Strickland test in Rhode Island

2024Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction * * * resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . - 11 - This Court has adopted the Strickland test.

2024Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction * * * resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . - 11 - This Court has adopted the Strickland test.

2011The Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Strickland standard in Heath v. Vose , 747 A.2d 475 , 478 (R.I. 2000).

2011The Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Strickland standard in Heath v. Vose , 747 A.2d 475 , 478 (R.I. 2000).

2013Only if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant “must show that the ‘deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors *746 were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Guerrero, 47 A.3d at 300 -01 (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I.2001)).

2013Only if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant “must show that the ‘deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors *746 were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Guerrero, 47 A.3d at 300 -01 (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I.2001)).

2012See Gonder, 935 A.2d at 88 ; see also Neufaille, 13 A.3d at 614 ; Page, 995 A.2d at 945 (holding that, since the attorney’s performance “did not run afoul of even the first prong (deficiency) under the Strickland test[,]” the Court need not consider the prejudice prong).

2012See Gonder, 935 A.2d at 88 ; see also Neufaille, 13 A.3d at 614 ; Page, 995 A.2d at 945 (holding that, since the attorney’s performance “did not run afoul of even the first prong (deficiency) under the Strickland test[,]” the Court need not consider the prejudice prong).

2013This Court considers counsel’s performance in its entirety, and “when that performance is deficient in a number of respects, then the possibility is greater that an accumulation of serious shortcomings prejudiced the defendant to a sufficient degree to meet the Strickland requirement.” Brown v. State, 964 A.2d 516, 528 (R.I.2009).

2010The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant *Page 9 setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment ." Id. at 691 (emphasis added); see also Brown , 964 A.2d at 528 (when counsel's performance is "deficient in a number of respects, then the possibility is greater that an accumulation of serious shortcomings prejudiced the defendant to a sufficient degree to meet the Strickland requirement") (internal citation omitted).

2010A defendant raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test to prevail; unless he or she does so, "it cannot be said that the conviction or . . . sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Simpson v. State , 769 A.2d 1257 , 1266 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2010A defendant raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test to prevail; unless he or she does so, "it cannot be said that the conviction or . . . sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Simpson v. State , 769 A.2d 1257 , 1266 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2010Washington argues that the facts here “are similar” to those in United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir.1992), which held that, under the first prong of the Strickland standard, the “essence” of such a claim “is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the defendant of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf.” After careful review of the record, we disagree with applicant and, like the hearing justice, hold that, as in Teague, 953 F.2d at 1535 , the record here “reflects a voluntary waiver by the defendant of his right to testify.” In Teague

2010Washington argues that the facts here “are similar” to those in United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir.1992), which held that, under the first prong of the Strickland standard, the “essence” of such a claim “is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the defendant of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf.” After careful review of the record, we disagree with applicant and, like the hearing justice, hold that, as in Teague, 953 F.2d at 1535 , the record here “reflects a voluntary waiver by the defendant of his right to testify.” In Teague

2010Moniz, 933 A.2d at 696 (citing Burke v. State, 925 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I.2007)).

2010Moniz, 933 A.2d at 696 (citing Burke v. State, 925 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I.2007)).

2016We have previously noted that “applicants seeking postconviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel are ‘saddled with a heavy burden, in that there exists a strongs presumption [recognized by this Court] that an attorney’s performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance and sound strategy * * *.’ ” Id. at 461 (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 17 (R.I.2012)), To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the [applicant] must satisfy the two prongs of the Strickland test: ‘[f]irst, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance wa

2016We have previously noted that “applicants seeking postconviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel are ‘saddled with a heavy burden, in that there exists a strongs presumption [recognized by this Court] that an attorney’s performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance and sound strategy * * *.’ ” Id. at 461 (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 17 (R.I.2012)), To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the [applicant] must satisfy the two prongs of the Strickland test: ‘[f]irst, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance wa

2014Then, “[o]nly if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant must show that the deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 745-46 (R.I.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289, 300-01 (R.I.2012).

2014Then, “[o]nly if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant must show that the deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 745-46 (R.I.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289, 300-01 (R.I.2012).

2012If (but only if) it is determined that there was deficient performance, the court proceeds to the second prong of the Strickland test, pursuant to which the applicant must show that the “deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.” Brennan, 764 A.2d at 171 ; see also Rice, 38 A.3d at 17 ; Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162 ; Young v. State, 877 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I.2005); Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 381 (R.I.2001).

2012If (but only if) it is determined that there was deficient performance, the court proceeds to the second prong of the Strickland test, pursuant to which the applicant must show that the “deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.” Brennan, 764 A.2d at 171 ; see also Rice, 38 A.3d at 17 ; Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162 ; Young v. State, 877 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I.2005); Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 381 (R.I.2001).

2013The first prong of the Strickland analysis requires an applicant to show “that counsel’s performance was deficient[, which] requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 522 (R.I.1999)).

2013The first prong of the Strickland analysis requires an applicant to show “that counsel’s performance was deficient[, which] requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 522 (R.I.1999)).

2010Before moving to the next part of the test, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an *Page 4 objective standard of reasonableness." Washington v. State , 989 A.2d 94 , 99 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2010Before moving to the next part of the test, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an *Page 4 objective standard of reasonableness." Washington v. State , 989 A.2d 94 , 99 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2010See, e.g. , Heath v. Vose , 747 A.2d 475 , 478 (R.I. 2000) (explicitly stating that Rhode Island has adopted the Strickland standard); Barboza v. State , 484 A.2d 881 , 883 (R.I. 1984) (recognizing for the first time the Strickland standard).

2010See, e.g. , Heath v. Vose , 747 A.2d 475 , 478 (R.I. 2000) (explicitly stating that Rhode Island has adopted the Strickland standard); Barboza v. State , 484 A.2d 881 , 883 (R.I. 1984) (recognizing for the first time the Strickland standard).

2008In Rhode Island, "`prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Larngar v. Wall , 918 A.2d 850 , 856 (R.I. 2007) (quoting State v. Figueroa , 639 A.2d 495 , 500 (R.I. 1994)). *Page 6 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the Strickland standard.

2008In Rhode Island, "`prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Larngar v. Wall , 918 A.2d 850 , 856 (R.I. 2007) (quoting State v. Figueroa , 639 A.2d 495 , 500 (R.I. 1994)). *Page 6 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the Strickland standard.

2016The second prong of the Strickland standard requires an applicant to “show that he [or she] was prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Bido, 56 A.3d at 111 (quoting Lynch, 13 A.3d at 605 ).

2016The second prong of the Strickland standard requires an applicant to “show that he [or she] was prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Bido, 56 A.3d at 111 (quoting Lynch, 13 A.3d at 605 ).

2010The core issue in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, then, is "whether `counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having a just result.'" Bustamante , 866 A.2d at 522 (citing Toole v. State , 748 A.2d 806 , 809 (R.I. 2000), quoting Tarvis v. Moran , 551 A.2d 699 , 700 (R.I. 1988)). 6 In considering the first prong of the test, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has clarified the Strickland standard, holding that "mere tactical decisions, though ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective a

2010The core issue in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, then, is "whether `counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having a just result.'" Bustamante , 866 A.2d at 522 (citing Toole v. State , 748 A.2d 806 , 809 (R.I. 2000), quoting Tarvis v. Moran , 551 A.2d 699 , 700 (R.I. 1988)). 6 In considering the first prong of the test, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has clarified the Strickland standard, holding that "mere tactical decisions, though ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective a

2016The second prong of the Strickland standard requires an applicant to “show that he [or she] was prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Bido, 56 A.3d at 111 (quoting Lynch, 13 A.3d at 605 ).

2016The second prong of the Strickland standard requires an applicant to “show that he [or she] was prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Bido, 56 A.3d at 111 (quoting Lynch, 13 A.3d at 605 ).

2015“Only if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant must show that the ‘deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Linde, 78 A.3d at 745-46 ).

2015“Only if it is determined that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient does the Court proceed to the second prong of the Strickland test, in which the applicant must show that the ‘deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Linde, 78 A.3d at 745-46 ).

2013As we have previously recognized, the United States Supreme Court *180 has “cautioned that the Strickland standard should not be applied overbroadly * * Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 864 (R.I.2007) (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S.Ct. 988 , 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986)). “[W]hen determining whether an attorney’s conduct amount[s] to ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable * * * so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct * * *.’ ” Id. (quoting Nix, 475 U.S. at 165 , 106

2013As we have previously recognized, the United States Supreme Court *180 has “cautioned that the Strickland standard should not be applied overbroadly * * Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 864 (R.I.2007) (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S.Ct. 988 , 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986)). “[W]hen determining whether an attorney’s conduct amount[s] to ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable * * * so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct * * *.’ ” Id. (quoting Nix, 475 U.S. at 165 , 106

2011Ill Prejudice Prong Because of our conclusion that counsel’s performance was “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Rodrigues, 985 A.2d at 315 (quoting Moniz, 933 A.2d at 697 ), we need not undertake the second part of the Strickland analysis, whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense in this case.

2011Ill Prejudice Prong Because of our conclusion that counsel’s performance was “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Rodrigues, 985 A.2d at 315 (quoting Moniz, 933 A.2d at 697 ), we need not undertake the second part of the Strickland analysis, whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense in this case.

2012See Gonder, 935 A.2d at 88 ; see also Neufaille, 13 A.3d at 614 ; Page, 995 A.2d at 945 (holding that, since the attorney’s performance “did not run afoul of even the first prong (deficiency) under the Strickland test[,]” the Court need not consider the prejudice prong).

2012See Gonder, 935 A.2d at 88 ; see also Neufaille, 13 A.3d at 614 ; Page, 995 A.2d at 945 (holding that, since the attorney’s performance “did not run afoul of even the first prong (deficiency) under the Strickland test[,]” the Court need not consider the prejudice prong).