Strickland test in District of Columbia

2026To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, Truesdale must show that Rudasill’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

2026To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, Truesdale must show that Rudasill’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

1992We adopted the Strickland test in White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558 (D.C.1984), and thus we must apply that test to appellants’ claims of ineffective assistance.

1992We adopted the Strickland test in White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558 (D.C.1984), and thus we must apply that test to appellants’ claims of ineffective assistance.

2022This court has recognized that “[t]he failure [by trial counsel] to make a proper pretrial investigation [and] to interview exculpatory witnesses . . . constitutes constitutional ineffectiveness.” Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 30 (D.C. 1992).

2022This court has recognized that “[t]he failure [by trial counsel] to make a proper pretrial investigation [and] to interview exculpatory witnesses . . . constitutes constitutional ineffectiveness.” Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 30 (D.C. 1992).

2018Under the two-part Strickland analysis, “[t]o prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim ..., appellant must demonstrate [both] that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Otts v. United States, 952 A.2d 156, 164 (D.C. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

2018Under the two-part Strickland analysis, “[t]o prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim ..., appellant must demonstrate [both] that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Otts v. United States, 952 A.2d 156, 164 (D.C. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

2009See Calkins, supra note 4, at 212-28 (surveying decisions); see also, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (seeing "no reason not to apply [the Strickland test ] in our civil parental-rights termination proceedings."); In re E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 (applying Strickland in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings).

2009See Calkins, supra note 4, at 212-28 (surveying decisions); see also, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (seeing "no reason not to apply [the Strickland test ] in our civil parental-rights termination proceedings."); In re E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 (applying Strickland in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings).

2009"Strickland is clear, familiar to lawyers and judges, and carries with it a developed body of case law...." New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038 (2007).

2009"Strickland is clear, familiar to lawyers and judges, and carries with it a developed body of case law...." New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301 , 929 A.2d 1034, 1038 (2007).

2009See Calkins, supra note 4, at 212-28 (surveying decisions); see also, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (seeing "no reason not to apply [the Strickland test ] in our civil parental-rights termination proceedings."); In re E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 (applying Strickland in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings).

2009See Calkins, supra note 4, at 212-28 (surveying decisions); see also, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (seeing "no reason not to apply [the Strickland test ] in our civil parental-rights termination proceedings."); In re E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 (applying Strickland in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings).

2009Chase v. United States, 656 A.2d 1151, 1154, n. 7 (D.C.1995) (citations omitted).

2009Chase v. United States, 656 A.2d 1151, 1154, n. 7 (D.C.1995) (citations omitted).

2002In order for Harkins to prevail on a § 23-110 claim, however, he must prove “(1) deficient pérformance on the part of his trial counsel, and (2) prejudice as a result of that deficient performance.” Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.1993) (emphasis in original) (enunciating the Strickland test).

2002In order for Harkins to prevail on a § 23-110 claim, however, he must prove “(1) deficient pérformance on the part of his trial counsel, and (2) prejudice as a result of that deficient performance.” Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.1993) (emphasis in original) (enunciating the Strickland test).

1999Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 73-74 (D.C.1994); Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C.1989); Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 539-40 (D.C.1984).

1999Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 73-74 (D.C.1994); Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C.1989); Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 539-40 (D.C.1984).

1999Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 73-74 (D.C.1994); Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C.1989); Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 539-40 (D.C.1984).

1999Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 73-74 (D.C.1994); Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C.1989); Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 539-40 (D.C.1984).

2026To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, Truesdale must show that Rudasill’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

2026To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, Truesdale must show that Rudasill’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ).

2017In Padilla, supra, the Supreme Court considered a threshold question before addressing the Strickland test — “Was advice about deportation ’categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a 'collateral consequence’ of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence?” Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 349 , 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at 366 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ).

2017In Padilla, supra, the Supreme Court considered a threshold question before addressing the Strickland test — “Was advice about deportation ’categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a 'collateral consequence’ of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence?” Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 349 , 133 S.Ct. 1103 , 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at 366 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 ).

1995See McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11 (D.C.1992) (holding that this court must ensure that a Monroe-Farrell claim has been definitively resolved before dealing with the Strickland inquiry). 6 .

1995See McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11 (D.C.1992) (holding that this court must ensure that a Monroe-Farrell claim has been definitively resolved before dealing with the Strickland inquiry). 6 .

2026Cir. 1996) (concluding that Rudasill “clearly presented an invalid” defense on behalf of his client and “may have failed to satisfy the Strickland standard”); United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893-95 (D.C.

2026Cir. 1996) (concluding that Rudasill “clearly presented an invalid” defense on behalf of his client and “may have failed to satisfy the Strickland standard”); United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893-95 (D.C.

2025See Faltz v. United States, 318 A.3d 338 , 345-46 (D.C. 2024) (declining to address the performance prong because appellant could not prove prejudice); see also Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 259 (D.C. 1999) (disposing of the Strickland claim solely on prejudice).

2025See Faltz v. United States, 318 A.3d 338 , 345-46 (D.C. 2024) (declining to address the performance prong because appellant could not prove prejudice); see also Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 259 (D.C. 1999) (disposing of the Strickland claim solely on prejudice).

2025And as explained, it does undergo harmless error review through the analysis of its own materiality standard. 32 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (holding that Brecht does not apply to habeas claims about the failure to disclose material evidence to the defendant under Brady); id. at 436 & n.9 (noting that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), need not be reviewed for Brecht harmlessness); see also Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806 , 821-24 (2020) (per curiam) (directing the trial court, without reference to Brecht, to analyze on remand the prej

2025And as explained, it does undergo harmless error review through the analysis of its own materiality standard. 32 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (holding that Brecht does not apply to habeas claims about the failure to disclose material evidence to the defendant under Brady); id. at 436 & n.9 (noting that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), need not be reviewed for Brecht harmlessness); see also Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806 , 821-24 (2020) (per curiam) (directing the trial court, without reference to Brecht, to analyze on remand the prej

2025Therefore, “we need not determine whether [Mr. Becton’s] trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient representation because we are convinced that [Mr. Becton] has not shown a reasonable probability or a substantial likelihood that the outcome of the proceeding against him would have been different.” Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172, 1196 (D.C. 2016).

2025Therefore, “we need not determine whether [Mr. Becton’s] trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient representation because we are convinced that [Mr. Becton] has not shown a reasonable probability or a substantial likelihood that the outcome of the proceeding against him would have been different.” Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172, 1196 (D.C. 2016).

2025And as explained, it does undergo harmless error review through the analysis of its own materiality standard. 32 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (holding that Brecht does not apply to habeas claims about the failure to disclose material evidence to the defendant under Brady); id. at 436 & n.9 (noting that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), need not be reviewed for Brecht harmlessness); see also Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806 , 821-24 (2020) (per curiam) (directing the trial court, without reference to Brecht, to analyze on remand the prej

2025And as explained, it does undergo harmless error review through the analysis of its own materiality standard. 32 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (holding that Brecht does not apply to habeas claims about the failure to disclose material evidence to the defendant under Brady); id. at 436 & n.9 (noting that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), need not be reviewed for Brecht harmlessness); see also Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806 , 821-24 (2020) (per curiam) (directing the trial court, without reference to Brecht, to analyze on remand the prej

2023Sup. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he conduct of a lawyer who has been suspended should be scrutinized very carefully.”); Massachusetts v. Thibeault, 556 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990) (“[S]crutiny should be particularly careful and discriminating where the attorney at the time was under suspension or other bar from practice” because “sound representation comprises not only legal proficiency on the part of the advocate but fidelity to ethical standards.”). 25 simply irrelevant to the Strickland analysis, as the trial court seemed to do.

2023Sup. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he conduct of a lawyer who has been suspended should be scrutinized very carefully.”); Massachusetts v. Thibeault, 556 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990) (“[S]crutiny should be particularly careful and discriminating where the attorney at the time was under suspension or other bar from practice” because “sound representation comprises not only legal proficiency on the part of the advocate but fidelity to ethical standards.”). 25 simply irrelevant to the Strickland analysis, as the trial court seemed to do.

2023See Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 733 (D.C. 2020) (“We cannot conclude at this point that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on this aspect of appellant’s claim, but the trial court should reconsider the issue in conjunction with the hearing on whether the Strickland test is satisfied as it applies to [the § 23-110 movant’s related] claim . . . .”); see also Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 518 (“Deficient investigation cannot be excused on the ground that a competent attorney . . . could have made an informed judgment to pursue an alternative strategy. . . .” (cleaned up)). 11 Although we af

2023See Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 733 (D.C. 2020) (“We cannot conclude at this point that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on this aspect of appellant’s claim, but the trial court should reconsider the issue in conjunction with the hearing on whether the Strickland test is satisfied as it applies to [the § 23-110 movant’s related] claim . . . .”); see also Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 518 (“Deficient investigation cannot be excused on the ground that a competent attorney . . . could have made an informed judgment to pursue an alternative strategy. . . .” (cleaned up)). 11 Although we af

2023See Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 733 (D.C. 2020) (“We cannot conclude at this point that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on this aspect of appellant’s claim, but the trial court should reconsider the issue in conjunction with the hearing on whether the Strickland test is satisfied as it applies to [the § 23-110 movant’s related] claim . . . .”); see also Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 518 (“Deficient investigation cannot be excused on the ground that a competent attorney . . . could have made an informed judgment to pursue an alternative strategy. . . .” (cleaned up)). 11 Although we af

2023See Dorsey v. United States, 225 A.3d 724 , 733 (D.C. 2020) (“We cannot conclude at this point that an evidentiary hearing is warranted on this aspect of appellant’s claim, but the trial court should reconsider the issue in conjunction with the hearing on whether the Strickland test is satisfied as it applies to [the § 23-110 movant’s related] claim . . . .”); see also Bellinger, 127 A.3d at 518 (“Deficient investigation cannot be excused on the ground that a competent attorney . . . could have made an informed judgment to pursue an alternative strategy. . . .” (cleaned up)). 11 Although we af

2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb

2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb

2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb

2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb

2016See Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C.2005) (noting that except for claims based on conflict of interest, “once jeopardy attaches in a criminal trial, any subsequent allegation of ineffective assistance should be addressed in a post-trial motion or on appeal (or both) where the Strickland standard can be applied in proper context”).

2016See Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C.2005) (noting that except for claims based on conflict of interest, “once jeopardy attaches in a criminal trial, any subsequent allegation of ineffective assistance should be addressed in a post-trial motion or on appeal (or both) where the Strickland standard can be applied in proper context”).

2015Fretes-Zarate, 40 A.3d at 374, 376 .

2015Fretes-Zarate, 40 A.3d at 374, 376 .