5 Virgin Islands opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virgin Islands courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2014In Vermont the offense includes a mens rea requirement, Wilson, 67 A. at 534 (“[T]he motive prompting the neglect of a misprision must be in some form evil as respects the administration of justice.”). | 1 | 1 |
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Richardsgreen1 sentence2012Rodriguez, 423 F.2d at 12-14 ; see also Richards, 44 V.I. at 51 (noting that, in general, “where a statute codifying a common law crime is silent as to intent, it is proper to look to the general provision [at] 14 V.I.C. § 14” but holding, id. at 52-55, that the legislative intent for statutory rape was clear that it should be a strict liability crime). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stifflergreen1 sentence2001See, State v. Stiffler, 114 ID 935, 763 P.2d 308 (1988), (construing an identical statute). 4 This distinction is not a new one. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virgin Islands. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Government of Virgin Islands v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2012Rodriguez, 423 F.2d at 12-14 ; see also Richards, 44 V.I. at 51 (noting that, in general, “where a statute codifying a common law crime is silent as to intent, it is proper to look to the general provision [at] 14 V.I.C. § 14” but holding, id. at 52-55, that the legislative intent for statutory rape was clear that it should be a strict liability crime). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Carlock v. People
green
1 sentence2012The mens rea requirement for assault in the third degree is clearly distinguishable for voluntary manslaughter (of which the defendant was acquitted by the jury), as the latter requires “an intent to kill or an intention to inflict serious bodily injury that would likely cause or result in the victim’s death.” Carlock, 54 V.I. at 760-61 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Richards v. State
neutral
1 sentence2010Van Sant v. State, 523 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. App. 1988); Richards v. State, 461 N.E.2d 744 , trans. denied (Ind. App. 1984) (scienter element read into statute); (See also, Peters v. State, 449 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. App. 1983)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Peters v. State
neutral
1 sentence2010Van Sant v. State, 523 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. App. 1988); Richards v. State, 461 N.E.2d 744 , trans. denied (Ind. App. 1984) (scienter element read into statute); (See also, Peters v. State, 449 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. App. 1983)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Van Sant v. State
green
1 sentence2010Van Sant v. State, 523 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. App. 1988); Richards v. State, 461 N.E.2d 744 , trans. denied (Ind. App. 1984) (scienter element read into statute); (See also, Peters v. State, 449 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. App. 1983)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.