Strickland test in Nevada

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2018However, because Strickland provides a well-established standard that has been developed through caselaw and can be easily applied in the postconviction-counsel context, see Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011 , 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004) (describing Strickland as "a fair, workable and, as it turns out, durable standard"), we take this opportunity to explicitly adopt the Strickland standard to evaluate postconviction counsel's 12 In the absence of a Supreme Court decision recognizing a constitutional right, we reiterate that the limited right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel addre

2018However, because Strickland provides a well-established standard that has been developed through caselaw and can be easily applied in the postconviction-counsel context, see Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011 , 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004) (describing Strickland as "a fair, workable and, as it turns out, durable standard"), we take this opportunity to explicitly adopt the Strickland standard to evaluate postconviction counsel's 12 In the absence of a Supreme Court decision recognizing a constitutional right, we reiterate that the limited right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel addre

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432 , 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113- 14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2018However, because Strickland provides a well-established standard that has been developed through caselaw and can be easily applied in the postconviction-counsel context, see Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011 , 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004) (describing Strickland as "a fair, workable and, as it turns out, durable standard"), we take this opportunity to explicitly adopt the Strickland standard to evaluate postconviction counsel's 12 In the absence of a Supreme Court decision recognizing a constitutional right, we reiterate that the limited right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel addre

2018However, because Strickland provides a well-established standard that has been developed through caselaw and can be easily applied in the postconviction-counsel context, see Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011 , 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004) (describing Strickland as "a fair, workable and, as it turns out, durable standard"), we take this opportunity to explicitly adopt the Strickland standard to evaluate postconviction counsel's 12 In the absence of a Supreme Court decision recognizing a constitutional right, we reiterate that the limited right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel addre

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35 , 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35 , 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018See , e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 , 748-49 (Cal. 1993) ; Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 , 1168-69 (Colo. 2007) ; Stovall v. State, 144 Md.App. 711 , 800 A.2d 31 , 38 (Md.

2018State v. Jim, 747 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Neb. 2008) (stating that layered claim of ineffective assistance requires evaluation at each level of counsel); see also Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 1 -3Not all states guarantee postconviction petitioners a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, but in states that do, use of the Strickland standard is not uncommon.

2018State v. Jim, 747 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Neb. 2008) (stating that layered claim of ineffective assistance requires evaluation at each level of counsel); see also Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 1 -3Not all states guarantee postconviction petitioners a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, but in states that do, use of the Strickland standard is not uncommon.

2018State v. Jim, 747 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Neb. 2008) (stating that layered claim of ineffective assistance requires evaluation at each level of counsel); see also Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 1 -3Not all states guarantee postconviction petitioners a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, but in states that do, use of the Strickland standard is not uncommon.

2018State v. Jim, 747 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Neb. 2008) (stating that layered claim of ineffective assistance requires evaluation at each level of counsel); see also Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 1 -3Not all states guarantee postconviction petitioners a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, but in states that do, use of the Strickland standard is not uncommon.

2021Chappell's claims that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance lack merit We have adopted the Strickland test "to evaluate postconviction counsePs performance where there is a statutory right to effective assistance of that counsel." Id. at 423, 423 P.3d at 1098 ; see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2021Chappell's claims that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance lack merit We have adopted the Strickland test "to evaluate postconviction counsePs performance where there is a statutory right to effective assistance of that counsel." Id. at 423, 423 P.3d at 1098 ; see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2014See Riley, 110 Nev. at 646 , 878 P.2d at 278 .

2014"The defendant carries the affirmative burden of establishing prejudice." Riley v. State, 110 Nev 638, 646, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994).

2013(U.S. Mar. 5, 2013) (No. 12-9118); compare NRS 207.200 (defining trespass in part as "under circumstances not amounting to a burglary"), with NRS 201.230, and Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 78-79 , 40 P.3d 413, 420-21 (2002); see also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996) (applying the Strickland test to claims regarding ineffective appellate counsel).

2013(U.S. Mar. 5, 2013) (No. 12-9118); compare NRS 207.200 (defining trespass in part as "under circumstances not amounting to a burglary"), with NRS 201.230, and Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 78-79 , 40 P.3d 413, 420-21 (2002); see also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996) (applying the Strickland test to claims regarding ineffective appellate counsel).

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647 , 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647 , 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2022Op. 40, 492 P.3d 556, 562 (2021) (applying Strickland's test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing where a defendant has pleaded guilty).

2022Op. 40, 492 P.3d 556, 562 (2021) (applying Strickland’s test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing where a defendant has pleaded guilty).

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647 , 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647 , 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2018See Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 730-31 , 30 P.3d 1128, 1131-32 (2001) (discussing the limitations on admitting evidence of uncharged bad acts). 2 We agree with the parties that the district court erred, however, in ordering a new appeal.

2018See Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 730-31 , 30 P.3d 1128, 1131-32 (2001) (discussing the limitations on admitting evidence of uncharged bad acts). 2 We agree with the parties that the district court erred, however, in ordering a new appeal.

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35 , 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35 , 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test

2018Id. ("A court need not consider both prongs of the Strickland test if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either prong.").

2018Id. ("A court need not consider both prongs of the Strickland test if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either prong.").

2015see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies to guilty pleas); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996).

2015see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (holding that the Strickland test applies to guilty pleas); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996).

2015State, 124 Nev. 978, 990 , 194 P.3d 1235, 1243 (2008) (holding that the trial court must canvass the defendant to determine whether he has consented to the concession of continued on next page . . .

2015State, 124 Nev. 978, 990 , 194 P.3d 1235, 1243 (2008) (holding that the trial court must canvass the defendant to determine whether he has consented to the concession of continued on next page . . .

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87 ; see also Paine v. State, 110 Nev. 609 , 877 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1994), cert. denied, .....

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87 ; see also Paine v. State, 110 Nev. 609 , 877 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1994), cert. denied, .....

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115 , 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115 , 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115 , 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).

1996Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115 , 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).