mens rea requirement in New Hampshire

2021Relying on our holding in State v. Goding, 126 N.H. 50 (1985), in which we concluded that misdemeanor DUI offenses do not include a mens rea requirement, the State argued that RSA 263:64, IV is a penalty enhancement to which the mens rea requirement does not apply.

2007Moreover, we held in Goding that a DWI second offense, a misdemeanor, does not contain a mens rea requirement because “the legislative history of the DWI statutes, their plain meaning and the case law thereunder necessitate that the mens rea requirement of RSA 626:2, I[,] not be applied to misdemeanor DWI offenses.” Goding, 126 N.H. at 51 .

2016Under RSA 263:64, whether an offense constitutes a misdemeanor or violation depends upon “the reason for the suspension or revocation.” State v. Curran, 140 N.H. 530, 531 (1995); see RSA 263:64, IV, V-a(b), VI (describing misdemeanor offenses), VII (providing that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs IV, V-a, and VI, any person who violates” RSA 263:64 “shall be guilty of a violation”). *153 The very structure of RSA 268:64 indicates that the legislature did not intend that only the misdemeanors set forth therein include a mens rea requirement.

2016In Curran , we concluded that this legislative history “offer[ed] no indication that the legislature intended to eliminate the mens rea requirement for those violations of RSA 268:64 that would remain . . . misdemeanor[s].” Curran, 140 N.H. at 532 .

2025The “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.” Id. at 330 (quotation omitted). [¶28] The trial court imposed a mens rea requirement for trespass, explaining that “if a person only commits an actual trespass for purposes of the Civil Rights Act where the person, knowing that they are not licensed or privileged [to] do so, enters or remains in any place, this eliminates many of the concerns outlined above.” The court explained that this narrower construction: (1) “eliminat[es] the vague

2025The “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.” Id. at 330 (quotation omitted). [¶28] The trial court imposed a mens rea requirement for trespass, explaining that “if a person only commits an actual trespass for purposes of the Civil Rights Act where the person, knowing that they are not licensed or privileged [to] do so, enters or remains in any place, this eliminates many of the concerns outlined above.” The court explained that this narrower construction: (1) “eliminat[es] the vague

2025The “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.” Id. at 330 (quotation omitted). [¶28] The trial court imposed a mens rea requirement for trespass, explaining that “if a person only commits an actual trespass for purposes of the Civil Rights Act where the person, knowing that they are not licensed or privileged [to] do so, enters or remains in any place, this eliminates many of the concerns outlined above.” The court explained that this narrower construction: (1) “eliminat[es] the vague

2016The defendant correctly notes that, when determining the mens rea requirement for an offense, we have equated “intentional” with “purposeful.” See State v. Pond, 132 N.H. 472, 475 (1989) (stating that we had previously concluded that “intentionally” was synonymous with “purposely,” and therefore, purposely was the mens rea for the offense at issue).

2009See State v. Polk, 155 N.H. 585, 588-89 (2007); State v. Goding, 126 N.H. 50, 51 (1985).

2007Cf. State v. King, 136 N.H. 674, 678 (1993) (reversing where court’s reinstruction following jury question “improperly focused the jury’s attention on whether the victim had been stabbed with a knife and away from the defendant’s claim that there had been no assault”).

1985Our holding today is consistent with prior opinions where we have stated that the purpose of the DWI statutes is “to prevent the operation of cars by persons under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” State v. Slater, 109 N.H. 279, 280 , 249 A.2d 692, 693 (1969).

1985Our holding today is consistent with prior opinions where we have stated that the purpose of the DWI statutes is “to prevent the operation of cars by persons under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” State v. Slater, 109 N.H. 279, 280 , 249 A.2d 692, 693 (1969).

1979A similar statutory rape statute was analyzed in State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alas. 1978), in which the court stated, “where the .. . statute is not a public welfare type of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into the statute or it must be found unconstitutional.” In England, the source of our law on the subject, “reasonable mistake of age has never been denied as a defense in an English statutory rape case,” nor has the mens rea requirement been modified.

1979State v. Akers, 119 N.H. 161 , 400 A.2d 38 (1979). *491 A similar statutory rape statute was analyzed in State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alas. 1978), in which the court stated, "where the . . . statute is not a public welfare type of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into the statute or it must be found unconstitutional." In England, the source of our law on the subject, "reasonable mistake of age has never been denied as a defense in an English statutory rape case," nor has the mens rea requirement been modified.