Strickland test in Delaware

2026Oct. 31, 2008). 73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (1984). 11 The Strickland test equally applies to the performance of appellate counsel.74 Importantly, appellate counsel is not constitutionally required to raise all possible issues on appeal.75 “A defendant can only show that his appellate counsel ineffectively represented him where the attorney omits issues that are clearly stronger than those the attorney presented” on appeal.76 Even where a defendant is successful in demonstrating the foregoing, he must then establish a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise

2026Oct. 31, 2008). 73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (1984). 11 The Strickland test equally applies to the performance of appellate counsel.74 Importantly, appellate counsel is not constitutionally required to raise all possible issues on appeal.75 “A defendant can only show that his appellate counsel ineffectively represented him where the attorney omits issues that are clearly stronger than those the attorney presented” on appeal.76 Even where a defendant is successful in demonstrating the foregoing, he must then establish a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise

2025To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must establish his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated under the two-part test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington102 as adopted by the state of Delaware.103 Under the Strickland test, the movant must show “first, that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, second, that the deficiencies in counsel’s from the plea agreement and the parties considered his potential self-defense claims when crafting the heavily negotiated

2025To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must establish his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated under the two-part test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington102 as adopted by the state of Delaware.103 Under the Strickland test, the movant must show “first, that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, second, that the deficiencies in counsel’s from the plea agreement and the parties considered his potential self-defense claims when crafting the heavily negotiated

2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To succeed under an IAC claim, a defendant must meet the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington.61 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,62 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”63 The Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonably professional assista

2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To succeed under an IAC claim, a defendant must meet the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington.61 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,62 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”63 The Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonably professional assista

2025Super.). 10 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 11 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 12 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988). 10 acquittal.13 The failure to establish that a defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief. 14 In addition, Delaware Courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.15 When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Stricklan

2025Super.). 10 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 11 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 12 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988). 10 acquittal.13 The failure to establish that a defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief. 14 In addition, Delaware Courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.15 When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Stricklan

2024After careful review, we find no merit to Jackson’s arguments. (7) We review Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the well-known two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington.11 In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must (i) show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) demonstrate prejudice.12 Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is deferential and our review of counsel’s representation is “subject to a strong presumption that the representation was profes

2024After careful review, we find no merit to Jackson’s arguments. (7) We review Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the well-known two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington.11 In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must (i) show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) demonstrate prejudice.12 Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is deferential and our review of counsel’s representation is “subject to a strong presumption that the representation was profes

2025Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168 In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a Strick

2025Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168 In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a Strick

2025Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington56 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.57 The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.58 Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice.59 I

2025Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington56 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.57 The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.58 Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice.59 I

2024Super.) 9 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 10 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 11 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988). 10 have insisted on going to trial and that the result of the trial would have been his acquittal.12 The failure to establish that they defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief.13 In addition, Delaware Courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them of risk summary dismissal.14 When

2024Super.) 9 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 10 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 11 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988). 10 have insisted on going to trial and that the result of the trial would have been his acquittal.12 The failure to establish that they defendant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief.13 In addition, Delaware Courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them of risk summary dismissal.14 When

2025Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington56 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.57 The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.58 Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice.59 I

2025Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington56 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.57 The Strickland test requires the movant show that counsel's errors were so grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.58 Second, under Strickland the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, that is, actual prejudice.59 I

2025According to that standard, set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 62 Kent must show that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 63 If he is successful there, Kent must then demonstrate sufficient prejudice to his defense. 64 To prevail on the first part of the Strickland test – the performance prong – Kent bears a heavy burden. 65 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly 59 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 173 (Del. 2020) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 60 Id. 61 2025 WL 16395 (Del.

2025According to that standard, set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 62 Kent must show that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 63 If he is successful there, Kent must then demonstrate sufficient prejudice to his defense. 64 To prevail on the first part of the Strickland test – the performance prong – Kent bears a heavy burden. 65 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly 59 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 173 (Del. 2020) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 60 Id. 61 2025 WL 16395 (Del.

2023Supr.). 15 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (Citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 16 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986)). 17 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . 12 convincing evidence to the contrary.18 Consequently, Hall has failed to establish that his counsel’s representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.

2023Supr.). 15 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (Citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 16 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986)). 17 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . 12 convincing evidence to the contrary.18 Consequently, Hall has failed to establish that his counsel’s representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.

2025Sept. 4, 2015). -6- did.”25 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was reasonable,26 and “[i]t is not this Court’s function to second-guess reasonable [ ] tactics” engaged by counsel.27 Indeed, an attorneys strategic or tactical choices made after thorough investigation of the relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable.28 (14) Too, one claiming ineffective assistance “must make specific allegations of how defense counsel’s conduct actually prejudiced the proceedings, rather than mere allegations of ineffectiveness.”29 This second prong requires the claimant to sh

2025If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 18 Id. at 689. 19 Id. at 681. 20 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 21 Strickland at 691. 22 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce ju

2025Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168 In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a Strick

2025Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168 In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a Strick

2025As noted above, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is also an “‘arduous standard” in a movant’s path because “a defendant ‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 99 A reasonable probability is one that “[a]lthough less than a preponderance of the evidence, [is] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” which “requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different 98 See Reply Br. at 9 (arguing that Kent lived at S.A.’s house fro

2025As noted above, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is also an “‘arduous standard” in a movant’s path because “a defendant ‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 99 A reasonable probability is one that “[a]lthough less than a preponderance of the evidence, [is] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” which “requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different 98 See Reply Br. at 9 (arguing that Kent lived at S.A.’s house fro

2024ANALYSIS A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the two-part Strickland test.87 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error(s), the result of his proceedings would have been different.88 For the first prong—deficient performance—the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonablenes

2024ANALYSIS A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the two-part Strickland test.87 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error(s), the result of his proceedings would have been different.88 For the first prong—deficient performance—the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonablenes

2025Sept. 4, 2015). -6- did.”25 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was reasonable,26 and “[i]t is not this Court’s function to second-guess reasonable [ ] tactics” engaged by counsel.27 Indeed, an attorneys strategic or tactical choices made after thorough investigation of the relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable.28 (14) Too, one claiming ineffective assistance “must make specific allegations of how defense counsel’s conduct actually prejudiced the proceedings, rather than mere allegations of ineffectiveness.”29 This second prong requires the claimant to sh

2025In evaluating such a claim, concrete allegations of prejudice, including specifying the nature of the prejudice and the adverse effects 104 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 174 (Del. 2020) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). 105 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 106 Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 (1987)). 107 Id. (citations omitted). 108 Id. (citing Burger, 483 U.S. at 791 ). 24 actually suffered are required;109 the Court dismisses conclusory allegations.110 When a movant collaterally attacks a guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, as Guilford

2025If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 18 Id. at 689. 19 Id. at 681. 20 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 21 Strickland at 691. 22 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce ju

2025If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 18 Id. at 689. 19 Id. at 681. 20 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 21 Strickland at 691. 22 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce ju

2019Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s representation of Harmon was somehow deficient, Harmon must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, '0 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . '' Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264 , at *2 (Del.Supr.)(citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).

2019Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s representation of Harmon was somehow deficient, Harmon must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, '0 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . '' Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264 , at *2 (Del.Supr.)(citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).

2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel A successful IAC claim must satisfy the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington.60 Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) if trial counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”61 The Strickland standard carries a strong presumption that counsel conducted himself in a professionally reasonable manner.62 Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are

2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel A successful IAC claim must satisfy the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington.60 Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) if trial counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”61 The Strickland standard carries a strong presumption that counsel conducted himself in a professionally reasonable manner.62 Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are

2026It is unquestionable that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”97 Even so, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the Strickland analysis applies similarly.98 Specifically, in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must first “demonstrate that the advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”99 To show prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have plea

2026It is unquestionable that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”97 Even so, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the Strickland analysis applies similarly.98 Specifically, in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must first “demonstrate that the advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”99 To show prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have plea

2025If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 18 Id. at 689. 19 Id. at 681. 20 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 21 Strickland at 691. 22 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce ju

2025If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 18 Id. at 689. 19 Id. at 681. 20 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 21 Strickland at 691. 22 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce ju

2026It is unquestionable that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”97 Even so, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the Strickland analysis applies similarly.98 Specifically, in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must first “demonstrate that the advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”99 To show prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have plea

2026It is unquestionable that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”97 Even so, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the Strickland analysis applies similarly.98 Specifically, in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must first “demonstrate that the advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”99 To show prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have plea

2021In their affidavit, trial counsel admitted that they “chose not to call Ronald Proctor to testify at trial.”111 “After numerous meetings with Proctor, trial counsel concluded that Proctor would be an unreliable witness . . . [and] could potentially prejudice defendant.”112 “If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable’ . . .”113 Thus, the decision not to call Proctor as a witness also fails to meet the first prong of the Strickland standard. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. 111 A4768. 1

2021In their affidavit, trial counsel admitted that they “chose not to call Ronald Proctor to testify at trial.”111 “After numerous meetings with Proctor, trial counsel concluded that Proctor would be an unreliable witness . . . [and] could potentially prejudice defendant.”112 “If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable’ . . .”113 Thus, the decision not to call Proctor as a witness also fails to meet the first prong of the Strickland standard. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. 111 A4768. 1

2019The Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State’? adopted the standard for analyzing Rule 61 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel required in Strickland v. Washington.’ Strickland mandated a showing that “...counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness...”, and “... that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ' See Superior Court Rule 61(1); Ayers v. State, 802 A2d 278 (Del. 2002). * 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). (“Albury”) ? 466 U.S.. 668 (1984). * Albury, 551 A.2d

2019The Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State’? adopted the standard for analyzing Rule 61 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel required in Strickland v. Washington.’ Strickland mandated a showing that “...counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness...”, and “... that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ' See Superior Court Rule 61(1); Ayers v. State, 802 A2d 278 (Del. 2002). * 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). (“Albury”) ? 466 U.S.. 668 (1984). * Albury, 551 A.2d

2025First, counsel’s performance must have been deficient, meaning that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Second, if counsel was deficient, there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”73 However, in United States v. Cronic, a companion case to Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that there are three scenarios in which the defendant need not satisfy the Strickland test, because prejudice is presumed: (1) where there is a complete denial of coun

2025First, counsel’s performance must have been deficient, meaning that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Second, if counsel was deficient, there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”73 However, in United States v. Cronic, a companion case to Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that there are three scenarios in which the defendant need not satisfy the Strickland test, because prejudice is presumed: (1) where there is a complete denial of coun

2025As the Supreme Court said in Cronic, some situations “ma[k]e it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [i]s properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial.” 30 27 478 P.3d at *7 (internal citations omitted). 28 203 A.3d 719 (Del. 2019). 29 Id. at 732. 30 Id. 50 And we then observed that “[e]ven if specific prejudice need be shown, under a Strickland analysis trial counsel’s pretrial ineffectiveness prejudiced Urquhart in plea negotiations. . . .

2025As the Supreme Court said in Cronic, some situations “ma[k]e it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [i]s properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial.” 30 27 478 P.3d at *7 (internal citations omitted). 28 203 A.3d 719 (Del. 2019). 29 Id. at 732. 30 Id. 50 And we then observed that “[e]ven if specific prejudice need be shown, under a Strickland analysis trial counsel’s pretrial ineffectiveness prejudiced Urquhart in plea negotiations. . . .

2022Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard regarding the first prong is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.32 A defendant must show that any alleged errors were so serious that his counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.33 Great weight and deference is given to the tactical decisions of 28 Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del.

2022Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard regarding the first prong is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.32 A defendant must show that any alleged errors were so serious that his counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.33 Great weight and deference is given to the tactical decisions of 28 Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del.

2024See Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 381 (Del. 2011) (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 127 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (finding that to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an inmate must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test); State v. McGlotten, 2011 WL 987534 , at *4 (Del.

2024See Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 381 (Del. 2011) (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ). 127 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (finding that to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an inmate must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test); State v. McGlotten, 2011 WL 987534 , at *4 (Del.