mens rea requirement in Iowa

2018We came to a similar conclusion in State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006).

2018We came to a similar conclusion in State v. Ragland , 420 N.W.2d 791 , 794 (Iowa 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra , 721 N.W.2d 549 , 558 (Iowa 2006).

2025The Dostarts attempt to distinguish Yegge on the basis that it involved common law fraud, which has a higher mens rea requirement than statutory consumer fraud under Iowa Code section 714H.3(1) (2019). 8 [T]o prevail on a common law fraud claim the plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) [the] defendant made a representation to the plaintiff, (2) the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the defendant knew the representation was false, (5) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff, (6) the plaintiff acted in [justifiable] reliance on the truth of the represe

2025The Dostarts attempt to distinguish Yegge on the basis that it involved common law fraud, which has a higher mens rea requirement than statutory consumer fraud under Iowa Code section 714H.3(1) (2019). 8 [T]o prevail on a common law fraud claim the plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) [the] defendant made a representation to the plaintiff, (2) the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the defendant knew the representation was false, (5) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff, (6) the plaintiff acted in [justifiable] reliance on the truth of the represe

2025The Dostarts attempt to distinguish Yegge on the basis that it involved common law fraud, which has a higher mens rea requirement than statutory consumer fraud under Iowa Code section 714H.3(1) (2019). 8 [T]o prevail on a common law fraud claim the plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) [the] defendant made a representation to the plaintiff, (2) the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the defendant knew the representation was false, (5) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff, (6) the plaintiff acted in [justifiable] reliance on the truth of the represe

2025The Dostarts attempt to distinguish Yegge on the basis that it involved common law fraud, which has a higher mens rea requirement than statutory consumer fraud under Iowa Code section 714H.3(1) (2019). 8 [T]o prevail on a common law fraud claim the plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) [the] defendant made a representation to the plaintiff, (2) the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the defendant knew the representation was false, (5) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff, (6) the plaintiff acted in [justifiable] reliance on the truth of the represe

2018Ed. 2d 508 (1975).”); State v. Burkhart, 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046–47 (Mont. 2004) (holding the felony- murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley, 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101–02 (Neb. 1982) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively presumes malice from the criminal intention to commit certain felonies and therefore violates “the rule against irrebuttable presumptions [as] stated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 685 , 96 S. Ct. 1881 . . . (1975)”); State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266,

2018Ed. 2d 508 (1975).”); State v. Burkhart, 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046–47 (Mont. 2004) (holding the felony- murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley, 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101–02 (Neb. 1982) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively presumes malice from the criminal intention to commit certain felonies and therefore violates “the rule against irrebuttable presumptions [as] stated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 685 , 96 S. Ct. 1881 . . . (1975)”); State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266,

2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift, 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668– 69 (N.C. 1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 757 (S.C. 1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the South Caroli

2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift, 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668– 69 (N.C. 1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 757 (S.C. 1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the South Caroli

2018We came to a similar conclusion in State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006).

2018We came to a similar conclusion in State v. Ragland , 420 N.W.2d 791 , 794 (Iowa 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Heemstra , 721 N.W.2d 549 , 558 (Iowa 2006).

2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift, 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668– 69 (N.C. 1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 757 (S.C. 1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the South Caroli

2018Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” (Citation omitted.)); State v. Swift, 226 S.E.2d 652 , 668– 69 (N.C. 1976) (holding the felony-murder rule does not involve any presumption of premeditation and deliberation that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because those are not elements of the crime of felony murder); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 757 (S.C. 1973) (holding the felony-murder rule did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the South Caroli

2018In Conner, we departed from the transferred-intent model of analysis, which would have exposed the felony-murder rule to due process attack, and instead declared that elimination of the mens rea requirement 53 was not an irrebuttable presumption but instead “a matter of substantive law that places responsibility on a wrongdoer for the direct and indirect consequences of his joint criminal conduct with another.” Id. at 456.

2018In Conner , we departed from the transferred-intent model of analysis, which would have exposed the felony-murder rule to due process attack, and instead declared that elimination of the mens rea requirement was not an irrebuttable presumption *213 but instead "a matter of substantive law that places responsibility on a wrongdoer for the direct and indirect consequences of his joint criminal conduct with another." Id. at 456 .

2018The court left open the issue of “the possibility that constitutional claims other than unlawful search and seizure may have a higher mens rea requirement, such as intent, embedded within the constitutional provision itself.” Id. at 281.

2018He acknowledges his argument is contrary to our holding in State v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1991) (holding willful injury is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder), but asserts our more recent precedent has abrogated Clarke. 60 We disagree.

2018He acknowledges his argument is contrary to our holding in State v. Clarke , 475 N.W.2d 193 , 196 (Iowa 1991) (holding willful injury is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder), but asserts our more recent precedent has abrogated Clarke .

2012See State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 605 (Iowa 1976) (finding the felony murder rule constitutional because the State must still prove every element, including the element of intent in the underlying crime, to enhance the degree of murder).

2004See, e.g., Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110 -12 (citing, in part, Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681 ) (clarifying recent cases to show the reckless driving alternative of Iowa’s vehicular homicide law requires more than ordinary negligence; “the State must prove the defendant engaged in conduct ‘fraught with a high degree of danger,’ conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it”).

2004See, e.g., Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110 -12 (citing, in part, Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681 ) (clarifying recent cases to show the reckless driving alternative of Iowa’s vehicular homicide law requires more than ordinary negligence; “the State must prove the defendant engaged in conduct ‘fraught with a high degree of danger,’ conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it”).

2004Indeed, in State v. Kolbet we upheld the statute against a due process *122 challenge, in which the defendant contended the statute was vague because, he alleged, it failed to state a mens rea requirement. 638 N.W.2d 653, 662 (Iowa 2001).

2004In rejecting Kolbet’s argument, we held “the [statute’s] requirement of a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others establishes a mens rea element that is essential to a finding of guilt.” Id.