Strickland test in Iowa

2026We “always ha[ve] the option to decide the [PCR] claim on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488 , 501 n.2 (Iowa 2012).

2026We “always ha[ve] the option to decide the [PCR] claim on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488 , 501 n.2 (Iowa 2012).

2025The prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 .

2025The prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 .

2020We have stated, [T]he prejudice prong of the Strickland test “does not mean a defendant must establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ A defendant need only show that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006)).

2020We have stated, [T]he prejudice prong of the Strickland test “does not mean a defendant must establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ A defendant need only show that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006)).

2020See id.; King, 797 N.W.2d at 574 (“In this case, however, it is not necessary to decide the issue of whether King’s counsel provided inadequate assistance because, upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that King has failed to show prejudice as required under the Strickland test.”).

2020See id.; King, 797 N.W.2d at 574 (“In this case, however, it is not necessary to decide the issue of whether King’s counsel provided inadequate assistance because, upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that King has failed to show prejudice as required under the Strickland test.”).

2020See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42 , 38 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015) (“[T]he failure of a criminal defense attorney to make a reasonable inquiry of the client regarding his or her citizenship and immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178 , 182 (N.M. 2015) (“A defense attorney’s failure to advise a client of the ‘specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually certain’ renders that attorney’s performance deficient, which satisfies

2020See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42 , 38 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015) (“[T]he failure of a criminal defense attorney to make a reasonable inquiry of the client regarding his or her citizenship and immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178 , 182 (N.M. 2015) (“A defense attorney’s failure to advise a client of the ‘specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually certain’ renders that attorney’s performance deficient, which satisfies

2020See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42 , 38 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015) (“[T]he failure of a criminal defense attorney to make a reasonable inquiry of the client regarding his or her citizenship and immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178 , 182 (N.M. 2015) (“A defense attorney’s failure to advise a client of the ‘specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually certain’ renders that attorney’s performance deficient, which satisfies

2020See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42 , 38 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015) (“[T]he failure of a criminal defense attorney to make a reasonable inquiry of the client regarding his or her citizenship and immigration status is sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178 , 182 (N.M. 2015) (“A defense attorney’s failure to advise a client of the ‘specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually certain’ renders that attorney’s performance deficient, which satisfies

2019See Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 784 (applying the Strickland standard under both Constitutions).

2019See Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 784 (applying the Strickland standard under both Constitutions).

2014Specifically, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of this case, Duff “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (interpreting the Strickland test as applied to challenges to guilty pleas); see State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006) (“After the Hill decision, we [have] applied the “reasonable probability” standard to ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims.”). 10 The postconviction court determined Duff failed to prove

2014Specifically, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of this case, Duff “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (interpreting the Strickland test as applied to challenges to guilty pleas); see State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006) (“After the Hill decision, we [have] applied the “reasonable probability” standard to ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims.”). 10 The postconviction court determined Duff failed to prove

2014Specifically, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of this case, Duff “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (interpreting the Strickland test as applied to challenges to guilty pleas); see State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006) (“After the Hill decision, we [have] applied the “reasonable probability” standard to ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims.”). 10 The postconviction court determined Duff failed to prove

2014Specifically, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of this case, Duff “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (interpreting the Strickland test as applied to challenges to guilty pleas); see State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006) (“After the Hill decision, we [have] applied the “reasonable probability” standard to ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims.”). 10 The postconviction court determined Duff failed to prove

2022“Failure to prove either prong of the Strickland test results in failure of the [applicant’s] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004).

2022“Failure to prove either prong of the Strickland test results in failure of the [applicant’s] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004).

2020We have stated, [T]he prejudice prong of the Strickland test “does not mean a defendant must establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ A defendant need only show that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006)).

2020We have stated, [T]he prejudice prong of the Strickland test “does not mean a defendant must establish ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ A defendant need only show that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006)).

2019See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 138 (Iowa 2006) (ruling where trial court could properly overrule objection, trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty when did not object); State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003) (recognizing the failure to prove either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).

2019See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 138 (Iowa 2006) (ruling where trial court could properly overrule objection, trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty when did not object); State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003) (recognizing the failure to prove either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015Even in such cases, however, “we reserve the right to apply the principles differently under the state constitution compared to its federal counterpart.” King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; see, e.g., State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 842 n. 1.

2015Even in such cases, however, “we reserve the right to apply the principles differently under the state constitution compared to its federal counterpart.” King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; see, e.g., State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 842 n.1.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2014Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 (“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”) To establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, Clark must show “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” See State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 )).

2014Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 (“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”) To establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, Clark must show “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” See State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 )).

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2025See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011) (applying 1 Chandler conceded, however, that he did not know the location of the house where he slept or the name of its owner. 4 constitutional standards of review even though PCR applicants have “a statutory, not constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel”).

2025See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011) (applying 1 Chandler conceded, however, that he did not know the location of the house where he slept or the name of its owner. 4 constitutional standards of review even though PCR applicants have “a statutory, not constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel”).

2024When analyzing the prejudicial effect of several allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “look to the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors to determine whether the defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Iowa 2012) (referencing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 ); see also Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 668 (Iowa 1984) (affirming the denial of PCR because after reviewing the effect of the cumulative errors, “it [had] not been established that petitioner was denied a fair trial”).

2024When analyzing the prejudicial effect of several allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “look to the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors to determine whether the defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Iowa 2012) (referencing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 ); see also Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 668 (Iowa 1984) (affirming the denial of PCR because after reviewing the effect of the cumulative errors, “it [had] not been established that petitioner was denied a fair trial”).

2021“The court always has the option to decide the claim on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

2021“The court always has the option to decide the claim on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

2018See, e.g. , State v. Halverson , 857 N.W.2d 632 , 635 (Iowa 2015) (applying the Strickland standard to ineffective-assistance claims brought under the Iowa Constitution when the defendant did not suggest the claims should be reviewed differently under the Iowa Constitution).

2018See, e.g. , State v. Halverson , 857 N.W.2d 632 , 635 (Iowa 2015) (applying the Strickland standard to ineffective-assistance claims brought under the Iowa Constitution when the defendant did not suggest the claims should be reviewed differently under the Iowa Constitution).

2022State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003).

2022State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003).

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2015See State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012) (applying the two-prong Strickland test under both Constitutions); State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260 , 265–66 (Iowa 2010) (same); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006) (same); Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399 , 401–02 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 1997) (same); Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 16 at 739 (same); State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984) (same).3 We should not retreat from these precedents when no one asks us to do so.

2023See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000); State v. Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1999); State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1995).

2023See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000); State v. Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1999); State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1995).

2023See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000); State v. Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1999); State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1995).

2023See State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000); State v. Carrillo, 597 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1999); State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1995).

2020“To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the claimant must prove by a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 705 .

2020“To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the claimant must prove by a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 705 .