Strickland test in South Carolina

2025Weaver reiterates Strickland's instruction that "the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" Weaver, 582 U.S. at 300 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 ).

2021This is clearly overwhelming evidence of Applicant's guilt." Finally, it appears the court conflated the fingerprint evidence against Pearson with Petitioner's DNA match from the duct tape, as the order denying relief states "Applicant's fingerprints were found on the duct tape that was placed on the victim by his attackers during the robbery." Strickland standard of 'a reasonable probability . . . the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt' cannot possibly be met." (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 )).

2016Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “the burden of proof is upon [the] petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured by the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 , 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999). “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456 , 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). “[W]hen coun

2016Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “the burden of proof is upon [the] petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured by the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 , 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999). “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456 , 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). “[W]hen coun

2017To overcome this presumption and prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Stone must satisfy the Strickland test, which requires that he prove: “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 343 , 611 S.E.2d 232, 233 (2005) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 ).

2017To overcome this presumption and prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Stone must satisfy the Strickland test, which requires that he prove: “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 343 , 611 S.E.2d 232, 233 (2005) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 ).

2023Rather, in a PCR court's analysis of prejudice, the strength of the State's case "is one significant factor the [PCR] court must consider—along with the specific impact of counsel's error and other relevant considerations—in determining whether [the petitioner] has met his burden of proving prejudice." Id. at 190 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 . "[F]or the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice": the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence

2023Rather, in a PCR court's analysis of prejudice, the strength of the State's case "is one significant factor the [PCR] court must consider—along with the specific impact of counsel's error and other relevant considerations—in determining whether [the petitioner] has met his burden of proving prejudice." Id. at 190 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 . "[F]or the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice": the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence

2019However, "the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong that the Strickland standard of 'a reasonable probability the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt' cannot possibly be met." Id. at 191 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 (internal alteration marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 ); see, e.g., Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 574 , 552 S.E.2d 718, 724 (2001) (finding there was overwhelming evidence where the evidence included the applicant's DNA on the victim'

2019However, "the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong that the Strickland standard of 'a reasonable probability the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt' cannot possibly be met." Id. at 191 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 (internal alteration marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 ); see, e.g., Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 574 , 552 S.E.2d 718, 724 (2001) (finding there was overwhelming evidence where the evidence included the applicant's DNA on the victim'

2023See Ryals v. State, 439 S.C. 230 , 237-38, 886 S.E.2d 239 , 243 (Ct. App. 2023) (examining the petitioner's PCR issue of wearing prison garb and shackles for prejudice under the Strickland standard). different." Terry, 394 S.C. at 66 , 714 S.E.2d at 329 .

2023See Ryals v. State, 439 S.C. 230 , 237-38, 886 S.E.2d 239 , 243 (Ct. App. 2023) (examining the petitioner's PCR issue of wearing prison garb and shackles for prejudice under the Strickland standard). different." Terry, 394 S.C. at 66 , 714 S.E.2d at 329 .

2015Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2016Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “the burden of proof is upon [the] petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured by the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 , 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999). “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456 , 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). “[W]hen coun

2016Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “the burden of proof is upon [the] petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured by the standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 , 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999). “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456 , 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). “[W]hen coun

2025"Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009).

2025"Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009).

2015Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (even if appellate counsel believes an appeal is without merit and files an Anders brief, the appellant may have been entitled to a merits brief, and the challenge to appellate counsel's performance should be reviewed under Strickland); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303 , 680 S.E.2d 273 (2009) (even where an Anders brief is filed, when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this Court applies the Strickland test).

2015Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (even if appellate counsel believes an appeal is without merit and files an Anders brief, the appellant may have been entitled to a merits brief, and the challenge to appellate counsel's performance should be reviewed under Strickland); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303 , 680 S.E.2d 273 (2009) (even where an Anders brief is filed, when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this Court applies the Strickland test).

2013See Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442 , 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (“The proper measure of counsel’s performance remains whether he has provided representation within the range of competence required by attorneys in criminal cases.”).

2013See Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442 , 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (“The proper measure of counsel’s performance remains whether he has provided representation within the range of competence required by attorneys in criminal cases.”).

2025"The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim." Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 300 (2017).

2025"The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim." Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 300 (2017).

2025Specifically, when a petitioner claims counsel's deficient performance caused him to accept a plea, the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [plea] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. "[A] petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).

2025Specifically, when a petitioner claims counsel's deficient performance caused him to accept a plea, the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [plea] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. "[A] petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).

2025Va. 2023) ("Weaver forecloses Carter's argument that the denial of his right to testify was structural error and not subject to a prejudice analysis."), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6382, 2023 WL 7128469 (4th Cir. June 9, 2023); Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1022-23 (Del. 2017) (applying Weaver and holding the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a Batson violation—a structural error—"was properly dismissed for failure to show prejudice"); Newton v. State, 168 A.3d 1, 10 (Md. 2017) (applying Weaver to a defendant's claim that "The prejudice showing is in most cases a nec

2025Va. 2023) ("Weaver forecloses Carter's argument that the denial of his right to testify was structural error and not subject to a prejudice analysis."), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6382, 2023 WL 7128469 (4th Cir. June 9, 2023); Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1022-23 (Del. 2017) (applying Weaver and holding the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a Batson violation—a structural error—"was properly dismissed for failure to show prejudice"); Newton v. State, 168 A.3d 1, 10 (Md. 2017) (applying Weaver to a defendant's claim that "The prejudice showing is in most cases a nec

2025Va. 2023) ("Weaver forecloses Carter's argument that the denial of his right to testify was structural error and not subject to a prejudice analysis."), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6382, 2023 WL 7128469 (4th Cir. June 9, 2023); Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1022-23 (Del. 2017) (applying Weaver and holding the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a Batson violation—a structural error—"was properly dismissed for failure to show prejudice"); Newton v. State, 168 A.3d 1, 10 (Md. 2017) (applying Weaver to a defendant's claim that "The prejudice showing is in most cases a nec

2025Va. 2023) ("Weaver forecloses Carter's argument that the denial of his right to testify was structural error and not subject to a prejudice analysis."), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6382, 2023 WL 7128469 (4th Cir. June 9, 2023); Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1022-23 (Del. 2017) (applying Weaver and holding the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a Batson violation—a structural error—"was properly dismissed for failure to show prejudice"); Newton v. State, 168 A.3d 1, 10 (Md. 2017) (applying Weaver to a defendant's claim that "The prejudice showing is in most cases a nec

2023First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 566 , 511 S.E.2d 372, 378 (Ct. App. 1998) ("It is a fundamental rule of law that an appellate court will affirm a ruling by a lower court if the offended party does not challenge that ruling.

2023First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 566 , 511 S.E.2d 372, 378 (Ct. App. 1998) ("It is a fundamental rule of law that an appellate court will affirm a ruling by a lower court if the offended party does not challenge that ruling.

2021In determining prejudice, we should consider "the strength of the State's case apart from the admissible evidence to which trial counsel deficiently failed to object." Thompson at 246, 814 S.E.2d at 493 . "[T]rial errors 'occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Jenkins, 412 S.C. 643 , 650–51, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307–08 (1991)). "[A]ppellate court

2021In determining prejudice, we should consider "the strength of the State's case apart from the admissible evidence to which trial counsel deficiently failed to object." Thompson at 246, 814 S.E.2d at 493 . "[T]rial errors 'occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Jenkins, 412 S.C. 643 , 650–51, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307–08 (1991)). "[A]ppellate court

2018See Stone v. State , 419 S.C. 370 , 380, 798 S.E.2d 561 , 566 (2017) (stating "the law requires we presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment" and "the Strickland test ... requires that [the applicant] prove" otherwise (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 , 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 , 693 ) ).

2018See Stone v. State , 419 S.C. 370 , 380, 798 S.E.2d 561 , 566 (2017) (stating "the law requires we presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment" and "the Strickland test ... requires that [the applicant] prove" otherwise (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 , 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 , 693 ) ).

2017We further note a majority of jurisdictions use the Strickland standard in evaluating ineffective assistance claims in a civil commitment context, "regardless of whether that court held that the person's right to effective counsel arose from statute or the constitution." Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (collecting cases).

2017We further note a majority of jurisdictions use the Strickland standard in evaluating ineffective assistance claims in a civil commitment context, "regardless of whether that court held that the person's right to effective counsel arose from statute or the constitution." Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (collecting cases).

2017See Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115 , 117–18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989) (describing the Strickland standard as requiring a PCR applicant to prove counsel's deficient performance, and the resulting prejudice).

2017See Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115 , 117–18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989) (describing the Strickland standard as requiring a PCR applicant to prove counsel's deficient performance, and the resulting prejudice).

2017Specifically, when establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evaluation, "the [applicant] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233 , 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992); see also Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456 , 458–60, 596 S.E.2d 49 , 50–51 (2004) (expanding the reasonable probability standard as the burden for proving both the deficiency of counsel and the prejudice prongs).

2017Specifically, when establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evaluation, "the [applicant] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233 , 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992); see also Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456 , 458–60, 596 S.E.2d 49 , 50–51 (2004) (expanding the reasonable probability standard as the burden for proving both the deficiency of counsel and the prejudice prongs).

2017See Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (citing T.A.H.-L., 97 P.3d at 771 ).

2017See Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (citing T.A.H.-L., 97 P.3d at 771 ).

2017Specifically, when establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evaluation, "the [applicant] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233 , 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992); see also Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456 , 458–60, 596 S.E.2d 49 , 50–51 (2004) (expanding the reasonable probability standard as the burden for proving both the deficiency of counsel and the prejudice prongs).

2017Specifically, when establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evaluation, "the [applicant] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea." Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233 , 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992); see also Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456 , 458–60, 596 S.E.2d 49 , 50–51 (2004) (expanding the reasonable probability standard as the burden for proving both the deficiency of counsel and the prejudice prongs).

2017An SVP's right to counsel arises from a constitutional right to due process similar to the rights attendant to a criminal trial.11 Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867, 868 ; see also Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("In considering what constitutes effective representation, it seems reasonable to look to criminal standards for guidance.

2017An SVP's right to counsel arises from a constitutional right to due process similar to the rights attendant to a criminal trial.11 Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867, 868 ; see also Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("In considering what constitutes effective representation, it seems reasonable to look to criminal standards for guidance.