Strickland test in Maryland

2023When undertaking a prejudice analysis, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 . “[E]ven if a court has found that an attorney’s performance was deficient, the court does not presume the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 87 (citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 299–300 (2017) (“The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.

2023When undertaking a prejudice analysis, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 . “[E]ven if a court has found that an attorney’s performance was deficient, the court does not presume the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 87 (citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 299–300 (2017) (“The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.

2023When undertaking a prejudice analysis, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 . “[E]ven if a court has found that an attorney’s performance was deficient, the court does not presume the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 87 (citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 299–300 (2017) (“The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.

2023When undertaking a prejudice analysis, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 . “[E]ven if a court has found that an attorney’s performance was deficient, the court does not presume the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 87 (citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 , 299–300 (2017) (“The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

1997Accordingly, applying the Strickland test that this *246 Court applied to ineffective assistance claims in Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990), the defendant must show that there is a “substantial possibility” that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted upon going to trial.

1997Accordingly, applying the Strickland test that this *246 Court applied to ineffective assistance claims in Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990), the defendant must show that there is a “substantial possibility” that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted upon going to trial.

2023Instead, we held that the Strickland standard applies to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the Maryland Constitution and considered the matter “settled.” Id. 455 Md. 341, 362 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018) (citations omitted); see also State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 (1986) (quoting Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685 , 695 n.3 (1985)).

2023Instead, we held that the Strickland standard applies to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the Maryland Constitution and considered the matter “settled.” Id. 455 Md. 341, 362 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018) (citations omitted); see also State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 (1986) (quoting Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685 , 695 n.3 (1985)).

2023As a starting point, none of the cases on which the Majority opinion predominantly relies—Geders; Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989); Strickland; or Ramirez v. State, 464 Md. 532 (2019)—held, either expressly or implicitly, that a no-communication order always results in an actual denial of the assistance of counsel for purposes of the Strickland analysis.

2023As a starting point, none of the cases on which the Majority opinion predominantly relies—Geders; Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989); Strickland; or Ramirez v. State, 464 Md. 532 (2019)—held, either expressly or implicitly, that a no-communication order always results in an actual denial of the assistance of counsel for purposes of the Strickland analysis.

2018The Strickland test "must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 -690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

2018The Strickland test "must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 -690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

2021To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has the burden to “show that his or her counsel performed deficiently[]” and “that he or she has suffered prejudice because of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 75 , 204 A.3d at 147 (citations omitted); Newton, 455 Md. at 355 , 168 A.3d at 9 (citation omitted) (“Under Strickland, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient; and (2) he was prejudiced as a result.”). 9 “[W]e need not approach the inquiry in any particular order, nor are w

2021To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has the burden to “show that his or her counsel performed deficiently[]” and “that he or she has suffered prejudice because of the deficient performance.” Syed, 463 Md. at 75 , 204 A.3d at 147 (citations omitted); Newton, 455 Md. at 355 , 168 A.3d at 9 (citation omitted) (“Under Strickland, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient; and (2) he was prejudiced as a result.”). 9 “[W]e need not approach the inquiry in any particular order, nor are w

2025See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (explaining that, “while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may affect the analysis”); id. at 393 (declaring that “[c]ases such as [Whiteside] and [Fretwell] do not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him”).

2025See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (explaining that, “while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness may affect the analysis”); id. at 393 (declaring that “[c]ases such as [Whiteside] and [Fretwell] do not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him”).

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

2025The State asserts that, even if Mr. Coyle were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, he has failed to satisfy either part of the Strickland test, and, in particular, he has failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating that, if filed, the petition for a writ of certiorari would have been granted.18 A. Standard of Review “Our review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” See State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , 204 A.3d 139, 146 (2019) (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 , 168 A.2d 1, 7 (2017); Harris

2005Appellant maintains that applying the Strickland standard, instead of the presumption of ineffectiveness analysis described in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), constituted reversible error.

2005Appellant maintains that applying the Strickland standard, instead of the presumption of ineffectiveness analysis described in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), constituted reversible error.

2003In order to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, under a Strickland analysis, petitioner must establish “that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel’s error, the result of his proceeding would have been different.” In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 727-28 , 770 A.2d 202, 208 (2001); see also Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 310 , 768 A.2d 656, 662 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

2003In order to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, under a Strickland analysis, petitioner must establish “that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel’s error, the result of his proceeding would have been different.” In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 727-28 , 770 A.2d 202, 208 (2001); see also Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 310 , 768 A.2d 656, 662 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

2003In order to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, under a Strickland analysis, petitioner must establish “that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel’s error, the result of his proceeding would have been different.” In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 727-28 , 770 A.2d 202, 208 (2001); see also Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 310 , 768 A.2d 656, 662 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

2003In order to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, under a Strickland analysis, petitioner must establish “that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel’s error, the result of his proceeding would have been different.” In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 727-28 , 770 A.2d 202, 208 (2001); see also Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 310 , 768 A.2d 656, 662 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

2025Moving to the second prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court stated that the case was unusual in that, assuming the defendant’s allegations were true, “counsel’s deficient performance has deprived [the defendant] of more than a fair judicial proceeding; - 23 - that deficiency deprived [the defendant] of the appellate proceeding altogether.” Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted). 9 The Supreme Court made clear “that when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assis

2025Moving to the second prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court stated that the case was unusual in that, assuming the defendant’s allegations were true, “counsel’s deficient performance has deprived [the defendant] of more than a fair judicial proceeding; - 23 - that deficiency deprived [the defendant] of the appellate proceeding altogether.” Id. at 483 (emphasis omitted). 9 The Supreme Court made clear “that when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assis

2019Compare Hebron v. State , 331 Md. 219 , 226, 627 A.2d 1029 , 1032 (1993) ("Maryland has long held that there is no difference between direct and circumstantial evidence.") with Strickland , 466 U.S. at 696 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ("[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.").

2019Compare Hebron v. State , 331 Md. 219 , 226, 627 A.2d 1029 , 1032 (1993) ("Maryland has long held that there is no difference between direct and circumstantial evidence.") with Strickland , 466 U.S. at 696 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ("[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.").

2018Because she failed to do so, Lawrence [ ] satisfied the first prong of the Strickland standard." Id. at 130 (citation omitted); see Avery v. Prelesnik , 548 F.3d 434 , 437-38 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding deficient performance where defense counsel never personally attempted to contact any of the potential alibi witnesses, even though counsel's investigator had talked with one alibi witness).

2018Because she failed to do so, Lawrence [ ] satisfied the first prong of the Strickland standard." Id. at 130 (citation omitted); see Avery v. Prelesnik , 548 F.3d 434 , 437-38 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding deficient performance where defense counsel never personally attempted to contact any of the potential alibi witnesses, even though counsel's investigator had talked with one alibi witness).

2023Instead, we held that the Strickland standard applies to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the Maryland Constitution and considered the matter “settled.” Id. 455 Md. 341, 362 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018) (citations omitted); see also State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 (1986) (quoting Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685 , 695 n.3 (1985)).

2023Instead, we held that the Strickland standard applies to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the Maryland Constitution and considered the matter “settled.” Id. 455 Md. 341, 362 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 665 (2018) (citations omitted); see also State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 (1986) (quoting Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685 , 695 n.3 (1985)).

2026“To show a deficiency, [the defendant] must (1) demonstrate that counsel’s acts or omissions, given the circumstances, ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms,’ and (2) overcome the presumption that the challenged conduct ‘be considered sound trial strategy.’” Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 602 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 283 (1996)).

2026“To show a deficiency, [the defendant] must (1) demonstrate that counsel’s acts or omissions, given the circumstances, ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing professional norms,’ and (2) overcome the presumption that the challenged conduct ‘be considered sound trial strategy.’” Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 602 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 283 (1996)).

2022The Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), informs our analysis.

2022The Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), informs our analysis.

2020See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 189 Md.

2020See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 189 Md.

2020This general rule, however, has an exception: “The defendant is excused from proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was ‘burdened by an actual conflict of interest,’ that is, the conflict is one that ‘actually affected the adequacy of [defense counsel’s] representation.’” Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386, 391 (2012) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 349–50 (1980) (internal citation omitted)).

2020This general rule, however, has an exception: “The defendant is excused from proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was ‘burdened by an actual conflict of interest,’ that is, the conflict is one that ‘actually affected the adequacy of [defense counsel’s] representation.’” Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386, 391 (2012) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 349–50 (1980) (internal citation omitted)).