mens rea requirement in Ohio

2007The appellant in Crain , like the instant appellant, relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510 and the Eighth Appellate District's decision in State v. Jacks (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 200 . {¶ 53} In Sandstrom , the defendant was on trial for intentional homicide.

2003Id. at 205 .

2026However, “ ‘the predicate offense contains the mens rea element.’ ” State v. Wilson, 2015-Ohio- 2016, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Fry, 2010-Ohio-1017, ¶ 43 . {¶57} Corrupting another with drugs is defined in R.C. 2925.02, which provides in pertinent part in section (A)(3) as follows: (A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: *** (3) By any means, administer or furnish to another or induce or cause another to use a controlled substance, and thereby cause Highland App. No. 24CA20 36 serious physical harm to the other person, or cause the other person to become a person with dr

2016Id., citing State v. Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 , 775 N.E.2d 498 , ¶ 31-33, and State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2010-Ohio-1017 , 926 N.E.2d 1239 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In addition, the court relied on a case from New York’s highest court, which had stated that “ ‘[t]he basic tenet of felony murder liability is that the mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing.

2017No. 07AP-999, 2008-Ohio-6677 , 2008 WL 5265893 , ¶ 73, citing State v. Squires, 108 Ohio App.3d 716 , 718, 671 N.E.2d 627 (2d Dist.1996) (finding that where an accused is charged with a strict liability crime, thus negating the mens rea requirement, "the prosecution need only prove that the offender engaged in a voluntary act or omission").

2017No. 07AP-999, 2008-Ohio-6677 , 2008 WL 5265893 , ¶ 73, citing State v. Squires, 108 Ohio App.3d 716 , 718, 671 N.E.2d 627 (2d Dist.1996) (finding that where an accused is charged with a strict liability crime, thus negating the mens rea requirement, "the prosecution need only prove that the offender engaged in a voluntary act or omission").

2009In fact, the majority noted that Congress "remains free to amend [the statute] by explicitly eliminating a mens rea requirement." Id. at 615 n. 11.

2008State v. Squires (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 716 , 718 ; Staples v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 600 , 607 , fn. 3.

2008State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 10 . {¶ 38} In some circumstances, the mens rea requirement is inapplicable; for example, in strict-liability offenses.

2008State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 10 . {¶ 38} In some circumstances, the mens rea requirement is inapplicable; for example, in strict-liability offenses.

2008No. 05CA0025-M, 2005-Ohio-6608 , this Court applied the same reasoning in regard to a charge of felonious assault on a peace officer in violation of R.C. 2903.11 .

2007See, also, State v. Koreny (Apr. 12, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78074 (holding that R.C. 2903.13 [C][3] does not contain a mens rea requirement); and State v. Mundy , Medina App. No. 05CA0025-M, 2005-Ohio-6608 (declining to reconsider its holding in Carter ). {¶ 9} In support of his argument, appellant cites State v. Lozier , 101 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2004-Ohio-732 .

2000However, nothing in the language of the statute would lead us to conclude that the General Assembly plainly indicated its intention to impose strict criminal liability in determining whether there is a violation of R.C. 2923.17(A). “ ‘[T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1978), 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869 , quoting Dennis v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1147 .

2000However, nothing in the language of the statute would lead us to conclude that the General Assembly plainly indicated its intention to impose strict criminal liability in determining whether there is a violation of R.C. 2923.17(A). “ ‘[T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1978), 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869 , quoting Dennis v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1147 .

1997Interpreting the mens rea requirement of the federal RICO statute, United States v. Scotto (C.A.2, 1980), 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 , held that the RICO statute does not require any specific intent to engage in an unlawful pattern of racketeering.

1997“It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922 , reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm. News at 1073. {¶ 15} Interpreting the mens rea requirement of the federal RICO statute, United States v. Scotto (C.A.2, 1980), 641 F.2d 47, 55

2025As a result, Clark was not prejudiced by the court’s complicity 4 While the OJI are helpful as an example of the generally accepted interpretation of Ohio statutes, OJI “are a product of the Ohio Judicial Conference and are not binding on the courts.” Id., citing State v. Nucklos, 2007-Ohio-1025, ¶ 57 (2d Dist.).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2020The mens rea requirement for R.C. 2913.46(B) is “knowingly.” R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts knowingly, {¶42} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978) citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27 , 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 , 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1992); State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 , 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 2001).

2018Wood No. WD-08-057, 2009-Ohio-5729 , ¶ 38, quoting State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 96 , 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971). {¶ 17} In his brief, appellant argues that he was confused regarding the concept of complicity, and that the concept was never correctly explained to him.

2018Wood No. WD-08-057, 2009-Ohio-5729 , ¶ 38, quoting State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 96 , 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971). {¶ 17} In his brief, appellant argues that he was confused regarding the concept of complicity, and that the concept was never correctly explained to him.

2017No. 07AP-999, 2008-Ohio-6677 , 2008 WL 5265893 , ¶ 73, citing State v. Squires, 108 Ohio App.3d 716 , 718, 671 N.E.2d 627 (2d Dist.1996) (finding that where an accused is charged with a strict liability crime, thus negating the mens rea requirement, "the prosecution need only prove that the offender engaged in a voluntary act or omission").

2017ANALYSIS {¶ 10} We review a trial court's refusal to provide a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, in light of "the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Wolons , 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 68, 541 N.E.2d 443 (1989). {¶ 11} Chinn argues that he was entitled to have the jury instruction his attorney requested given to the jury because "his only available defense was that the shooting was an accident and thus, the State could not meet the mens rea requirement for both of the felonies with which the appellant was charged." (Appellant's Brief at 4-5.) {¶ 12} "After arguments ar

2017ANALYSIS {¶ 10} We review a trial court's refusal to provide a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, in light of "the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Wolons , 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 68, 541 N.E.2d 443 (1989). {¶ 11} Chinn argues that he was entitled to have the jury instruction his attorney requested given to the jury because "his only available defense was that the shooting was an accident and thus, the State could not meet the mens rea requirement for both of the felonies with which the appellant was charged." (Appellant's Brief at 4-5.) {¶ 12} "After arguments ar

2017ANALYSIS {¶ 10} We review a trial court's refusal to provide a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, in light of "the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Wolons , 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 68, 541 N.E.2d 443 (1989). {¶ 11} Chinn argues that he was entitled to have the jury instruction his attorney requested given to the jury because "his only available defense was that the shooting was an accident and thus, the State could not meet the mens rea requirement for both of the felonies with which the appellant was charged." (Appellant's Brief at 4-5.) {¶ 12} "After arguments ar

2017ANALYSIS {¶ 10} We review a trial court's refusal to provide a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, in light of "the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Wolons , 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 68, 541 N.E.2d 443 (1989). {¶ 11} Chinn argues that he was entitled to have the jury instruction his attorney requested given to the jury because "his only available defense was that the shooting was an accident and thus, the State could not meet the mens rea requirement for both of the felonies with which the appellant was charged." (Appellant's Brief at 4-5.) {¶ 12} "After arguments ar

2016Id., citing State v. Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 , 775 N.E.2d 498 , ¶ 31-33, and State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2010-Ohio-1017 , 926 N.E.2d 1239 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In addition, the court relied on a case from New York’s highest court, which had stated that “ ‘[t]he basic tenet of felony murder liability is that the mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing.

2016Id., citing State v. Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 , 775 N.E.2d 498 , ¶ 31-33, and State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2010-Ohio-1017 , 926 N.E.2d 1239 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In addition, the court relied on a case from New York’s highest court, which had stated that “ ‘[t]he basic tenet of felony murder liability is that the mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing.

2016Id., citing State v. Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 , 775 N.E.2d 498 , ¶ 31-33, and State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2010-Ohio-1017 , 926 N.E.2d 1239 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In addition, the court relied on a case from New York’s highest court, which had stated that “ ‘[t]he basic tenet of felony murder liability is that the mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing.

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013And to the extent that this interpretation of the rule would limit the participation of judicial candidates at party-sponsored fundraising events where there is a tiered-giving structure, it would adversely affect the candidates’ exercise of fundamental First Amendment freedoms. {¶ 20} It has long been recognized that a statute or other rule of law “ ‘must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ ” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 , 53 S.Ct. 620 , 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933), quot

2013Id. at 334 .

2009No. 23199, 2006-Ohio-6381 , 2006 WL 3498599 , at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2006-Ohio-1245 , 846 N.E.2d 824 , at ¶ 16; Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 , at syllabus.

2009No. 23199, 2006-Ohio-6381 , 2006 WL 3498599 , at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2006-Ohio-1245 , 846 N.E.2d 824 , at ¶ 16; Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 , at syllabus.

2009No. 23199, 2006-Ohio-6381 , 2006 WL 3498599 , at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2006-Ohio-1245 , 846 N.E.2d 824 , at ¶ 16; Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379 , 653 N.E.2d 226 , at syllabus.

2009No. 2007-L-120, 2008-Ohio-1781 , 2008 WL 1701702 , at ¶ 97 (“R.C. 2903.02(B) is constitutional and does not offend notions of due process, equal protection, or constitute cruel and unusual punishment”). {¶ 51} Jeffries’s ninth assignment of error is without merit. {¶ 52} Jeffries’s third and fifth assignments of error will be discussed together since they both allege erroneous jury instructions to which she did not object at the trial court level. {¶ 53} In her third assignment of error, Jeffries argues that the trial court committed plain error in giving instructions related to “natural conse