mens rea requirement in Pennsylvania

2026“The mens rea requirement applicable to § 3714, careless disregard, implies less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Gezovich, 7 A.3d 300, 301 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

2026“The mens rea requirement applicable to § 3714, careless disregard, implies less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth. v. Gezovich, 7 A.3d 300, 301 (Pa. Super. 2010). -4- J-E03004-25 Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove the mens rea element of careless driving.

2026“The mens rea requirement of Section 5503 demands proof that appellant by [his] or her actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2026The mens rea requirement of Section 5503(a) demands proof that a defendant by her actions “intentionally or recklessly created a risk of causing or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance[,] or alarm.” Bertothy, 307 A.3d at 783 (quoting Maerz, 879 A.2d at 1269 ; brackets added in Bertothy).

2025“The specific intent requirement . . . may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if the [defendant’s] intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 51 (Pa. Super. 2020)[;] see also [Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100 (Pa. 2008)] (stating, “[a]lthough Section 5503 as a whole is aimed at preventing public disturbance, it accomplishes this aim by focusing upon certain individual acts, which, if pursued with the

2023“The specific intent requirement of [Section 5503(a)(2)] may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if the [defendant’s] intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 51 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005)). see also Fedorek, 946 A.2d at 100 (stating, “[a]lthough Section 5503 as a whole is aimed at preventing public disturbance, it accomplishes this aim by focusing

2022“The mens rea requirement of [section 5503] demands proof that appellant by his actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk or caused a -6- J-S33040-21 public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa.Super. 1996)).

2020“The mens rea requirement of th[e disorderly conduct] statute demands proof that appellant by his actions ____________________________________________ 674 A.2d 284, 287 (Pa. Super. 1996)) (emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2026“The specific intent requirement of [Section 5503] may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if the [defendant’s] intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 51 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Maerz, 879 A.3d at 1269).

2025“The specific intent requirement . . . may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if the [defendant’s] intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 51 (Pa. Super. 2020)[;] see also [Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100 (Pa. 2008)] (stating, “[a]lthough Section 5503 as a whole is aimed at preventing public disturbance, it accomplishes this aim by focusing upon certain individual acts, which, if pursued with the

2024The more serious the penalty, such as a lengthy term of imprisonment, the more likely it is the legislature did not intend to eliminate the mens rea requirement (unless the legislature plainly indicates otherwise in the language of the statute, as for statutory rape). ____________________________________________ 7 Section 305(a)(2) addresses situations wherein culpability requirements are inapplicable to summary offenses and to offenses defined by other statutes, and provides: “[t]he requirements of culpability prescribed by section 301 of this title (relating to requirement of voluntary act)

2017“The more serious the penalty, such as a lengthy term of imprisonment, the more likely it is that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the mens rea requirement (unless the legislature plainly indicates otherwise in the language of the statute, as for statutory rape).” Commonwealth v. Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 707 (Pa.Super. 2004).

2025Id., at 42-43.4 4 In Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168-69 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme Court categorized the mens rea standard of “malice” as falling in between the standards of “recklessness or culpable negligence necessary to support the charge of involuntary manslaughter, and the specific intent to kill which is a prerequisite of murder[.]” (Quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545, 564 (Pa. 1975)).

2024This mens rea requirement is met only in circumstances where “the defendant could reasonably anticipate that serious bodily injury or death would be the likely and logical consequence of his actions . . . [but that] consequence was ignored.” Packer, 168 A.3d at 170-71 (reaffirming distinction between ordinary recklessness and malice).

2025However, Howard asserts that the court failed to provide a mens rea instruction as to the second element of the offense, namely that Burkhart “die[d] as a result of using the substance” delivered to him. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a) Howard relies on our decision in Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986 (Pa. Super. 2015), wherein we held that, not only does the drug delivery resulting in death offense require proof that the defendant intentionally delivered a controlled substance but also that the defendant acted recklessly with respect to causing the death.

2023Although the statute does not include a mens rea requirement for the second element of DDRD, this Court has concluded that the actions leading to the “death must be at least ‘reckless.’” Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 16 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 995 ).

2025See Carr, supra. Moreover, DDRD’s requirement of an intentional and unlawful provision of a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance to - 19 - J-S46013-24 another person is not an element of first-degree murder.

2023Although the statute does not include a mens rea requirement for the second element of DDRD, this Court has concluded that the actions leading to the “death must be at least ‘reckless.’” Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 16 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 995 ).

2022See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 250 … (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.

2022See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 250 … (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.

2020Commonwealth v. Hurst, 889 A.2d 624, 630 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2006). -6- J.

2014Otero was convicted of accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742.1(a) (“A person whose operating privilege was disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or suspended and not restored or who does not hold a valid driver’s license . . . commits an offense under this section if the person was the driver of any vehicle and caused an accident resulting in injury or death of any person.”). - 16 - J-A25016-14 It is well-settled that “the mens rea for a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742.1 is criminal negligence.” Commonwealth v. Hurst, 889 A.2d 624, 6

2015“The omission of an explicit mens rea element in a criminal statute is not alone sufficient evidence of the legislature’s plain intent to dispense with a traditional mens rea requirement and impose absolute criminal liability.” Commonwealth v. Parmar, 551 Pa. 318 , 710 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1998) (OISA) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 592 Pa. 262 , 924 A.2d 636, 638-39 (2007).

2015“The omission of an explicit mens rea element in a criminal statute is not alone sufficient evidence of the legislature’s plain intent to dispense with a traditional mens rea requirement and impose absolute criminal liability.” Commonwealth v. Parmar, 551 Pa. 318 , 710 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1998) (OISA) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 592 Pa. 262 , 924 A.2d 636, 638-39 (2007).

2024“The mens rea requirement of [section 5503] demands proof that -4- J-S36025-24 [the defendant] by his [or her] actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted) (some alterations in original).

2022“The mens rea requirement of [section 5503] demands proof that appellant by his actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk or caused a -6- J-S33040-21 public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa.Super. 1996)).

2023In Commonwealth v. Adams, … 369 A.2d 479 ([Pa. Super.] 1976), Judge Spaeth, in a Concurring Opinion which I joined, noted the probable existence of a mens rea requirement: “If (the appellant) defends under [Section] 908(b) by saying that he possessed it ‘solely as a curio,’ is he, or is he not, saying that he possessed it without mens rea?

1977In Commonwealth v. Adams, 245 Pa.Super. 431 , 369 A.2d 479 (1976), Judge Spaeth, in a Concurring Opinion which I joined, noted the probable existence of a mens rea requirement: "If [the appellant] defends under § 908(b) by saying that he possessed it `solely as a curio,' is he, or is he not, saying that he possessed it without mens rea ?

2019“The mens rea requirement applicable to [Section] 3714, careless disregard, implies less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 556 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

2019“The mens rea requirement applicable to § 3714, careless disregard, implies less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 556 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 164 A.3d 483 (Pa. 2016).

2017Idaho Apr. 20, 1999) (explaining that Staples and two other Supreme Court decisions “have not altered the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but have only stated that knowledge is required where the statute specifically imposes that type of requirement”); cf. Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1934) (in a civil setting, distinguishing ignorance of the law from ignorance of certain facts); Ciesielski v. Prudential Ins.

2017Idaho Apr. 20, 1999) (explaining that Staples and two other Supreme Court decisions “have not altered the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but have only stated that knowledge is required where the statute specifically imposes that type of requirement”); cf. Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1934) (in a civil setting, 25 Although 21 U.S.C. §841 (a) facially applies to controlled substances, under the federal Analogue Act the term subsumes controlled substance analogues, see 21 U.S.C. §813 , the very category of chemicals at issue in McFadden. [J-124-2016] -

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.

2019Recklessness under the statute denotes a “conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that public annoyance or alarm would result from her conduct, or a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in her situation.” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 490 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa. Super. [] 1985).

1996Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 528 Pa. 290 , 597 A.2d 1121 (1991); Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254 , 414 A.2d 54 (1980); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 340 Pa.Super. 427 , 490 A.2d 853 (1985); Commonwealth v. Navarro, 251 Pa.Super. 125 , 380 A.2d 409 (1977).

2025Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 426 (Pa. 2003).

2005In fact, I believe the decision in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460 , 832 A.2d 418 (2003), compels us to do so.

2024See Packer, supra; O’ Hanlon, supra. -8- J-E03004-23 meet the heightened mens rea requirement outlined in O’Hanlon and Comer and reaffirmed in Packer.

2004Our Supreme Court has essentially adopted this viewpoint by stating that the mens rea requirement in the present offense is “equivalent to that which seeks to cause injury.” O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d at 618 . ¶ 14 Speaking rhetorically, when does reckless conduct rise to such a level to be nearly tantamount to purposeful or intentional conduct?

2024Accord Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 630 (explaining that the statute for drug delivery resulting in death, which is defined as murder of the third degree, was not - 14 - J-S04009-24 unconstitutionally vague because it shared the well-settled mens rea for third- degree murder, being malice).

2015Moreover, Appellant contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005), compels a conclusion that the only appropriate mens rea for the second element of the crime is intentional because Ludwig stands for the principle that “the mens rea requirement must still attach to every material element of the crime.” (Id. at 29; see also id. at 26-29).

2021See Hopkins, supra 747 A.2d at 916 .

2021See Hopkins, supra 747 A.2d at 916 .

2020It has a specific purpose; it has a definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace.” Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (1999) (quotation omitted). -5- J-A05035-20 intended to or recklessly created the risk of a “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” “The mens rea requirement of Section 5503 demands proof that appellant by [his] actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quotation omitted).

2005It has a specific purpose; it has a definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace.” Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409 , 728 A.2d 943 (1999). ¶ 8 “The mens rea requirement of Section 5503 demands proof that appellant by her actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 449 Pa.Super. 450, 674 A.2d 284 (1996).

2019See Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 597 A.2d 1121 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089 (Pa. Super. 2003).5 “The mens rea requirement of [18 Pa.C.S. § 5503] demands proof that appellant by her actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.

2019See Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 597 A.2d 1121 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089 (Pa. Super. 2003).5 “The mens rea requirement of [18 Pa.C.S. § 5503] demands proof that appellant by her actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.