Strickland test in Arizona

2019See State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 543 (1985). ¶8 Hill’s claim fails to meet the Strickland standard.

2019See State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 543 (1985). ¶8 Hill’s claim fails to meet the Strickland standard.

2026Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ).

2026Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ).

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006). ¶9 First, Lawrence argues counsel pressured him to accept the plea by saying he would likely be sentenced to life in prison if convicted at trial.

2026“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006). ¶9 First, Lawrence argues counsel pressured him to accept the plea by saying he would likely be sentenced to life in prison if convicted at trial.

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392 , 397–98 (1985) (adopting the Strickland test).

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392 , 397–98 (1985) (adopting the Strickland test).

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2007Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla.2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659, 664-65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223, 224-25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistance-of

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2026Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ).

2026Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ).

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2007Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla.2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659, 664-65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223, 224-25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistance-of

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2007Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla.2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659, 664-65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223, 224-25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistance-of

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2020Compare, e.g., S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 851 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2003) (ineffective assistance claim recognized in appeal of termination order, where right to counsel grounded in state constitution, but not dependency order, where right to counsel only statutory); In re Heather R., 269 Neb. 653 , 694 N.W.2d 659 , 664–65 (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in civil juvenile proceeding; allegation of inadequate representation assessed as a due process claim to fundamentally fair procedure); In re N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379 , 115 P.3d 223 , 224–25 (2005) (“no ineffective-assistan

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2022See State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 264 (1984) (“Proof of ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation.”).

2017"The petitioner must offer some demonstration that the attorney's representation fell below that of the prevailing objective standards . . . [and] some evidence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the [proceeding] would have been different." State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999). "[P]roof of ineffectiveness of counsel must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation." State v. Vaughn, 163 Ariz. 200, 205 (App. 1989) (citing State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 264 (1984)). ¶5 The superior court dismissed the pet

2007Sec., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶¶ 12, 14 , 77 P.3d 55, 58 (App.2003).

2007Sec., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶¶ 12, 14 , 77 P.3d 55, 58 (App.2003).

2007Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038-39 (2007) (collecting eases adopting Strickland standard for termination proceedings); cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 , 101 S.Ct. at 2162 (failure to appoint counsel not denial of due process where counsel could not have made any “determinative difference” in result of severance hearing); Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

2007Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038-39 (2007) (collecting eases adopting Strickland standard for termination proceedings); cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 , 101 S.Ct. at 2162 (failure to appoint counsel not denial of due process where counsel could not have made any “determinative difference” in result of severance hearing); Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

2007Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, ¶ 27 , 118 P.3d 37, 43 (App.2005) (failure to provide parent notice of right to jury trial in severance proceeding not fundamental error where parent presented no evidence that jury would have decided case differently). ¶ 19 John has provided no basis for us to conclude that the severance proceedings in this case were fundamentally unfair; that the result of the hearing is unreliable; or that, had counsel conducted himself differently, the juvenile court would have reached a different result.

2007Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, ¶ 27 , 118 P.3d 37, 43 (App.2005) (failure to provide parent notice of right to jury trial in severance proceeding not fundamental error where parent presented no evidence that jury would have decided case differently). ¶ 19 John has provided no basis for us to conclude that the severance proceedings in this case were fundamentally unfair; that the result of the hearing is unreliable; or that, had counsel conducted himself differently, the juvenile court would have reached a different result.

2007P.); see also Walden Books Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 198 Ariz. 584, ¶¶ 20-23 , 12 P.3d 809, 814 (App.2000) (discussion of rule). ¶ 9 In lieu of the Strickland standard, John proposes we consider whether a parent claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has been denied due process, which he frames as “an adequate opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner,” as the result of counsel’s conduct.

2007P.); see also Walden Books Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 198 Ariz. 584, ¶¶ 20-23 , 12 P.3d 809, 814 (App.2000) (discussion of rule). ¶ 9 In lieu of the Strickland standard, John proposes we consider whether a parent claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has been denied due process, which he frames as “an adequate opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner,” as the result of counsel’s conduct.

2007ADES urges us to apply the Strickland standard and, because John has faded to show how any alleged errors by counsel prejudiced his defense, affirm the juvenile court’s termination order. ¶ 11 In Arizona State Department of Public Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 253 , 296 P.2d 298, 300 (1956), our supreme court held the denial of a parent’s request to be represented by retained counsel in a dependency hearing violated due process, and Division One of this court has relied on Barlow to conclude that appointment of counsel in a severance proceeding is not merely required by statute, but a matte

2007ADES urges us to apply the Strickland standard and, because John has faded to show how any alleged errors by counsel prejudiced his defense, affirm the juvenile court’s termination order. ¶ 11 In Arizona State Department of Public Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 253 , 296 P.2d 298, 300 (1956), our supreme court held the denial of a parent’s request to be represented by retained counsel in a dependency hearing violated due process, and Division One of this court has relied on Barlow to conclude that appointment of counsel in a severance proceeding is not merely required by statute, but a matte

2024But “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 5 STATE v. STUEBE Decision of the Court outcome of the proceeding” because then “[v]irtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 . ¶12 Although a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, we need not address both prongs “if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180–81, ¶¶ 5-6 (2017).

2024But “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 5 STATE v. STUEBE Decision of the Court outcome of the proceeding” because then “[v]irtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 . ¶12 Although a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, we need not address both prongs “if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180–81, ¶¶ 5-6 (2017).

2023Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), is telling.

2023Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), is telling.

1996See also State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210 , 689 P.2d 153 (1984)(adopting Strickland test).

1996See also State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210 , 689 P.2d 153 (1984)(adopting Strickland test).

2011But, although a new rule generally is not created by the application of an established rule, a new rule may be announced if “the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 1130 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).

2011But, although a new rule generally is not created by the application of an established rule, a new rule may be announced if “the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 1130 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).

2007Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038-39 (2007) (collecting eases adopting Strickland standard for termination proceedings); cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 , 101 S.Ct. at 2162 (failure to appoint counsel not denial of due process where counsel could not have made any “determinative difference” in result of severance hearing); Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

2007Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038-39 (2007) (collecting eases adopting Strickland standard for termination proceedings); cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 , 101 S.Ct. at 2162 (failure to appoint counsel not denial of due process where counsel could not have made any “determinative difference” in result of severance hearing); Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

2026To establish the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Miller, 251 Ariz. 99, 104, ¶ 17 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2026To establish the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Miller, 251 Ariz. 99, 104, ¶ 17 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have

2024When a defendant receives erroneous advice, he can “establish prejudice in the rejection of a plea offer” under the second part of the Strickland test if he can show “a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer and declined to go forward to trial.” Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414 ¶ 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 . ¶34 In Rule 32 proceedings, a defendant states a colorable claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing when “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have