Strickland standard in California

2025Lobato cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland standard. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688.) As to deficient performance, the appellate record is silent as to why defense counsel did not request CALCRIM No. 3515.

2025Lobato cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland standard. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688.) As to deficient performance, the appellate record is silent as to why defense counsel did not request CALCRIM No. 3515.

2023Sometimes, 33 the best action an attorney can take regarding an available objection is not to make it.” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202 .) Moreover, assuming deficient performance by counsel, to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, “[i]t is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 104 [ 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 ] (Harrington).) Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s performanc

2023Sometimes, 33 the best action an attorney can take regarding an available objection is not to make it.” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202 .) Moreover, assuming deficient performance by counsel, to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, “[i]t is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 104 [ 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 ] (Harrington).) Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s performanc

2026Nevertheless, Waln points to a sentence in a trial brief—which defense counsel drafted— stating it “is not true” that counsel failed to question Deputy Meredith for strategic reasons.15 Counsel also suggested during 14 Although the Strickland standard is objective, the California Supreme Court has stated a defendant can “reasonably expect that before counsel undertakes to act at all he will make a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded on adequate investigation and preparation. [Citations.] If counsel fails to make such a decision, his action—no matter how unobjectionab

2026Nevertheless, Waln points to a sentence in a trial brief—which defense counsel drafted— stating it “is not true” that counsel failed to question Deputy Meredith for strategic reasons.15 Counsel also suggested during 14 Although the Strickland standard is objective, the California Supreme Court has stated a defendant can “reasonably expect that before counsel undertakes to act at all he will make a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded on adequate investigation and preparation. [Citations.] If counsel fails to make such a decision, his action—no matter how unobjectionab

2022(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 , 691-694 24 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 696-698 ] (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma).) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 632 ], quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 357 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297 ].) Strickland’s bar is high because “[a]n ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be

2022(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 , 691-694 24 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 696-698 ] (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma).) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 632 ], quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 357 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297 ].) Strickland’s bar is high because “[a]n ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be

2016Rather, the Sixth Amendment inquiry is into whether the attorney‟s conduct was „reasonably effective.‟ To counteract the natural tendency to fault an unsuccessful defense, a court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance must „indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.‟ [Citation.] In giving shape to the perimeters of this range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland mandates that „[prevailing] norms of 6 practice as reflected in American Bar Association Standards and the like, . . . are guides to determi

2016Rather, the Sixth Amendment inquiry is into whether the attorney‟s conduct was „reasonably effective.‟ To counteract the natural tendency to fault an unsuccessful defense, a court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance must „indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.‟ [Citation.] In giving shape to the perimeters of this range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland mandates that „[prevailing] norms of 6 practice as reflected in American Bar Association Standards and the like, . . . are guides to determi

2023I, § 15.) “ ‘[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).) Ordinarily, a defendant must establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 3 (Strickland, at pp. 687–688, 691–692; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 357 .) In United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 (Cronic), the United States Supreme Court

2022(Gay, at p. 1073.) The prejudice component of the Strickland test may be satisfied “when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 .) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) But the test “is not solely one of outcome determination.” (Ibid.) The focus of the test is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of . . . the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell

2023(See Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 [comparing Watson standard for prejudice to Strickland standard].) Under either rubric, whether we reviewed the issue as instructional error or ineffective assistance, the prejudice standard would require Deltoro to show there was reasonable probability of a different outcome had the verdict forms not contained the error.

2016(See Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 [comparing Watson standard to Strickland standard].) 15 intent to kill––but not whether he harbored express malice––the trial court’s instruction ran afoul of Section 28.

2021(See Jae Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. __ [ 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967 ] (Lee) [defendant “adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation”]; see also People v. Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 567 [“To establish prejudice, defendant must show that he would not have entered into the 15 We note that the amendment to section 1473.7 also made various other changes to the statute, such as “substantially enlarg[ing] the time periods in which to bring these motions. (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).)” (Ruiz, supr

2021(See Jae Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. __ [ 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967 ] (Lee) [defendant “adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation”]; see also People v. Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 567 [“To establish prejudice, defendant must show that he would not have entered into the 15 We note that the amendment to section 1473.7 also made various other changes to the statute, such as “substantially enlarg[ing] the time periods in which to bring these motions. (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).)” (Ruiz, supr

2019That is, the record in Camacho established " defendant's own error in ... not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States." ( Id. at p. 1009, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 , italics added.) As far as prejudice, Camacho held: "Because the errors need not amount to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it follows that courts are not limited to the Strickland test of prejudice, ... [a] reasonable probability of a different outcome in the original proceedings absent the error." ( Camacho, supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009 , 244 Cal.

2019That is, the record in Camacho established " defendant's own error in ... not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States." ( Id. at p. 1009, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 , italics added.) As far as prejudice, Camacho held: "Because the errors need not amount to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it follows that courts are not limited to the Strickland test of prejudice, ... [a] reasonable probability of a different outcome in the original proceedings absent the error." ( Camacho, supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009 , 244 Cal.

2021(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696 ] (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma); People v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1367 (Rogers).) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 642 ] (Richter), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 371 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297 ].) The reason why Strickland’s bar is high is because “[a]n ineffective- assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise

2021(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696 ] (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma); People v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1367 (Rogers).) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’ ” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 642 ] (Richter), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 371 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297 ].) The reason why Strickland’s bar is high is because “[a]n ineffective- assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise

2014(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 .) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 ; accord, People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 430-431.) Johnson’s claim is most easily disposed of under the second prong of the Strickland analysis. 54.

2014(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 .) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 ; accord, People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 430-431.) Johnson’s claim is most easily disposed of under the second prong of the Strickland analysis. 54.

2024Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958 ; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) A court can reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2024Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958 ; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) A court can reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2017A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‖ (Id. at p. 694.) Although we usually require that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266–267), because the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was fully developed in the trial court on a motion for a new trial, we shall entertain the issue in this appeal, applying the Strickland test. 18 3.

2017A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‖ (Id. at p. 694.) Although we usually require that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266–267), because the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was fully developed in the trial court on a motion for a new trial, we shall entertain the issue in this appeal, applying the Strickland test. 18 3.

2024All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) A court can reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2024All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) A court can reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2023(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215 .) Counsel’s failure to attend the presentence interviews was not a violation of Delgado’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, therefore his lawyer’s performance did not fall below prevailing professional norms when he was not present at the probation interviews.

2023(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215 .) Counsel’s failure to attend the presentence interviews was not a violation of Delgado’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, therefore his lawyer’s performance did not fall below prevailing professional norms when he was not present at the probation interviews.

2021We therefore apply the Strickland standard: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland); see People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 208-209, 217-218 [applying Strickland’s “reasonable probability” test to ineffective assistance claim based on defense counsel’s failure to protect 20 defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by filing a suppression motion]; People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008 [“had [def

2021We therefore apply the Strickland standard: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland); see People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 208-209, 217-218 [applying Strickland’s “reasonable probability” test to ineffective assistance claim based on defense counsel’s failure to protect 20 defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by filing a suppression motion]; People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008 [“had [def

2015(Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 689 ; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546 .) As to the prejudice prong, “[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] explained that this second prong of the Strickland test is not solely one of outcome determination. 13 Instead, the question is ‘whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 833 .) A defendant must prove prejudice that is a “ ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 ; People

2015(Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 689 ; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546 .) As to the prejudice prong, “[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] explained that this second prong of the Strickland test is not solely one of outcome determination. 13 Instead, the question is ‘whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 833 .) A defendant must prove prejudice that is a “ ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 ; People

2022(Gay, at p. 1073.) The prejudice component of the Strickland test may be satisfied “when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 .) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) But the test “is not solely one of outcome determination.” (Ibid.) The focus of the test is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of . . . the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell

2022(Gay, at p. 1073.) The prejudice component of the Strickland test may be satisfied “when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 .) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) But the test “is not solely one of outcome determination.” (Ibid.) The focus of the test is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of . . . the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell

2022“If a client declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest.” (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1509 .) It is only when there are express statements of the client’s will to maintain innocence that “counsel may not steer the ship the other way.” (Ibid., citing Gonzalez v. United States, supra, 553 U.S. at p. 254 .) If counsel’s concession strategy, “given the evidence bearing on the defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, . . . no tenable claim of ineffective assis

2022“If a client declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest.” (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1509 .) It is only when there are express statements of the client’s will to maintain innocence that “counsel may not steer the ship the other way.” (Ibid., citing Gonzalez v. United States, supra, 553 U.S. at p. 254 .) If counsel’s concession strategy, “given the evidence bearing on the defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, . . . no tenable claim of ineffective assis

2022(Gay, at p. 1073.) The prejudice component of the Strickland test may be satisfied “when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 .) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) But the test “is not solely one of outcome determination.” (Ibid.) The focus of the test is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of . . . the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell

2022(Gay, at p. 1073.) The prejudice component of the Strickland test may be satisfied “when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 .) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) But the test “is not solely one of outcome determination.” (Ibid.) The focus of the test is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of . . . the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell

2015(Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 689 ; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546 .) As to the prejudice prong, “[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] explained that this second prong of the Strickland test is not solely one of outcome determination.

2015(Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 689 ; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546 .) As to the prejudice prong, “[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] explained that this second prong of the Strickland test is not solely one of outcome determination.

2005Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.’ (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 ; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685 [ 152 L.Ed.2d 914 , 122 S.Ct. 1843 ].) The high court has also expressly reaffirmed that the Strickland standard applies to an assessment of counsel’s ‘failure to adduce mitigating evidence and the waiver of closing *926 argument’ with respect to capital sentencing.

2005Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.’ (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 ; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685 [ 152 L.Ed.2d 914 , 122 S.Ct. 1843 ].) The high court has also expressly reaffirmed that the Strickland standard applies to an assessment of counsel’s ‘failure to adduce mitigating evidence and the waiver of closing *926 argument’ with respect to capital sentencing.