mens rea requirement in Indiana

2011See Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (belief that one has right to be present on property of another will preclude liability for trespass, so long as belief has fair and reasonable foundation).

2005Olsen, 663 N.E.2d at 1196 .

2008Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869 (Ind.2000); Clay v. State, 766 N.E.2d 33 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); Booker v. State, 741 N.E.2d 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); State v. Foster, 733 N.E.2d 534 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2004See Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869 (Ind.2000); Clay v. State, 766 N.E.2d 33 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); Booker v. State, 741 N.E.2d 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); State v. Foster, 783 N.E.2d 534 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2002State v. J.D., 701 N.E.2d 908, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Warren v. State, 701 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 165 (1999).

2001State v. J.D., 701 N.E.2d 908, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Warren, 701 N.E.2d at 905 .

2016See also Medina, 828 N.E.2d at 431 (finding harmless error in the trial court’s failure to give a mens rea instruction with regard to a class A felony child molesting charge). 4.

2014Although the statute in effect at the time of Thomeson’s offenses did not specify a mens rea requirement, the culpability required for a child molestation conviction under the statute was “knowingly or intentionally.” See Medina v. State, 828 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (some citations omitted and citing in part State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 967-968 (Ind. 1989) (where the legislature fails to specify a level of mental culpability with respect to an offense, a level of mental culpability of knowingly will be presumed to be required)), affirmed on reh’g, trans. denied.

2002State v. J.D., 701 N.E.2d 908, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Warren v. State, 701 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 165 (1999).

2001State v. J.D., 701 N.E.2d 908, 909 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trams. denied; Warren, 701 N.E.2d at 905 .

2014Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5 “redefines the requirement of mens rea to include voluntary intoxication, in addition to the traditional mental states, i.e., intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly.” Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 520 (Ind. 2001). “[E]vidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate the mens rea requirement . . . .” Id.

2014Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5 “redefines the requirement of mens rea to include voluntary intoxication, in addition to the traditional mental states, i.e., intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly.” Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 520 (Ind. 2001). “[E]vidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate the mens rea requirement . . . .” Id.

2026For criminal conversion, then, good faith is a defense because the offense requires criminal intent: “It is this mens rea requirement that differentiates criminal conversion from the more innocent breach of con- tract or failure to pay a debt—situations the criminal conversion statute was not intended to cover.” Larson v. Karagan, 979 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2020“It is this mens rea requirement that differentiates criminal conversion from the more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt – situations the criminal conversion and theft statutes were not intended to cover.” Id.

2006See Gilliana v. Paniaguas, 708 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ("It is this mens rea requirement that differentiates criminal conversion from the more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt situation that the criminal conversion statute was not intended to cover."), trans. demied.

2005We have observed that "the mens rea requirement differentiates criminal conversion from the more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt situation that the eriminal conversion statute was not intended to cover." Whitaker, 814 N.E.2d at 297 (quoting Greco v. KMA Auto Exch., Inc., 765 N.BE.2d 140, 147 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), and illiana, 708 N.E.2d at 899 ).

2014Although the statute in effect at the time of Thomeson’s offenses did not specify a mens rea requirement, the culpability required for a child molestation conviction under the statute was “knowingly or intentionally.” See Medina v. State, 828 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (some citations omitted and citing in part State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 967-968 (Ind. 1989) (where the legislature fails to specify a level of mental culpability with respect to an offense, a level of mental culpability of knowingly will be presumed to be required)), affirmed on reh’g, trans. denied.

1992When construing a criminal statute which does not expressly contain a mens rea requirement, we must bear in mind that "[eJriminal intent has generally been viewed as a presumptive element in criminal offenses." State v. Keihn (1989), Ind., 542 N.E.2d 963, 966 .

1999Midland-Guardian Co. v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 499 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.1986).

1998Midland-Guardian, 499 N.E.2d at 797 .

2020Moreover, “[i]t is well established that refusal to pay a debt will not generally support a conversion claim.” Bowden v. Agnew, 2 N.E.3d 743, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

2019See Hancock, 65 N.E.3d at 590 (referring to Ohio judicial interpretation of that state’s burglary statute when determining whether Ohio’s second-degree burglary statute was substantially similar to Indiana’s Level 4 felony burglary statute).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2561 | August 19, 2019 Page 11 of 21 See id. at 592 (holding that crime of second degree burglary as defined in Ohio was substantially similar to crime of Level 4 felony burglary in Indiana even though the elements of the crime in Ohio required the actual or likely presence of a person in the structure because the very same conduct meeting the elements of the crime would necessarily satisfy the elements of the Indiana crime). [22] Next, the elements of both crimes require the taking of “property” from another person or from the presence of another p

2017Bolt directs our attention to Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 2002), wherein our Indiana Supreme Court found “knowing” conduct to be the appropriate standard of culpability for a child molesting offense and clarified that, although the child molesting statute was silent as to a mens rea requirement: “we … have nevertheless long held that criminal intent is an element of the offense.” [16] Bolt then argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently when he did not proffer an instruction similar to the Pattern Jury Instruction given in Louallen, specifically: To convict the defend

2017Bolt directs our attention to Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 2002), wherein our Indiana Supreme Court found “knowing” conduct to be the appropriate standard of culpability for a child molesting offense and clarified that, although the child molesting statute was silent as to a mens rea requirement: “we … have nevertheless long held that criminal intent is an element of the offense.” [16] Bolt then argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently when he did not proffer an instruction similar to the Pattern Jury Instruction given in Louallen, specifically: To convict the defend

2017“It is this mens rea requirement that differentiates criminal conversion from a more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt, which situations the criminal conversion statute was not intended to cover.” Id. at 1167 . “[A] party may not restyle a breach-of-contract claim as a tort claim simply to obtain additional damages.” JPMCC 2006-CIBC14, Eads Parkway, LLC v. DBL Axel, LLC, 977 N.E.2d 354, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

2015Id. at 522, 524 . ■ [18] The Court rejected Johnson’s argument that there should be a mens rea requirement when it comes to venue.

2015The Court first noted that section 78aa of Title 15 of the United States Code applied, id. at 524 , which provides in part that “[a]ny criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.” The Court continued: In the context of securities offenses, we need not speculate as to whether there is, or should be, a mens rea requirement when it comes to venue.

2015“The belief that one has a right to be on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation.” Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2012“The legislature did not intend to criminalize 8 bona fide contract disputes.” Id. at 1079 . “[W]e normally regard a finding of criminal intent as the sort of determination requiring intervention by a fact-finder. . . .” White v. Indiana Realty Associates II, 555 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 1990).

2012Cliver v. State, 666 N.E.2d 59, 67 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied; Ind. Trial Rule 61.

2010A defendant who has been convicted of being an habitual traffic offender and whose license has accordingly been suspended for life has almost certainly appeared in court, entered a plea of guilty or been convicted after a trial in which he participated, and been sentenced by the trial court to a lifetime suspension. 737 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2009"The belief that one has a right to be on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation." A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). -It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant believed that he had a right to be on the property of another and whether that belief had a fair and reasonable foundation.

2009Id.

2008(Id. at 127.) Taylor directs us to Dawson v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied 822 N.E.2d 974 (Ind.2004), 10 which states: [NJumerous opinions ... have held that it is improper to include the term “knowing” in the mens rea instruction, even when the instruction properly states that the “specific intent to kill” is required.