38 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Leachgreen2 sentences2019The jury’s question here was explicit; the jury’s question was a question of law because it dealt with the mens rea requirement and the construction of its jury instruction (Leach, 2011 IL App (1st) 090339, ¶ 17 (“the construction of a jury instruction is a question of law”)); and the jury expressed confusion over what the State was required to prove defendant had knowledge of. 2019The jury’s question here was explicit; the jury’s question was a question of law because it dealt with the mens rea requirement and the construction of its jury instruction (Leach, 2011 IL App (1st) 090339, ¶ 17 (“the construction of a jury instruction is a question of law”)); and the jury expressed confusion over what the State was required to prove defendant had knowledge of. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Geangreen2 sentences2019People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 286 (1991). 2019People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 286 (1991). | 3 | 4 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 | 2 | 4 |
Staples v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 | 2 | 4 |
Cochran & Sayre v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 2016Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (“defendant could face ‘liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind’ ” (quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895))). ¶ 27 Accordingly, we hold that subsection (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, of which defendant was convicted and sentenced, lacks a mens rea requirement and is therefore facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¶ 28 We next address defendant’s claims concerning his convictions under subsection (a)(1 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2011See Robinson, 186 Ill.App.3d at 3 , 133 Ill.Dec. 898 , 541 N.E.2d 1336 ("Section 32-4(b) appears to be directed to the prevention of paying a witness to testify other than truthfully and of her own free will." (Emphasis added.)). ¶ 23 However, the legislature used two different words when defining the respective mens rea elements of communicating with a juror and communicating with a witness, and we cannot presume that the difference was anything other than intentional. 2011See Robinson, 186 Ill.App.3d at 3 , 133 Ill.Dec. 898 , 541 N.E.2d 1336 ("Section 32-4(b) appears to be directed to the prevention of paying a witness to testify other than truthfully and of her own free will." (Emphasis added.)). ¶ 23 However, the legislature used two different words when defining the respective mens rea elements of communicating with a juror and communicating with a witness, and we cannot presume that the difference was anything other than intentional. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stancielgreen2 sentences2002Aggravated battery of a child is an offense which requires a knowing or intentional state of mind (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3 (West 2000)), and "[accountability, tied as it is to the crime charged, must comport with the requirements of that crime" ( People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill.2d 218, 234 , 180 Ill.Dec. 124 , 606 N.E.2d 1201 (1992)). 2002Aggravated battery of a child is an offense which requires a knowing or intentional state of mind (720 ILCS 5/12 — 4.3 (West 2000)), and “[a]c-countability, tied as it is to the crime charged, must comport with the requirements of that crime” (People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234 (1992)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2004People v. Wright, 194 Ill.2d 1, 29 , 251 Ill.Dec. 469 , 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000). 2004People v. Wright, 194 Ill.2d 1, 29 , 251 Ill.Dec. 469 , 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mikuschgreen2 sentences2001When viewing the statute in its entirety, as we must ( State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill.2d 242, 247 , 149 Ill.Dec. 704 , 562 N.E.2d 168 (1990) (in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts should consider the statute in its entirety, noting the subject being addressed and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting the statute)), a statutory scheme is revealed, which makes clear that the legislature's omission of a mens rea requirement was not an oversight. 2001When viewing the statute in its entirety, as we must (State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247 (1990) (in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, courts should consider the statute in its entirety, noting the subject being addressed and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting the statute)), a statutory scheme is revealed, which makes clear that the legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement was not an oversight. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shellygreen1 sentence2025See People v. Shelly, 2024 IL App (3d) 220432, ¶ 34 (concluding that, following a post-trial change in the law regarding a mens rea requirement, the appropriate remedy was to vacate the defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial and that double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial in that situation). ¶ 15 In reaching this conclusion, we note that this outcome differs from the remedy ordered by the supreme court in Guy. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Walkergreen1 sentence2025See People v. Walker, 2020 IL App (4th) 180774, ¶ 93 (noting that lying to the police may be construed as consciousness of guilt). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robisongreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Clarke Dexter Weemsgreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arturo Gonzalez and Ricardo Ramirezgreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harold Fordgreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kurt Harringtongreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Clifford Houstongreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pollardgreen1 sentence2022See Pollard, 2015 IL App (3d) 130467, ¶ 40 (McDade, J., dissenting). ¶ 57 But we would respectfully suggest that, in the mens rea analysis in Pollard, the child’s death was not the relevant result that the defendant had to know. | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See Watts , 394 U.S. at 708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 ; Black , 538 U.S. at 359 -60 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 . 2018See Watts , 394 U.S. at 708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 ; Black , 538 U.S. at 359 -60 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 710261green1 sentence2023See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial on one count where the then-applicable rule on “use” of a firearm was abrogated by the Supreme Court); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s mens rea requirement for relevant financial offenses after trial); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2015) (permitting retrial where the Supreme Court abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s standard defining a “true threat” after trial); United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Relerford
green
2 sentences2021Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of one year and six months’ imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of mandatory supervised release. ¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argued that subsection (a) of the stalking statute violated state and federal constitutional guarantees of (1) due process, because it lacks a mens rea requirement and is unduly vague, and (2) free speech, because it overbroadly criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. ¶ 15 The appellate court rejected defendant’s argument that subsection (a) violates due process, relying on this court’s decision in People 2020Defendant was subsequently -4- sentenced to a term of one year and six months’ imprisonment, followed by a four- year term of mandatory supervised release. ¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argued that subsection (a) of the stalking statute violated state and federal constitutional guarantees of (1) due process, because it lacks a mens rea requirement and is unduly vague, and (2) free speech, because it overbroadly criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. ¶ 15 The appellate court rejected defendant’s argument that subsection (a) violates due process, relying on this court’s decision in P | 4 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2016The statute further defines “emotional distress” as “significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm” (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(3) (West 2012)) and “reasonable person” as “a person in the victim’s situation” (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(8) (West 2012)). ¶ 21 In People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 , the Fifth District rejected a due process challenge to subsection (a) of the general stalking statute on the basis that it did not contain a mens rea requirement. 2016The statute further defines “emotional distress” as “significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm” (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(3) (West 2012)) and “reasonable person” as “a person in the victim’s situation” (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(8) (West 2012)). ¶ 21 In People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 , the Fifth District rejected a due process challenge to subsection (a) of the general stalking statute on the basis that it did not contain a mens rea requirement. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Pollock
green
2 sentences2014Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189 .” ¶ 60 After quoting this test, the trial court ignored it and considered only one of the factors, made findings contradictory to the supreme court’s decision, and reached its conclusion: “Looking at all the facts and circumstances of this case, the issue boils down to whether the defendant knew that her children had been abused in the past by Scott English. *** [T]he court has to look to what evidence the defendant had that Scott had abused her children. 2014Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189 .” ¶ 60 After quoting this test, the trial court ignored it and considered only one of the factors, made findings contradictory to the supreme court’s decision, and reached its conclusion: “Looking at all the facts and circumstances of this case, the issue boils down to whether the defendant knew that her children had been abused in the past by Scott English. *** [T]he court has to look to what evidence the defendant had that Scott had abused her children. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Flores-Figueroa v. United States
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 657 , 129 S.Ct. at 1894 . ¶ 35 The State argues that one "critical" difference between the Illinois state statute and the federal statute is that the Illinois statute "is not a[n] enhancement statute and does not carry with it a mandatory prison sentence." This is a distinction without a difference in terms of statutory interpretation of identical language. ¶ 36 The State further notes that "Illinois has a corollary Aggravated Identity Theft statute, 720 ILCS 5/16G-20, which defendant was not charged under," and argues that "adding the more stringent mens rea requirement from the federa 2012Id. at 657 , 129 S.Ct. at 1894 . ¶ 35 The State argues that one "critical" difference between the Illinois state statute and the federal statute is that the Illinois statute "is not a[n] enhancement statute and does not carry with it a mandatory prison sentence." This is a distinction without a difference in terms of statutory interpretation of identical language. ¶ 36 The State further notes that "Illinois has a corollary Aggravated Identity Theft statute, 720 ILCS 5/16G-20, which defendant was not charged under," and argues that "adding the more stringent mens rea requirement from the federa | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2024The question posed by this appeal is whether the mens rea requirement applies to both elements of the offense—in other words, whether the State was required to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew that his FOID card was revoked. ¶ 30 As the parties discuss in their briefs, this question of statutory interpretation has not yet been before this court. 1 However, the Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed an analogous situation in People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123 . ¶ 31 In Ramirez, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed section 24-5(b) of the Code, which prohibits the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Stanley
green
2 sentences2023Stanley, 397 Ill. 2023Id. at 605- 07 (citing 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 2006)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Comage
green
1 sentence2021Carrying an object is not necessarily concealing it to avoid apprehension or to thwart law enforcement. ¶ 42 Despite flaws in M.F.’s reasoning and its self-imposed limitation to its particular facts, the Comage court relied upon M.F. in concluding section 31-4, the obstructing justice statute (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2006)), requires proof the defendant’s actions of separating himself from the contraband “actually interferes with the administration of justice.” (Emphasis in original.) Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 149 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Relerford
green
1 sentence2020After inquiring regarding the potential use of his prior convictions for telephone harassment, forgery, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle, defendant declined to testify and rested. ¶ 18 At the continued trial date, the ASA indicated that the State could not sustain its burden as to the aggravated stalking, cyberstalking, and stalking counts based on the recent decision in People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 , which held that portions of the stalking and cyberstalking statutes lacked a mens rea requirement and were thus facially unconstitutional. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Leach
green
2 sentences2019The jury's question here was explicit; it was a question of law because it dealt with the mens rea requirement and the construction of its jury instruction ( Leach , 2011 IL App (1st) 090339 , ¶ 17, 351 Ill.Dec. 855 , 952 N.E.2d 647 ("the construction of a jury instruction is a question of law") ); and the jury expressed confusion over what the State was required to prove defendant had knowledge of. 2019The jury's question here was explicit; it was a question of law because it dealt with the mens rea requirement and the construction of its jury instruction ( Leach , 2011 IL App (1st) 090339 , ¶ 17, 351 Ill.Dec. 855 , 952 N.E.2d 647 ("the construction of a jury instruction is a question of law") ); and the jury expressed confusion over what the State was required to prove defendant had knowledge of. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Virginia v. Black
green
2 sentences2018See Watts , 394 U.S. at 708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 ; Black , 538 U.S. at 359 -60 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 . 2018See Watts , 394 U.S. at 708 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 ; Black , 538 U.S. at 359 -60 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Lopez green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Fornear green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Talley green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.