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40 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357 , 360- 11 57910-3-II 67, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040). 2021See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 9 Significantly, Moreno does not show that he was unable to argue his theory that he was in the townhome lawfully, and the jury was provided with the instructions that mirrored the language of the statute for unlawfully entering or remaining. 15 State v. Moreno, No. 99147- 2 Wn.2d 357, 360-67 , 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357 , 360- 11 57910-3-II 67, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040). 2021See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 9 Significantly, Moreno does not show that he was unable to argue his theory that he was in the townhome lawfully, and the jury was provided with the instructions that mirrored the language of the statute for unlawfully entering or remaining. 15 State v. Moreno, No. 99147- 2 Wn.2d 357, 360-67 , 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040)). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Ulibarrigreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a 2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164 , 168 12 No. 92593-3 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because "the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated" in the provision in question, this "places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis"); United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) ("Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. ... [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already 'separate[s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,' Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goregreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a 2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Rapertgreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a 2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164 , 168 12 No. 92593-3 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because "the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated" in the provision in question, this "places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis"); United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) ("Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. ... [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already 'separate[s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,' Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Murillogreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a 2016See United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (because “the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) [i.e., absence of mens rea] are not replicated” in the provision in question, this “places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis”)-, United States v. Ulibarri, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333 (D.N.M. 2015) (“Unlike [18 U.S.C.] § 875(c), [the provision in question] already contains a mens rea requirement. . . . [Accordingly, b]ecause [the provision in question] already ‘separate [s] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct,’ Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 , a | 2 | 2 |
Bianco v. California Highway Patrolgreen2 sentences1998See Bianco, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1113 . 7 The State correctly contends that the issue for due process is adequate notice, that is, fair warning of what is prohibited. 1998See Bianco, 24 Cal.App.4th 1113 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 711 . [7] *358 The State correctly contends that the issue for due process is adequate notice, that is, fair warning of what is prohibited. | 2 | 2 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Thus, the statute does not criminalize “idle talk” or “political argument.” We agree this statute implies a mens rea requirement above negligence and is therefore consistent with “‘the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.’” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 128 L. 2021Thus, the statute does not criminalize “idle talk” or “political argument.” We agree this statute implies a mens rea requirement above negligence and is therefore consistent with “‘the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.’” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 128 L. | 1 | 4 |
Leocal v. Ashcroftgreen2 sentences2026It added that because the Supreme Court previously held that a DUI “cannot be considered a crime of violence because it lacked a mens rea requirement,” a “DUI cannot be categorically defined as a crime of violence for which there may be historical support for Second Amendment restrictions.” Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. 2026It added that because the Supreme Court previously held that a DUI “cannot be considered a crime of violence because it lacked a mens rea requirement,” a “DUI cannot be categorically defined as a crime of violence for which there may be historical support for Second Amendment restrictions.” Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Contegreen2 sentences2020Conte, 159 Wn.2d at 811 (“Further, as the State maintains, RCW 40.16.030 contains a mens rea requirement. 2020Conte, 159 Wn.2d at 811 (“Further, as the State maintains, RCW 40.16.030 contains a mens rea requirement. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2020See Clark, 175 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bauergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Staples v. United States
green
2 sentences2021Thus, the statute does not criminalize “idle talk” or “political argument.” We agree this statute implies a mens rea requirement above negligence and is therefore consistent with “‘the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.’” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 128 L. 2021Thus, the statute does not criminalize “idle talk” or “political argument.” We agree this statute implies a mens rea requirement above negligence and is therefore consistent with “‘the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.’” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 114 S. Ct. 1793 , 128 L. | 4 | 2019–2021 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences2016Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (“ ‘ [t] he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S. Ct. 2864 , 57 L. 2016Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (“ ‘ [t] he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S. Ct. 2864 , 57 L. | 3 | 2016–2019 |
City of Seattle v. Webster
green
2 sentences2014App. 951, 960-61 , 231 P.3d 212 (2010), Division One relied on the mens rea requirement imposed by the statute, likening it to the pedestrian interference ordinance that our Supreme Court concluded was not overbroad in City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990). 2014App. 951, 960-61 , 231 P.3d 212 (2010), Division One relied on the mens rea requirement imposed by the statute, likening it to the pedestrian interference ordinance that our Supreme Court concluded was not overbroad in City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990). | 3 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Coleman
neutral
2 sentences2014App. 951, 960-61 , 231 P.3d 212 (2010), Division One relied on the mens rea requirement imposed by the statute, likening it to the pedestrian interference ordinance that our Supreme Court concluded was not overbroad in City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990). 2014App. 951, 960-61 , 231 P.3d 212 (2010), Division One relied on the mens rea requirement imposed by the statute, likening it to the pedestrian interference ordinance that our Supreme Court concluded was not overbroad in City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990). | 3 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Ferguson
procedural
2 sentences2014In State v. Ferguson, 164 Wn. 2014In State v. Ferguson, 164 Wn. | 3 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357 , 360- 11 57910-3-II 67, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040). 2021See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 9 Significantly, Moreno does not show that he was unable to argue his theory that he was in the townhome lawfully, and the jury was provided with the instructions that mirrored the language of the statute for unlawfully entering or remaining. 15 State v. Moreno, No. 99147- 2 Wn.2d 357, 360-67 , 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040)). | 2 | 2021–2024 |
State v. Blake
green
2 sentences2021State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 195 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021). 2021State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 195 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2018"The language of the accomplice liability statute establishes a mens rea requirement of'knowledge' of 'the crime.'" Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 510 (quoting RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)). 2002The statute, which is based on section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code, “establishes a mens rea requirement of ‘knowledge’ of ‘the crime.’ ” Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 510 . | 2 | 2002–2018 |
State v. Danforth
green
2 sentences2017Mr. Buttolph relied principally on State v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255 , 643 P.2d 882 (1982) for the proposition that the legislature plainly intended to impose a greater mens rea requirement for this statute. 2017Mr. Buttolph relied principally on State v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255 , 643 P.2d 882 (1982) for the proposition that the legislature plainly intended to impose a greater mens rea requirement for this statute. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2015Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 345 , 610 P.2d 869 (1980). 2015Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 345 , 610 P.2d 869 (1980). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Chhom
green
2 sentences2010Although the State is correct that rape of a child is a strict liability crime, see State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739, 743 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996), the "minimal mental element" of volitionas part of the actus reusmust be proved even for those crimes without a mens rea requirement. 2010Although the State is correct that rape of a child is a strict liability crime, see State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739, 743 , 911 P.2d 1014 (1996), the "minimal mental element" of volitionas part of the actus reusmust be proved even for those crimes without a mens rea requirement. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Cornwall v. State
green
2 sentences2008Cornwall, 915 P.2d at 648-49 . 2008Cornwall, 915 P.2d at 648-49 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Counterman v. Colorado
green
2 sentences2024Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 , 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 216 L. 2024Counterman, 600 U.S. at 75 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2024See, e.g., State v. Williams, 158 Wn.2d 904, 908-16 , 148 P.3d 993 (2006) (reading in a mens rea requirement to unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to RCW 9.41.190(1)); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357 , 360- 11 57910-3-II 67, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same for RCW 9.41.040). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State Of Washington v. Docie Burch
green
1 sentence2024State v. Burch, 197 Wn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State Of Washington, V. Turner Lee Calloway
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dunner v. McLaughlin
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Cleppe
green
2 sentences2021We reiterated this principle in State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 378 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), unanimously rejecting a challenge to the validity of the legislature’s power to enact RCW 69.50.401(c), which continued to make possession of a controlled substance a crime without a mens rea requirement. 2021We reiterated this principle in State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 378 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), unanimously rejecting a challenge to the validity of the legislature’s power to enact RCW 69.50.401(c), which continued to make possession of a controlled substance a crime without a mens rea requirement. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. WEAVILLE
green
1 sentence2019Weaville, 162 Wn. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Maxfield green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Kilburn green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bishop v. City of Spokane green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Verda Lee Crosswhite Vv Washington State Dept. of Social & Health Services green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Bash green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Brandenburg v. Ohio green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Gamble green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Ware neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Ware green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Roberts green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Dennis v. United States green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.