Strickland test in Alabama

2013Furthermore, as explained above, “ ‘[i]n a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether “the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”’” Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 568 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (quoting Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.1992)).

2013Furthermore, as explained above, “ ‘[i]n a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether “the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”’” Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 568 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (quoting Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.1992)).

2015See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independentl

2012See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independently

2013Furthermore, as explained above, “ ‘[i]n a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether “the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”’” Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 568 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (quoting Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.1992)).

2013Furthermore, as explained above, “ ‘[i]n a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether “the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”’” Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 568 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (quoting Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.1992)).

2015See, e.g., Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1219 (4tH Cir. 1986) (considering ineffective assistance claims individually rather than considering their cumulative impact.).’).

2012See, e.g., Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1219 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering ineffective assistance claims individually rather than considering their cumulative impact.).’).

2015See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independentl

2015See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independentl

2018In the context of guilty-plea proceedings, this Court has held: "When an appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arises from alleged errors committed by counsel in the guilty plea process, the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis is satisfied by the appellant's establishing 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he could not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' " Culver v. State , 549 So.2d 568 , 572 (Ala. Crim.

2018In the context of guilty-plea proceedings, this Court has held: "When an appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arises from alleged errors committed by counsel in the guilty plea process, the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis is satisfied by the appellant's establishing 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he could not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' " Culver v. State , 549 So.2d 568 , 572 (Ala. Crim.

2009The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.” “‘State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078 , 114 S.Ct. 1664 , 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994).’ “Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108, 118 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘We have held, ‘Also, counsel does not necessarily render ineffective assistance simply because he does not present all possible mitigating evidence.’ Id. at 117 .

2009The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.” “‘State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078 , 114 S.Ct. 1664 , 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994).’ “Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108, 118 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘We have held, ‘Also, counsel does not necessarily render ineffective assistance simply because he does not present all possible mitigating evidence.’ Id. at 117 .

2015As the Supreme Court of North Dakota noted in Garcia v. State, 678 N.W.2d 568, 578 (N.D.2004): .“‘Garcia argues that even if trial counsel’s individual acts or omissions are insufficient ‘ to establish he was prejudiced, the cumulative effect was substantial enough- to meet Strickland’s test.

2014As the Supreme Court of North Dakota noted in Garcia v. State, 678 N.W.2d 568, 578 (N.D.2004): “‘Garcia argues that even if trial counsel’s individual acts or-omissions are insufficient' to establish he was prejudiced, the cumulative effect was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.

2015See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independentl

2012See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (“In making this showing, a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test”); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (“cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas claim must stand or fall on its own”).’ “See also Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28 , 550 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2001) (‘Because the so-called cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable, each claim of inadequacy must be examined independently

2004We also recognize that "`[w]hile "[i]t should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective standard of reasonableness," see Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.1985), it is unclear how detailed an investigation is necessary to provide a defendant with the effective assistance of counsel.

2004We also recognize that "`[w]hile "[i]t should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective standard of reasonableness," see Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.1985), it is unclear how detailed an investigation is necessary to provide a defendant with the effective assistance of counsel.

2026In Yelder v. State, 575 So. 2d 137, 139 (Ala. 1991), the Alabama Supreme Court held that 'the failure of trial counsel to make a timely Batson objection to a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the State in the jury selection process through its use of peremptory challenges is presumptively prejudicial to a defendant.' However, the 'holding in Yelder does not relieve the defendant of his burden of meeting the 37 CR-2023-0545 first prong of the Strickland test—a showing of deficient performance by counsel,' Ex parte Frazier, 758 So. 2d 611, 615 (Ala. 1999), and this Court has recog

2026In Yelder v. State, 575 So. 2d 137, 139 (Ala. 1991), the Alabama Supreme Court held that 'the failure of trial counsel to make a timely Batson objection to a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the State in the jury selection process through its use of peremptory challenges is presumptively prejudicial to a defendant.' However, the 'holding in Yelder does not relieve the defendant of his burden of meeting the 37 CR-2023-0545 first prong of the Strickland test—a showing of deficient performance by counsel,' Ex parte Frazier, 758 So. 2d 611, 615 (Ala. 1999), and this Court has recog

2015See Thomas v. State, 511 So.2d 248, 255 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (“In determining whether a defendant has established his burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective, we are not required to address both considerations of the Strickland v. Washington test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the 'prongs.”). .Because both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied- to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the failure to establish one of the prongs is a valid basis, in and of itself, to deny the claim.

2015See Thomas v. State, 511 So.2d 248, 255 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (“In determining whether a defendant has established his burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective, we are not required to address both considerations of the Strickland v. Washington test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the 'prongs.”). .Because both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied- to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the failure to establish one of the prongs is a valid basis, in and of itself, to deny the claim.

2023Standard of Review In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the defendant must show (1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant "must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987).

2023Standard of Review In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the defendant must show (1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant "must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987).

2026We further recognize, as Creque asserts, that " 'a determination on direct appeal that there has been no plain error does not automatically foreclose a determination of the existence of the prejudice required under Strickland to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.' " (Creque's brief, p. 94 (quoting Ex parte Taylor, 10 So. 3d 1075, 1078 (Ala. 2005) (recognizing, however, that "it may be the rare case in which the application of the plain-error test and the prejudice prong of the Strickland test will result in different outcomes").) However, Creque does not address the fact tha

2026We further recognize, as Creque asserts, that " 'a determination on direct appeal that there has been no plain error does not automatically foreclose a determination of the existence of the prejudice required under Strickland to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.' " (Creque's brief, p. 94 (quoting Ex parte Taylor, 10 So. 3d 1075, 1078 (Ala. 2005) (recognizing, however, that "it may be the rare case in which the application of the plain-error test and the prejudice prong of the Strickland test will result in different outcomes").) However, Creque does not address the fact tha

2009The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.” “‘State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078 , 114 S.Ct. 1664 , 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994).’ “Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108, 118 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘We have held, ‘Also, counsel does not necessarily render ineffective assistance simply because he does not present all possible mitigating evidence.’ Id. at 117 .

2009The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.” “‘State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078 , 114 S.Ct. 1664 , 128 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994).’ “Williams v. State, 783 So.2d 108, 118 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). ‘We have held, ‘Also, counsel does not necessarily render ineffective assistance simply because he does not present all possible mitigating evidence.’ Id. at 117 .

2004See, Stevens v. Zant , 968 F.2d 1076 , 1081 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993) (In a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice part of the Strickland test focuses on whether the sentencer would have still imposed the death penalty after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.)" (Supplement record, p. 108-10.) Carroll stated that funds for experts were available to him even if not approved by the circuit court and that it was a strategic decision not to present evidence of Giles's drug use given the fact t

2004See, Stevens v. Zant , 968 F.2d 1076 , 1081 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993) (In a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice part of the Strickland test focuses on whether the sentencer would have still imposed the death penalty after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.)" (Supplement record, p. 108-10.) Carroll stated that funds for experts were available to him even if not approved by the circuit court and that it was a strategic decision not to present evidence of Giles's drug use given the fact t

2004See, Stevens v. Zant , 968 F.2d 1076 , 1081 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993) (In a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice part of the Strickland test focuses on whether the sentencer would have still imposed the death penalty after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.)" (Supplement record, p. 108-10.) Carroll stated that funds for experts were available to him even if not approved by the circuit court and that it was a strategic decision not to present evidence of Giles's drug use given the fact t

2004See, Stevens v. Zant , 968 F.2d 1076 , 1081 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 929 , 113 S.Ct. 1306 , 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993) (In a challenge to the imposition of a death sentence, the prejudice part of the Strickland test focuses on whether the sentencer would have still imposed the death penalty after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.)" (Supplement record, p. 108-10.) Carroll stated that funds for experts were available to him even if not approved by the circuit court and that it was a strategic decision not to present evidence of Giles's drug use given the fact t

2024App. 2017) ("Because counsel's deficient performance was harmless, Kerley has not satisfied his burden of proving that he was prejudiced as required by Strickland. 'Harmless error does not rise to the level of the prejudice required to satisfy the Strickland test.' Gaddy v. State, 952 So. 2d 1149, 1160 (Ala. Crim.

2024App. 2017) ("Because counsel's deficient performance was harmless, Kerley has not satisfied his burden of proving that he was prejudiced as required by Strickland. 'Harmless error does not rise to the level of the prejudice required to satisfy the Strickland test.' Gaddy v. State, 952 So. 2d 1149, 1160 (Ala. Crim.

2000The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.' " State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala. Cr.App.1993). "`With regard to McKinnon's representation of Morrison at the punishment-fixing and sentencing phases of his trial, we find that the observations of the court in Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1568 (11th Cir.1987), are appropriate: "`"The failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of possible mitigating evidence may render counsel's assistance ineffective.

2000The appellant has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.' " State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala. Cr.App.1993). "`With regard to McKinnon's representation of Morrison at the punishment-fixing and sentencing phases of his trial, we find that the observations of the court in Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1568 (11th Cir.1987), are appropriate: "`"The failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of possible mitigating evidence may render counsel's assistance ineffective.

2015Indeed, in Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), this Court held that the death of an attorney did not relieve postconviction counsel of satisfying the Strickland test when raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2015Indeed, in Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), this Court held that the death of an attorney did not relieve postconviction counsel of satisfying the Strickland test when raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2015In the context of guilty pleas, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires that “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 .

2015In the context of guilty pleas, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires that “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 .

2023Standard of Review In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the defendant must show (1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant "must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987).

2023Standard of Review In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the defendant must show (1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant "must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987).

2024Instead, Strickland requires 'only a " 'reasonably competent attorney,' " ' which is to say that it 'does not guarantee perfect representation,' Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 , 131 S. Ct. 770 , 178 L.

2024Instead, Strickland requires 'only a " 'reasonably competent attorney,' " ' which is to say that it 'does not guarantee perfect representation,' Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 , 131 S. Ct. 770 , 178 L.