Strickland test in New Mexico

2013Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027 , ¶ 36. {14} The first requirement of the Strickland test is a showing by the defendant “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” that is, “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2013Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027 , ¶ 36. {14} The first requirement of the Strickland test is a showing by the defendant “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” that is, “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2022Prejudice {10} The second prong of the Strickland test requires Defendant to demonstrate that her attorney’s “constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Prejudice {10} The second prong of the Strickland test requires Defendant to demonstrate that her attorney’s “constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2015See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.”); see also Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 29 (“We have identified two types of additional evidence that are pertinent to the analysis in this case.”) (emphasis added); Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 32 (“[T]here are no mechanical rules for determining prejudice.”).

2013Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027 , ¶ 36. {14} The first requirement of the Strickland test is a showing by the defendant “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” that is, “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2013Dylan J., 2009-NMCA-027 , ¶ 36. {14} The first requirement of the Strickland test is a showing by the defendant “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” that is, “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2022The Strickland test requires a defendant to show “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 12 , 140 N.M. 406 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022The Strickland test requires a defendant to show “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 12 , 140 N.M. 406 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2017See State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137 , 16 ¶ 36, 136 N.M. 614 , 103 P.3d 54 (declining to address an assertion where the 17 defendant provided no authority in support of that assertion); see also Hunter, 2006- 18 NMSC-043, ¶ 12 (recognizing the Strickland two-prong standard). 21 1 {36} But even if this Court agreed that defense counsel exhibited some deficiencies 2 during the pendency of Defendant’s case, we nevertheless conclude that Defendant 3 failed to prove that defense counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense and failed 4 to prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

2017See State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137 , 16 ¶ 36, 136 N.M. 614 , 103 P.3d 54 (declining to address an assertion where the 17 defendant provided no authority in support of that assertion); see also Hunter, 2006- 18 NMSC-043, ¶ 12 (recognizing the Strickland two-prong standard). 21 1 {36} But even if this Court agreed that defense counsel exhibited some deficiencies 2 during the pendency of Defendant’s case, we nevertheless conclude that Defendant 3 failed to prove that defense counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense and failed 4 to prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

2011See State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020 , ¶ 9, 127 10 N.M. 218 , 979 P.2d 729 (“New Mexico follows the test for ineffective assistance of 11 counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984).”); see also 12 State v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311 , 657 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining 13 that the Court of Appeals must follow applicable precedents of the Supreme Court). 14 Turning to Defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance, there is a two- 15 part test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

2011See State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020 , ¶ 9, 127 10 N.M. 218 , 979 P.2d 729 (“New Mexico follows the test for ineffective assistance of 11 counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984).”); see also 12 State v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311 , 657 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining 13 that the Court of Appeals must follow applicable precedents of the Supreme Court). 14 Turning to Defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance, there is a two- 15 part test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

2011See State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020 , ¶ 9, 127 10 N.M. 218 , 979 P.2d 729 (“New Mexico follows the test for ineffective assistance of 11 counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984).”); see also 12 State v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311 , 657 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining 13 that the Court of Appeals must follow applicable precedents of the Supreme Court). 14 Turning to Defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance, there is a two- 15 part test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

2011See State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020 , ¶ 9, 127 10 N.M. 218 , 979 P.2d 729 (“New Mexico follows the test for ineffective assistance of 11 counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984).”); see also 12 State v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311 , 657 P.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining 13 that the Court of Appeals must follow applicable precedents of the Supreme Court). 14 Turning to Defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance, there is a two- 15 part test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

2004This inquiry requires us to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 , 76 S.Ct. 158 , 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). {15} We agree with those jurisdictions that have held that “an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasona

2004This inquiry requires us to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 , 76 S.Ct. 158 , 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). {15} We agree with those jurisdictions that have held that “an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasona

2004This inquiry requires us to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 , 76 S.Ct. 158 , 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). {15} We agree with those jurisdictions that have held that “an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasona

2004This inquiry requires us to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 , 76 S.Ct. 158 , 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). {15} We agree with those jurisdictions that have held that “an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasona

2000Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 17 , 846 P.2d at 323 ; accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 ,-, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming this standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and stating that “the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims”).

2000Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 17 , 846 P.2d at 323 ; accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 ,-, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming this standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and stating that “the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims”).

2000Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 17 , 846 P.2d at 323 ; accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 ,-, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming this standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and stating that “the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims”).

2000Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 17 , 846 P.2d at 323 ; accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 ,-, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming this standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and stating that “the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims”).

1997See Martinez, 122 N.M. at 484 , 927 P.2d at 39 (“This Court has expressed its preference for habeas corpus proceedings over remand when the record on appeal does not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 34.

1997See Martinez, 122 N.M. at 484 , 927 P.2d at 39 (“This Court has expressed its preference for habeas corpus proceedings over remand when the record on appeal does not establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 34.

1997See State v. Lopez, 122 N.M. 63, 70 , 920 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1996) (utilizing the Strickland Test); State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 795-96 , 867 P.2d 1175, 1177-78 (1994) (stating that it is desirable to make the law certain and holding that Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court precedent).

1997See State v. Lopez, 122 N.M. 63, 70 , 920 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1996) (utilizing the Strickland Test); State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 795-96 , 867 P.2d 1175, 1177-78 (1994) (stating that it is desirable to make the law certain and holding that Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court precedent).