the Strickland test requires appellant to show “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” and deprived appellant of a fair trial.

2023Due to the challenges of reviewing an attorney’s performance at trial, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id., quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). {¶ 31} The second part of the Strickland test requires appellant to show “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” and deprived appellant of a fair trial.

2023See Dixon, supra; State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673 , 693 N.E.2d 267 ; State v. Newton, 2017-Ohio-7068 , 95 N.E.3d 789 (8th Dist.). {¶18} A court need not analyze both Strickland test prongs, deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant resulting in an unfair trial, if it can resolve the claim under one prong.

2023See Dixon, supra; State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673 , 693 N.E.2d 267 ; State v. Newton, 2017-Ohio-7068 , 95 N.E.3d 789 (8th Dist.). {¶18} A court need not analyze both Strickland test prongs, deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant resulting in an unfair trial, if it can resolve the claim under one prong.

2009Accordingly, we will direct our attention to the second prong of the Strickland test. {¶ 97} "`The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329 , 347 , 715 N.E.2d 136 , quoting State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239 , 244 , 527 N.E.2d 831 . {¶ 98} Essentially, Appellant argues that both of his attorneys' failures to raise in the trial court the same issues and arguments that he presents in the above assignments of error on appeal rendered trial counsel's performance ineffective.

2009Accordingly, we will direct our attention to the second prong of the Strickland test. {¶ 97} "`The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329 , 347 , 715 N.E.2d 136 , quoting State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239 , 244 , 527 N.E.2d 831 . {¶ 98} Essentially, Appellant argues that both of his attorneys' failures to raise in the trial court the same issues and arguments that he presents in the above assignments of error on appeal rendered trial counsel's performance ineffective.