Strickland test in Texas

2026To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Stubblefield must overcome “a strong presumption that [his] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonabl[y] professional assistance.” Id. “[A]ny allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2026To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Stubblefield must overcome “a strong presumption that [his] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonabl[y] professional assistance.” Id. “[A]ny allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2026To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Stubblefield must overcome “a strong presumption that [his] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonabl[y] professional assistance.” Id. “[A]ny allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2026To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Stubblefield must overcome “a strong presumption that [his] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonabl[y] professional assistance.” Id. “[A]ny allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim.

2026A person claiming that his counsel was ineffective must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an “objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding - 17 - would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); see Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (applying Strickland test).

2026See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (applying Strickland test).

2026West v. State, 474 S.W.3d 785, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“As with the guilt[–]innocence phase of trial, the standard [of ineffective assistance of counsel in the punishment phase] is the two-pronged Strickland test.” (citing Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2026West v. State, 474 S.W.3d 785, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“As with the guilt[–]innocence phase of trial, the standard [of ineffective assistance of counsel in the punishment phase] is the two-pronged Strickland test.” (citing Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2026App. 1998). “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2026App. 1998). “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2026To constitute deficient performance, “the challenged conduct [must be] so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (“An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.”). (1) Motion for new trial O

2026To constitute deficient performance, “the challenged conduct [must be] so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (“An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.”). (1) Motion for new trial O

2021The record on direct appeal will generally “not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard” because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record.” Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “[T]rial counsel should ordinarily be given an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.” Id. at 111; Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex

2021The record on direct appeal will generally “not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard” because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record.” Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “[T]rial counsel should ordinarily be given an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.” Id. at 111; Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex

2024Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-step analysis articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “an appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim.

2024Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-step analysis articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “an appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim.

2024Under the first prong of the Strickland test, an appellant must show that counsel’s performance was “deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim.

2024Under the first prong of the Strickland test, an appellant must show that counsel’s performance was “deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim.

2026To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, Aleman must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

2026To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, Aleman must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

2026Applicable here, the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis requires an applicant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Aguilar, 537 S.W.3d 122, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2026Applicable here, the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis requires an applicant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Aguilar, 537 S.W.3d 122, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2023“The Strickland test is judged by the ‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel’s isolated acts or omissions, and the test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight.” Id. 21 To establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2023“The Strickland test is judged by the ‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel’s isolated acts or omissions, and the test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight.” Id. 21 To establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2026In the majority of cases, the appellant is unable to meet the first prong of the Strickland test because the record on direct appeal is “undeveloped and inadequately reflective of the reasons for defense counsel’s actions . . . .” Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

2026In the majority of cases, the appellant is unable to meet the first prong of the Strickland test because the record on direct appeal is “undeveloped and inadequately reflective of the reasons for defense counsel’s actions . . . .” Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal.” Id. (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 , 730 n.14 (Tex. Crim.

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal.” Id. (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 , 730 n.14 (Tex. Crim.

2004Whether the Strickland test has been met is to be judged by the "totality of the representation." Welborn , 785 S.W.2d at 393 .

2004Whether the Strickland test has been met is to be judged by the "totality of the representation." Welborn , 785 S.W.2d at 393 .

2015Brown Cannot Meet the First Strickland Prong As for the first Strickland prong, “[w]e indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance and that it was motivated by sound trial strategy.” Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)), “A Strickland claim must be ‘firmly founded in the. record,’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 ); see Lopez v. State, 343 S.

2015Brown Cannot Meet the First Strickland Prong As for the first Strickland prong, “[w]e indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance and that it was motivated by sound trial strategy.” Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)), “A Strickland claim must be ‘firmly founded in the. record,’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 ); see Lopez v. State, 343 S.

2025In that interest, Texas courts have applied criminal standards in parental-rights jurisprudence as it relates to effective assistance of counsel. 16 See M.S. 115 S.W.3d at 544–45 (adopting the Strickland standard in parental-termination cases).

2025In that interest, Texas courts have applied criminal standards in parental-rights jurisprudence as it relates to effective assistance of counsel. 16 See M.S. 115 S.W.3d at 544–45 (adopting the Strickland standard in parental-termination cases).

2022“A party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed.” Id. (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 ); see In re K.M.H., 181 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), (finding that the second Strickland prong is required for ineffective assistance claims based on conflict of interest in parental-rights termination cases)).3 “Allegations of ineffectiveness ‘must “be firmly founded in the record.”’” Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876, 897 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.

2022“A party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed.” Id. (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 ); see In re K.M.H., 181 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), (finding that the second Strickland prong is required for ineffective assistance claims based on conflict of interest in parental-rights termination cases)).3 “Allegations of ineffectiveness ‘must “be firmly founded in the record.”’” Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876, 897 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.

2023Jackson, 973 S.W.2d at 956 . “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 ; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . 31 Related to appellant’s third issue, we need not address whether appellant’s trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when counsel purportedly “failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence” at the November 23, 2021 hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt.

2023Jackson, 973 S.W.2d at 956 . “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 ; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . 31 Related to appellant’s third issue, we need not address whether appellant’s trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when counsel purportedly “failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence” at the November 23, 2021 hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt.

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal.” Id. (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 , 730 n.14 (Tex. Crim.

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal.” Id. (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 , 730 n.14 (Tex. Crim.

2025The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).

2025The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).

2013In order to defeat Strickland’s presumption of reasonable professional assistance, “any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Id. at 814 (citing McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

2012In order to defeat Strickland’s presumption of reasonable professional assistance, “any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Id. at 814 (quoting McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that they would “follow in full the Strickland standards in determining effective assistance and prejudice resulting therefrom.” The Court in Bridge v. State, 726 S.W.2d 558, 571 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) explained that the Strickland standard has not been interpreted to mean that an accused is entitled to “errorless or perfect counsel” and that the court must look to the “totality of the representation” applied at the “time of trial, and not through hindsight.” An appellant is “not entitled to a tri

2015In Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that they would “follow in full the Strickland standards in determining effective assistance and prejudice resulting therefrom.” The Court in Bridge v. State, 726 S.W.2d 558, 571 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) explained that the Strickland standard has not been interpreted to mean that an accused is entitled to “errorless or perfect counsel” and that the court must look to the “totality of the representation” applied at the “time of trial, and not through hindsight.” An appellant is “not entitled to a tri

1994It is critical that the defendant obtain the necessary record in the trial court to rebut the Strickland presumption that counsel's conduct was strategic for purposes of appeal.  Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 814; McCullough v. State , 116 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd.).  This kind of record is best developed in a hearing on a motion for new trial, or by an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  See Jackson v. State , 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); McCullough , 116 S.W.3d at 92 .  Without evidence of the strategy and methods involved concerning c

1994It is critical that the defendant obtain the necessary record in the trial court to rebut the Strickland presumption that counsel's conduct was strategic for purposes of appeal.  Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 814; McCullough v. State , 116 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd.).  This kind of record is best developed in a hearing on a motion for new trial, or by an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  See Jackson v. State , 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); McCullough , 116 S.W.3d at 92 .  Without evidence of the strategy and methods involved concerning c

2025Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 6 Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the appellant establishes prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that but for counsel’s deficient performance the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2025Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 6 Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the appellant establishes prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that but for counsel’s deficient performance the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2008Texas adopted the Strickland test in Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2008Texas adopted the Strickland test in Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2026“The Strickland test is judged by the ‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel’s isolated acts or omissions, and the test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight.” Id.

2026“The Strickland test is judged by the ‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel’s isolated acts or omissions, and the test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight.” Id.

2015An appellant claiming a Strickland violation must establish that: (1) “his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 851 ; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2014An appellant claiming a 1 We also note that Acosta’s trial counsel stated on the record that he felt the deadly conduct instruction was not warranted by the evidence and that he only requested it at his client’s insistence. 11 Strickland violation must establish that: (1) “his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 851 ; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2024Because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record,” the record will generally “not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard.” Id. at 341.

2024Because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record,” the record will generally “not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard.” Id. at 341.