Strickland test in Minnesota

2026To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under the Strickland standard, the party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that a reasonable probability exists that, but for . . . counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 12 of the proceedings would have been different.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 )).

2026To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under the Strickland standard, the party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that a reasonable probability exists that, but for . . . counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 12 of the proceedings would have been different.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 )).

2015See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842 (stating that, if a defendant does not fulfill one prong of the Strickland test, the other prong need not be considered).

2015See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842 (stating that, if a defendant does not fulfill one prong of the Strickland test, the other prong need not be considered).

2026Because Love’s notice to remove was untimely, he cannot establish the second requirement of the Strickland test, which requires “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Gates, 398 N.W.2d at 561 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2026Because Love’s notice to remove was untimely, he cannot establish the second requirement of the Strickland test, which requires “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Gates, 398 N.W.2d at 561 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2024See Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 2013) (noting that a reviewing court need not address both parts of the Strickland test if one is determinative).

2024See Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 2013) (noting that a reviewing court need not address both parts of the Strickland test if one is determinative).

2024Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009).

2024Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009).

2026“We review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017). 7 Reyes-Jovel argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys (1) inadequately advised him about the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and (2) improperly advised him on a possible duress defense.

2026“We review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017). 7 Reyes-Jovel argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys (1) inadequately advised him about the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and (2) improperly advised him on a possible duress defense.

2025“Under the Strickland test, [appellant] must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10 .

2025“Under the Strickland test, [appellant] must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10 .

2026Failing “to do so clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.” Id. at 371 (quotation omitted).

2026Failing “to do so clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.” Id. at 371 (quotation omitted).

2025See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (stating that even if a defendant’s claim succeeds on the first prong, no relief is warranted unless counsel’s ineffective representation resulted in prejudice to the defendant); see, e.g., Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992) (applying the Strickland test to determine whether to grant a defendant a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel).

2025See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (stating that even if a defendant’s claim succeeds on the first prong, no relief is warranted unless counsel’s ineffective representation resulted in prejudice to the defendant); see, e.g., Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992) (applying the Strickland test to determine whether to grant a defendant a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel).

2024See Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 266-67 ; see also Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 539 (stating that an attorney’s mistake of law “may amount to “affirmative misadvice about [collateral] consequences may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel if the Strickland factors are met.” Id. at 539 .

2024See Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 266-67 ; see also Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 539 (stating that an attorney’s mistake of law “may amount to “affirmative misadvice about [collateral] consequences may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel if the Strickland factors are met.” Id. at 539 .

2015To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show “(1) that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); see also Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 2013) (stating that a reviewing court need not address both parts of the Stric

2015To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show “(1) that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); see also Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 2013) (stating that a reviewing court need not address both parts of the Stric

2013Under the first prong of the Strickland test, counsel’s performance is objectively reasonable if he or she exercises “‘the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” Reed, 793 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting State v. Gassier, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn.1993)).

2013Under the first prong of the Strickland test, counsel’s performance is objectively reasonable if he or she exercises “‘the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” Reed, 793 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting State v. Gassier, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn.1993)).

2026Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007).

2026Schneider v. State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007).

2024Regarding the first prong of the Strickland test, Holinka argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the testimony at issue on either hearsay or Confrontation Clause grounds was objectively unreasonable because the “out-of-court statement was the sole piece of evidence identifying Holinka as the seller, an element the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” and therefore “there was no strategic advantage to not objecting.” Holinka’s argument is unpersuasive. 16 Appellate courts presume that trial counsel’s performance is reasonable and give “particular deference to mat

2024Regarding the first prong of the Strickland test, Holinka argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the testimony at issue on either hearsay or Confrontation Clause grounds was objectively unreasonable because the “out-of-court statement was the sole piece of evidence identifying Holinka as the seller, an element the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” and therefore “there was no strategic advantage to not objecting.” Holinka’s argument is unpersuasive. 16 Appellate courts presume that trial counsel’s performance is reasonable and give “particular deference to mat

2016A court may address the two prongs of the Strickland test in any order and “may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2006).

2016A court may address the two prongs of the Strickland test in any order and “may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2006).

2024But “[i]f the postconviction court concludes there are no material facts in dispute that preclude dismissal, and the [s]tate is entitled to dismissal of the petition as a matter of law, the court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 506 (quotation omitted). 17 More specifically as to this matter, “[t]o be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence,” satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. 3 Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665 , 671 (Minn. 2020) (quo

2024But “[i]f the postconviction court concludes there are no material facts in dispute that preclude dismissal, and the [s]tate is entitled to dismissal of the petition as a matter of law, the court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 506 (quotation omitted). 17 More specifically as to this matter, “[t]o be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence,” satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. 3 Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665 , 671 (Minn. 2020) (quo

2012See Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn.1992); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (applying the Strickland standard to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel).

2012See Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn.1992); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (applying the Strickland standard to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel).

2025Under the Strickland test Davis had to show, first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2025Under the Strickland test Davis had to show, first, “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 266–67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). “[A]pplication of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, [so the] standard of review is de novo.” Griffin v. State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2016).

2017“The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 266–67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). “[A]pplication of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, [so the] standard of review is de novo.” Griffin v. State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2016).

2007State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998) (applying the Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel); Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Minn.1996) (applying the Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2007State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998) (applying the Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel); Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Minn.1996) (applying the Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2014See Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012) 9 (stating that an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test). “[W]e resolve any doubts about whether an evidentiary hearing is required in favor of the petitioner.” Patterson v. State, 670 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Minn. 2003).

2014See Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012) 9 (stating that an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test). “[W]e resolve any doubts about whether an evidentiary hearing is required in favor of the petitioner.” Patterson v. State, 670 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Minn. 2003).

2025Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “[a]ppellate counsel has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016).

2025Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “[a]ppellate counsel has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016).

2024“Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019). 19 Murray argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) perform an independent investigation, (2) properly impeach P.G.’s testimony, (3) hire expert witnesses, (4) call a police officer to testify regarding Murray’s gun charge, (5) assert a speedy-trial violation, (6) challenge the legality of his arrest, (7) challenge the “malice aforethought” element of the crime, (8) present evidence of mitigating circ

2024“Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019). 19 Murray argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) perform an independent investigation, (2) properly impeach P.G.’s testimony, (3) hire expert witnesses, (4) call a police officer to testify regarding Murray’s gun charge, (5) assert a speedy-trial violation, (6) challenge the legality of his arrest, (7) challenge the “malice aforethought” element of the crime, (8) present evidence of mitigating circ

2023Under the first element of the Strickland test, there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007).

2023Under the first element of the Strickland test, there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007).

2017Staunton v. State, 784 N.W.2d 289, 300 (Minn. 2010). 1 Sanchez did not raise a separate claim under the Minnesota Constitution. 7 Before the Supreme Court decided Padilla in 2010, the rule in Minnesota was that a criminal-defense attorney had no duty to inform a noncitizen defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea because such consequences were “collateral” to the decision of whether to plead guilty.

2017Staunton v. State, 784 N.W.2d 289, 300 (Minn. 2010). 1 Sanchez did not raise a separate claim under the Minnesota Constitution. 7 Before the Supreme Court decided Padilla in 2010, the rule in Minnesota was that a criminal-defense attorney had no duty to inform a noncitizen defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea because such consequences were “collateral” to the decision of whether to plead guilty.

2016See Williams, 764 N.W.2d at 30 (concluding that appellant could not establish the prejudice prong).

2016See Williams, 764 N.W.2d at 30 (concluding that appellant could not establish the prejudice prong).

2023An attorney meets the reasonableness standard if they provide the “client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills 9 and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

2023An attorney meets the reasonableness standard if they provide the “client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills 9 and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

2016“Under the second part of the Strickland test, [the court] determine[s] whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814 , 844–45 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

2016“Under the second part of the Strickland test, [the court] determine[s] whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814 , 844–45 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).