mens rea requirement in South Dakota

2023In fact, “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence” and “offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored[.]” Jones, 2011 S.D. 60, ¶ 10 , 804 N.W.2d at 412 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

2023In fact, “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence” and “offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored[.]” Jones, 2011 S.D. 60, ¶ 10 , 804 N.W.2d at 412 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

2023Therefore, there must be “some indication of [legislative] intent, express or implied[,]” “to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.” Id. ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d at 412–13 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 , 114 S. Ct. at 1797 ). [¶33.] To determine “[w]hether criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a statutory offense,” this Court looks to “the language of the act in connection with its manifest purpose and design.” Id. ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911, 915 (S.D. 1979)).

2023Therefore, there must be “some indication of [legislative] intent, express or implied[,]” “to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.” Id. ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d at 412–13 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 , 114 S. Ct. at 1797 ). [¶33.] To determine “[w]hether criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a statutory offense,” this Court looks to “the language of the act in connection with its manifest purpose and design.” Id. ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911, 915 (S.D. 1979)).

2021This mens rea requirement involves less culpability than the element of premeditation required for first-degree murder.” State v. Harruff, 2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 39 , 939 N.W.2d 20, 30 (citations omitted). -15- #29287 [¶33.] Falkenberg contends that insufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict that he killed Tamara with a “depraved mind.” Falkenberg asserts that post-mortem acts, such as dismemberment, were used to “retroactively establish” an act evincing a depraved mind, and, therefore, the State’s theory has no support in the record.

2021This mens rea requirement involves less culpability than the element of premeditation required for first-degree murder.” State v. Harruff, 2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 39 , 939 N.W.2d 20, 30 (citations omitted). -15- #29287 [¶33.] Falkenberg contends that insufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict that he killed Tamara with a “depraved mind.” Falkenberg asserts that post-mortem acts, such as dismemberment, were used to “retroactively establish” an act evincing a depraved mind, and, therefore, the State’s theory has no support in the record.

2014See Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 28 , 835 N.W.2d at 113 ; Cottier, 2008 5.D. 79, ¶ 7, 755 N.W.2d at 125 ; State v. Eagle Star, 1996 S.D. 143 , ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d 70, 73 ; State v. Olson, 408 N.W.2d 748, 753 (S.D.1987). [¶ 19.] The jury in this case was instructed that they must consider the instructions as a whole. 7 As a whole, the jury instructions thoroughly informed the jury of the mens rea requirement and that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the crime.

2014See Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 28 , 835 N.W.2d at 113 ; Cottier, 2008 S.D. 79 , ¶ 7, 755 N.W.2d at 125 ; State v. Eagle Star, 1996 S.D. 143 , ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d 70, 73 ; State v. Olson, 408 N.W.2d 748, 753 (S.D. 1987). [¶19.] The jury in this case was instructed that they must consider the instructions as a whole. 7 As a whole, the jury instructions thoroughly informed the jury of the mens rea requirement and that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the crime.

2011This is because “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Id. at 605 , 114 S.Ct. at 1797 (citation omitted).

2011This is because “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Id. at 605 , 114 S.Ct. at 1797 (citation omitted).

2021In Falkenberg’s view, his conviction “hinged on exploiting the dismemberment” and the jury was encouraged to conclude that “anyone who could dismember a body—despite such an act indisputably occurring post-mortem, days later, and without any connection to cause of death—must have had a depraved mind . . . .” Further, Falkenberg argues the State’s theory that Falkenberg struck Tamara in the head hard enough to kill her in one blow did not rise to the level of an act evincing a depraved mind. [¶34.] In State v. Hart, we reaffirmed the principle that “[i]f a person is able to act with a lack of r

2020See 502 N.W.2d at 569 . 5 However, Jackson asks us to revisit our holding in Schuster in light of State v. Jones, 2011 S.D. 60, ¶ 15 , 804 N.W.2d 409, 414 .

2020Ed. 288 (1952) (noting “[e]xceptions [to the common law mens rea presumption] came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim’s actual age was determinative despite defendant’s reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent”). [¶38.] We recognized such an exception in Schuster, where we rejected the identical argument made by Jackson here—that a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s inability to give consent because of physical or mental incapacity is an element of the crime despite the absence of statutory language expressing a mens rea requirement. 502 N.W.2d at 5

2014See Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 28 , 835 N.W.2d at 113 ; Cottier, 2008 5.D. 79, ¶ 7, 755 N.W.2d at 125 ; State v. Eagle Star, 1996 S.D. 143 , ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d 70, 73 ; State v. Olson, 408 N.W.2d 748, 753 (S.D.1987). [¶ 19.] The jury in this case was instructed that they must consider the instructions as a whole. 7 As a whole, the jury instructions thoroughly informed the jury of the mens rea requirement and that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the crime.

2014See Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 28 , 835 N.W.2d at 113 ; Cottier, 2008 S.D. 79 , ¶ 7, 755 N.W.2d at 125 ; State v. Eagle Star, 1996 S.D. 143 , ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d 70, 73 ; State v. Olson, 408 N.W.2d 748, 753 (S.D. 1987). [¶19.] The jury in this case was instructed that they must consider the instructions as a whole. 7 As a whole, the jury instructions thoroughly informed the jury of the mens rea requirement and that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the crime.

2012We have not previously addressed the mens rea requirement of SDCL 22-29-1. 2 “However, we have addressed the dichotomy of specific intent/general intent crimes several times under other statutes.” State v. Schouten, 2005 S.D. 122 , ¶ 11, 707 N.W.2d 820, 823 (citations omitted).

2012State v. Shilvock-Havird, 472 N.W.2d 773, 776-77 (S.D.1991).

2003The use of the terms ‘intentionally’ or ‘knowingly’ merely designate that the culpability required is something more than negligence or recklessness.” State v. Heftel, 513 N.W.2d 397, 400 (S.D.1994) (string citations omitted). “[M]ere use of that term (intentionally) does not designate an additional mental state beyond that accompanying the act.” State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468, 473 (S.D.1984).

2003The use of the terms ‘intentionally’ or ‘knowingly’ merely designate that the culpability required is something more than negligence or recklessness.” State v. Heftel, 513 N.W.2d 397, 400 (S.D.1994) (string citations omitted). “[M]ere use of that term (intentionally) does not designate an additional mental state beyond that accompanying the act.” State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468, 473 (S.D.1984).