mens rea requirement in Florida

2014As our supreme court has said, “ ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743 (Fla.1996) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415-16 (Fla.2012).

2005As the Florida Supreme Court in Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743-44 (Fla.1996), confirmed, we will ordinarily presume, absent an express indication of a contrary intent, that the Legislature intends a statute defining a criminal violation to contain a mens rea requirement, even when expressly silent on the subject. "[A]n express provision dispensing with guilty knowledge will always control, of course, since in that instance the Legislature will have made its intent clear," but in the absence of such a provision, a criminal statute will be presumed to include a broad applicable scienter re

2022Cir. 1974) (“ ‘Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.’ This is in accord with the great weight of authority - 25 - B We turn now to Statler’s argument that, unless we read into it the particular subjective knowledge requirement that he proposes, subsection (5)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement as to the nonconsent element, and therefore denies an accused due process. 11 In weighing a challenge to a statute’s constitutionality, we “accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and . . . construe challenged legislation to effect a

2018In Giorgetti, the Florida Supreme Court construed sexual offender registration statutes to have a knowledge element so as to "include a requirement that the alleged offender knows of the obligation to register and maintain current addresses." 868 So. 2d at 520 ; see also Ramirez v. State, 113 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (construing a statute that prevented felons from being employed at a bail bond agency to contain a mens rea requirement because absent the knowledge element the statute criminalized "otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job"); Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (

2022On the contrary, we must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citations omitted); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“[T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose. § 794.011(1)(j), Fla. Stat. 3.

2016Including a mens rea requirement remains “the rule of, rather than the exception to, the Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting United States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S.Ct. 2864 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)).

2014As our supreme court has said, “ ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743 (Fla.1996) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415-16 (Fla.2012).

2014As our supreme court has said, “ ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743 (Fla.1996) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415-16 (Fla.2012).

1996See Staples, 511 U.S. at 620 , 114 S.Ct. at 1805 ("Although the word `knowingly' does not appear in the statute's text, courts generally assume that Congress, absent a contrary indication, means to retain a mens rea requirement.") (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Cohen v. State, 125 So.2d 560 (Fla.1960), and cases cited therein. [12] Further, "[t]he purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumsc

1996See Staples, 511 U.S. at 620 , 114 S.Ct. at 1805 ("Although the word `knowingly' does not appear in the statute's text, courts generally assume that Congress, absent a contrary indication, means to retain a mens rea requirement.") (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Cohen v. State, 125 So.2d 560 (Fla.1960), and cases cited therein. [12] Further, "[t]he purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumsc

2022On the contrary, we must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citations omitted); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“[T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose. § 794.011(1)(j), Fla. Stat. 3.

2016Including a mens rea requirement remains “the rule of, rather than the exception to, the Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting United States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 , 98 S.Ct. 2864 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)).

2022Cir. 1974) (“ ‘Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.’ This is in accord with the great weight of authority - 25 - B We turn now to Statler’s argument that, unless we read into it the particular subjective knowledge requirement that he proposes, subsection (5)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement as to the nonconsent element, and therefore denies an accused due process. 11 In weighing a challenge to a statute’s constitutionality, we “accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and . . . construe challenged legislation to effect a

2014As our supreme court has said, “ ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ ” Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743 (Fla.1996) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415-16 (Fla.2012).

2007See Knott v. State, 573 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

2007See Knott v. State, 573 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

2022Cir. 1974) (“ ‘Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.’ This is in accord with the great weight of authority - 25 - B We turn now to Statler’s argument that, unless we read into it the particular subjective knowledge requirement that he proposes, subsection (5)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement as to the nonconsent element, and therefore denies an accused due process. 11 In weighing a challenge to a statute’s constitutionality, we “accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and . . . construe challenged legislation to effect a

2022In Borden, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “use . . . against the person of another” in the ACCA’s elements clause “sets out a mens rea requirement—of purposeful or knowing conduct.” 141 S. Ct. at 1828 , 1829 n.6.

2022Specific intent to direct action at another satisfies this latter requirement, as does “knowing conduct.” Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1828 (holding that the elements clause’s “against the person of another” phrase “sets out a mens rea requirement -- of purposeful or knowing conduct”).

2022Cir. 1974) (“ ‘Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.’ This is in accord with the great weight of authority - 25 - B We turn now to Statler’s argument that, unless we read into it the particular subjective knowledge requirement that he proposes, subsection (5)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement as to the nonconsent element, and therefore denies an accused due process. 11 In weighing a challenge to a statute’s constitutionality, we “accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and . . . construe challenged legislation to effect a

2021Nonetheless, in the context presented here, the word lends itself to a definition that renders the statute susceptible to a limited construction that removes any chilling effect on constitutionally protected expression. “[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001) (citing State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997)).

2021Nonetheless, in the context presented here, the word lends itself to a definition that renders the statute susceptible to a limited construction that removes any chilling effect on constitutionally protected expression. “[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001) (citing State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997)).

2021We are cognizant that “[t]he word ‘threat’ does not itself contain a mens rea requirement.” Elonis, 575 U.S. 723 , 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2021We are cognizant that “[t]he word ‘threat’ does not itself contain a mens rea requirement.” Elonis, 575 U.S. 723 , 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2020See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (stating invalidation of state laws for facial overbreadth is a remedy that should be applied “sparingly and only as a last resort.”); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-93 (2008) (“Invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitutional—particularly a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made criminal—has obvious harmful effects.

2020See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (stating invalidation of state laws for facial overbreadth is a remedy that should be applied “sparingly and only as a last resort.”); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-93 (2008) (“Invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitutional—particularly a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made criminal—has obvious harmful effects.

2019See Exantus, 198 So. 3d at 2 .

2018In Giorgetti, the Florida Supreme Court construed sexual offender registration statutes to have a knowledge element so as to "include a requirement that the alleged offender knows of the obligation to register and maintain current addresses." 868 So. 2d at 520 ; see also Ramirez v. State, 113 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (construing a statute that prevented felons from being employed at a bail bond agency to contain a mens rea requirement because absent the knowledge element the statute criminalized "otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job"); Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (

2018In Giorgetti, the Florida Supreme Court construed sexual offender registration statutes to have a knowledge element so as to "include a requirement that the alleged offender knows of the obligation to register and maintain current addresses." 868 So. 2d at 520 ; see also Ramirez v. State, 113 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (construing a statute that prevented felons from being employed at a bail bond agency to contain a mens rea requirement because absent the knowledge element the statute criminalized "otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job"); Wegner, 928 So. 2d at 439 (

2011The holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Enmund and Tison were summarized by this Court in Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 759 (Fla. 2001): The United States Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that a sentence of death must be proportional to the defendant’s culpability.

2008Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 51 (Fla.2002) (“That the statute contains a requirement of a general intent to commit an act that is obviously reasonably related to the harm sought to be avoided, rather than a more specific intent, is a choice for the Legislature.”); see also, Wright, 920 So.2d at 28-24 (the legislature has broad authority to determine intent requirements in defining crimes and courts must defer to the legislative determination on such matters as long as there is a rational basis for the legislative action). 5 In other words, placing oneself in actual physical control of a mo

2008Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 51 (Fla.2002) (“That the statute contains a requirement of a general intent to commit an act that is obviously reasonably related to the harm sought to be avoided, rather than a more specific intent, is a choice for the Legislature.”); see also, Wright, 920 So.2d at 28-24 (the legislature has broad authority to determine intent requirements in defining crimes and courts must defer to the legislative determination on such matters as long as there is a rational basis for the legislative action). 5 In other words, placing oneself in actual physical control of a mo

2007See, e.g., Cox v. State, 966 So.2d 337, 347 (Fla. 2007) ("The harmless error test . . . requires the State "as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.") (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)).