1,517 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2026 263 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goad v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). 2026Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). | 458 | 468 |
Nichols v. Stategreen2 sentences2026If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). 2026If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). | 251 | 252 |
Henley v. Stategreen2 sentences2026As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 . 2026As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 . | 203 | 422 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tenn. 1994); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the two-part Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012). “‘[A] lawyer must abide by his client’s decision [to accept or reject a plea] only after having provided the client with competent and fully informed advice, 2017See Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tenn. 1994); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the two-part Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012). “‘[A] lawyer must abide by his client’s decision [to accept or reject a plea] only after having provided the client with competent and fully informed advice, | 201 | 202 |
State v. Melsongreen2 sentences2026See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989). -6- A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 2026See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989). -6- A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. | 140 | 492 |
Baxter v. Rosegreen2 sentences2026As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 . 2026As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 . | 110 | 124 |
Michel v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2026However, “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). -8- I. 2026However, “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). -8- I. | 85 | 85 |
Lockhart v. Fretwellgreen2 sentences2011In Lockhart *337 v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the Supreme Court, “apply[ing] the case-by-case prejudice inquiry that has always been built into the Strickland test,” id. at 370 n. 2, 113 S.Ct. 838 , reiterated that “an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Id. at 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838 . 2011In Lockhart *337 v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the Supreme Court, “apply[ing] the case-by-case prejudice inquiry that has always been built into the Strickland test,” id. at 370 n. 2, 113 S.Ct. 838 , reiterated that “an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Id. at 369 , 113 S.Ct. 838 . | 56 | 58 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). 2026Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). | 28 | 750 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2022We also apply the Strickland standard for determining deficiency when reviewing “challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 2022We also apply the Strickland standard for determining deficiency when reviewing “challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). | 21 | 73 |
Missouri v. Fryegreen2 sentences2024“The Strickland standard for determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel applies during plea negotiations as well as during trial.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 787 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144-45 (2012)). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 . 2024“The Strickland standard for determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel applies during plea negotiations as well as during trial.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 787 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144-45 (2012)). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 . | 19 | 20 |
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2010If the petitioner meets his or her burden, the trial court must apply the Strickland analysis and determine whether counsel’s error “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and whether the error raised ‘a reasonable probability . . . that the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694 ). 2010If the petitioner meets his or her burden, the trial court must apply the Strickland analysis and determine whether counsel’s error “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and whether the error raised ‘a reasonable probability . . . that the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694 ). | 19 | 20 |
Carpenter v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004) (applying the Strickland standard to appellate-ineffectiveness claims). 2024See Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004) (applying the Strickland standard to appellate-ineffectiveness claims). | 18 | 20 |
Black v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). -4- We note that when post-conviction proceedings have included a full evidentiary hearing, as was true in this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are given the effect and weight of a jury verdict, and this 2012Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). -4- We note that when post-conviction proceedings have included a full evidentiary hearing, as was true in this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are given the effect and weight of a jury verdict, and this | 17 | 27 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2011The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or “outside the range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). 2011The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or “outside the range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). | 16 | 17 |
Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia v. State of Tennesseegreen2 sentences2025Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tenn. 2013). 2025Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tenn. 2013). | 15 | 15 |
Clarence Nesbit v. State of Tennesseegreen2 sentences2024“The Strickland standard for determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel applies during plea negotiations as well as during trial.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 787 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144-45 (2012)). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 . 2024“The Strickland standard for determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel applies during plea negotiations as well as during trial.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 787 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144-45 (2012)). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 . | 11 | 11 |
Dellinger v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“The overlap between a petitioner’s statutory burden of proof under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f) and a court’s application of the Strickland inquiry means that Petitioner is required to prove the fact of counsel’s alleged error by clear and convincing evidence.” Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 294 ) (emphasis in original). 2026“The overlap between a petitioner’s statutory burden of proof under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f) and a court’s application of the Strickland inquiry means that Petitioner is required to prove the fact of counsel’s alleged error by clear and convincing evidence.” Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 294 ) (emphasis in original). | 10 | 14 |
Campbell v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995). -22- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). 2014Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995). -22- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”). | 9 | 9 |
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences2021“In order to succeed in proving ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the evidence, [a petitioner] must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, showing that counsel’s failure to file the motion was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ). 2021“In order to succeed in proving ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the evidence, [a petitioner] must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, showing that counsel’s failure to file the motion was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ). | 8 | 10 |
Overton v. Stategreen2 sentences2012A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694; see also Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that petitioner failed to establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”). -17- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to pr 2012A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694; see also Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that petitioner failed to establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”). -17- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to pr | 7 | 7 |
Evitts v. Luceygreen2 sentences2020Id. 2020Id. | 6 | 15 |
Cooper v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993). 2014Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993). | 6 | 6 |
Ronald Dean Combs v. Ralph Coylegreen2 sentences2012Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Combs, 205 F.3d at 277 . -10- The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . 2012Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; see also Combs, 205 F.3d at 277 . -10- The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . | 5 | 25 |
| United States v. Segun Ashimigreen | 5 | 5 |
| King v. Stategreen | 4 | 4 |
| cluster 708222green | 4 | 4 |
House v. Stategreen2 sentences2023However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’” House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 ). 12 If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2023However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’” House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 ). 12 If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. | 3 | 22 |
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2014The Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court should have presumed prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), thereby relieving the Petitioner of the burden of proving the Strickland factors. 2014The Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court should have presumed prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), thereby relieving the Petitioner of the burden of proving the Strickland factors. | 3 | 18 |
Martinez-Villareal v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2010See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989). 2010See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989). | 3 | 13 |
| Cyntoia Brown v. Carolyn Jordangreen | 3 | 3 |
| Burt v. Titlowgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Calvert v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| Hadley v. Washingtongreen | 3 | 3 |
| Ross v. Nortongreen | 3 | 3 |
State v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2022This Court must evaluate the questionable conduct from the attorney’s perspective at the time, Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982), and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999). - 11 - Even if a petitioner shows that counsel’s representation was deficient, the petitioner must also satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in order to obtain relief. 2022This Court must evaluate the questionable conduct from the attorney’s perspective at the time, Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982), and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999). - 11 - Even if a petitioner shows that counsel’s representation was deficient, the petitioner must also satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in order to obtain relief. | 2 | 19 |
Wallace v. Stategreen2 sentences2024As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, however, the trial court -15- applied Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), overruled by Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020), and concluded that prejudice was presumed by counsel’s error. 2024As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, however, the trial court -15- applied Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), overruled by Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020), and concluded that prejudice was presumed by counsel’s error. | 2 | 5 |
| Burger v. Kempgreen | 2 | 4 |
| Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Charles R. Chadwick v. Calvin E. Green, Superintendent, Wayne Correctional Institution, Odum, Georgiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wallace v. Stategreen2 sentences2024As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, however, the trial court -15- applied Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), overruled by Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020), and concluded that prejudice was presumed by counsel’s error. 2024As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, however, the trial court -15- applied Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), overruled by Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53 (Tenn. 2020), and concluded that prejudice was presumed by counsel’s error. | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
| D'Angelo v. Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission green | 3 | 1995–1998 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 2 | 2013–2020 |
| Rashe Moore v. State of Tennessee green | 2 | 2020–2020 |
| Grindstaff v. State green | 2 | 2011–2017 |
| People v. Washington green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Garza v. Idaho green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Jesse Peoples v. Blaine Lafler green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.