Strickland test in Maine

2022Contrary to the State's assertions, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 1984 ), does not establish the standard for a claim that counsel is ineffective currently; the Strickland standard applies retrospectively.

2022Contrary to the State's assertions, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 1984 ), does not establish the standard for a claim that counsel is ineffective currently; the Strickland standard applies retrospectively.

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2023Pratt contends that her self-defense theory was “readily apparent from the beginning of the attorney-client relationship” and that trial counsel “should have simply asked his client how she would testify.”7 [¶22] Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “a petitioner must demonstrate . . . that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 19 , 230 A.3d 6 (quotation marks omitted).

2023Pratt contends that her self-defense theory was “readily apparent from the beginning of the attorney-client relationship” and that trial counsel “should have simply asked his client how she would testify.”7 [¶22] Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “a petitioner must demonstrate . . . that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 19 , 230 A.3d 6 (quotation marks omitted).

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2023The Strickland test compels us to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." (Internal citations and punctuation omitted.) Meggans v, State of Maine, 2014 ME 125 , 423, 103 A.3d 1031,1039 (Emphasis added).

2023The Strickland test compels us to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." (Internal citations and punctuation omitted.) Meggans v, State of Maine, 2014 ME 125 , 423, 103 A.3d 1031,1039 (Emphasis added).

2024“Both prongs of the Strickland analysis often present mixed questions of law and fact,” and we “apply the most appropriate standard of 13 review for the issue raised depending on the extent to which that issue is dominated by fact or by law.” Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, ¶ 13 , 249 A.3d 132 (quotation marks omitted).

2024“Both prongs of the Strickland analysis often present mixed questions of law and fact,” and we “apply the most appropriate standard of 13 review for the issue raised depending on the extent to which that issue is dominated by fact or by law.” Hodgdon v. State, 2021 ME 22, ¶ 13 , 249 A.3d 132 (quotation marks omitted).

2015To the extent that our post-Strickland, decisions did not clearly apply both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Gauthier v. State, 2011 ME 75, ¶ 12 , 23 A.3d 185 ; State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶ 15 , 699 A.2d 1139 ; Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 656 (Me.1985), we confirm that the Strickland test, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, is the correct test for evaluating whether trial counsel provided effective assistance in .a given case.

2015To the extent that our post-Strickland, decisions did not clearly apply both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Gauthier v. State, 2011 ME 75, ¶ 12 , 23 A.3d 185 ; State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶ 15 , 699 A.2d 1139 ; Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 656 (Me.1985), we confirm that the Strickland test, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, is the correct test for evaluating whether trial counsel provided effective assistance in .a given case.

2013Tucker argues that the court should consider the presumed prejudice standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661-62 (1984), rather than the Strickland standard.

2013Tucker argues that the court should consider the presumed prejudice standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661-62 (1984), rather than the Strickland standard.

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2021See, e.g., In re Child of Kimberlee C., 2018 ME 134, ¶ 6 , 194 A.3d 925 (citing, as proof of counsel’s effective assistance, that counsel made numerous objections, presented evidence, and conducted a “rigorous[] cross-examin[ation]” of the Department’s witnesses); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that, where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2019See Owens v. United States , 483 F.3d 48 , 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to inform a defendant of his right to testify constitutes performance outside of an objective standard of reasonable competence, and [ ] such performance is constitutionally deficient."), overruled on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-13, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) ; United States v. Teague , 953 F.2d 1525 , 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically t

2017See Manley v. State, 2015 13 ME 117, ~~12, 18, 123 A.3d 219 (adopting the Strickland test for purposes of the Maine Constitution).

2017See Manley v. State, 2015 13 ME 117, ~~12, 18, 123 A.3d 219 (adopting the Strickland test for purposes of the Maine Constitution).

2022We review this prong by examining “whether [the] ineffective assistance of counsel rose to the level of compromising the reliability of the judgment and undermining confidence in it.” In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21 , 187 A.3d 602 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

2022We review this prong by examining “whether [the] ineffective assistance of counsel rose to the level of compromising the reliability of the judgment and undermining confidence in it.” In re Children of Jeremy A., 2018 ME 82, ¶ 21 , 187 A.3d 602 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2026R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard. [¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14 , 125 A.3d 1163 , we have applied the Strickland standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8 , 208 A.3d 371 , petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see, e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26 , 126 A.3d 718 , abrogated by, In re Children of Destiny H.,

2019It is the test used to evaluate such claims arising from criminal trials, Fahnley , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 ; involuntary commitment proceedings, In re Henry B. , 2017 ME 72 , ¶ 9, 159 A.3d 824 ; and proceedings to terminate parental rights, In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 26, 126 A.3d 718 ; and, as we have noted, "[t]he Strickland standard is known to the bar and the bench, and Strickland carries with it a developing body of case law, which will aid courts in the efficient and timely resolution of such claims." In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 26, 126 A.3d 718 ; see also In re Henry B. , 201

2019It is the test used to evaluate such claims arising from criminal trials, Fahnley , 2018 ME 92 , ¶ 17, 188 A.3d 871 ; involuntary commitment proceedings, In re Henry B. , 2017 ME 72 , ¶ 9, 159 A.3d 824 ; and proceedings to terminate parental rights, In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 26, 126 A.3d 718 ; and, as we have noted, "[t]he Strickland standard is known to the bar and the bench, and Strickland carries with it a developing body of case law, which will aid courts in the efficient and timely resolution of such claims." In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 26, 126 A.3d 718 ; see also In re Henry B. , 201

2021A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 29 , 230 A.3d 6 . 9 [¶13] We “review a post-conviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 512 . “[B]oth prongs of the Strickland analysis often present mixed questions of law and fact . . . .” Id.

2021A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see Watson, 2020 ME 51, ¶ 29 , 230 A.3d 6 . 9 [¶13] We “review a post-conviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 512 . “[B]oth prongs of the Strickland analysis often present mixed questions of law and fact . . . .” Id.