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10 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morissette v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978In Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), a case involving the mens rea requirement as an element in the crime of conversion of government property, the United States Supreme Court examined at length the historical development of mens rea as an element of criminal conduct and recognized certain exceptions, including "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent." Crimes involving juveniles, historically recognized as a special class of persons 1978In Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), a case involving the mens rea requirement as an element in the crime of conversion of government property, the United States Supreme Court examined at length the historical development of mens rea as an element of criminal conduct and recognized certain exceptions, including "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent." Crimes involving juveniles, historically recognized as a special class of persons | 5 | 7 |
State v. Biasgreen2 sentences2016R.S. 14:68.4 as the “intentional taking or' use of a motor vehicle which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the motor vehicle permanently.” With respect to the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, this Court, in State v. White, 07-831 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08) , 982 So.2d 843, 846 , unit denied, 08-846 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 534 , stated: This court has recognized a mens rea requirement or criminal intent based on State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652 2008This court has recognized a mens rea requirement or criminal intent based on State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652 (La.1981), a case involving a virtually identical statute — unauthorized use of a movable, R.S. 14:68. [1] State v. Joseph, 05-368 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/17/06) , 921 So.2d 1060, 1063 . "[T]he `evil' state of mind of the actor normally distinguishes criminal acts (punishable by the state alone) from mere civil wrongs (actionable by private individuals against one another). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Charles E. Jones, Iii, A/K/A Chuckiegreen2 sentences2016Imposing such a mens rea requirement would be tantamount to permitting adults to prey upon minors so long as they cultivate ignorance of their victims’ age.” Jones, 471 F.3d at 540 (“It would be nonsensical to require proof of knowledge of the victim’s age when the statute exists to provide special protection for all minors, including, if not especially, those who could too easily be mistaken for adults.”). 2016Imposing such a mens rea requirement would be tantamount to permitting adults to prey upon minors so long as they cultivate ignorance of their victims’ age.” Jones, 471 F.3d at 540 (“It would be nonsensical to require proof of knowledge of the victim’s age when the statute exists to provide special protection for all minors, including, if not especially, those who could too easily be mistaken for adults.”). | 1 | 1 |
Liparota v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 , 105 S.Ct. 2084 , 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (it is appropriate to interpret statutes in a way that does not criminalize “a broad range of apparently innocent conduct”). 4 More, specifically, deviation from the general preference for a mens rea requirement is not unusual in the realm of offenses involving juveniles. 2016See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 , 105 S.Ct. 2084 , 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (it is appropriate to interpret statutes in a way that does not criminalize “a broad range of apparently innocent conduct”). 4 More, specifically, deviation from the general preference for a mens rea requirement is not unusual in the realm of offenses involving juveniles. | 1 | 1 |
American Communications Assn. v. Doudsgreen2 sentences1961See American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 411 , 70 S.Ct. 674 , 94 L.Ed. 925, 950 .” See, Morissette v. United States of America, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 . 4 We conclude that the word “Intentional” and the phrase “With Inten *485 tion” in the Louisiana Obscenity Statute mean that knowledge is implied where one has criminal intent. 1961See American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 411 , 70 S.Ct. 674 , 94 L.Ed. 925, 950 .” See, Morissette v. United States of America, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 . 4 We conclude that the word “Intentional” and the phrase “With Inten *485 tion” in the Louisiana Obscenity Statute mean that knowledge is implied where one has criminal intent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dennis v. United States
green
2 sentences2009In State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980), a case in which we construed a statute prohibiting possession of certain controlled substances to require proof of criminal intent, we stated: “(w)e observe the familiar proposition that ‘(t)he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). 2009In State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980), a case in which we construed a statute prohibiting possession of certain controlled substances to require proof of criminal intent, we stated: “(w)e observe the familiar proposition that ‘(t)he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). | 4 | 1980–2009 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2009In State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980), a case in which we construed a statute prohibiting possession of certain controlled substances to require proof of criminal intent, we stated: “(w)e observe the familiar proposition that ‘(t)he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). 2007In State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980), quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 , 71 S.Ct. 857 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), the Louisiana Supreme Court found, however, that it was unconstitutional to criminalize the unknowing possession of Schedule IV CDS because "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence." Even so, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the remainder of the statute was constitutional and enforceable against those who knowingly possessed such substances. | 3 | 1981–2009 |
State v. Joseph
green
2 sentences2016State v. Joseph, 05-368 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/17/06) , 921 So.2d 1060, 1063 . “[T]he ‘evil’ state of mind of the actor normally distinguishes criminal acts (punishable by the state alone) from mere civil wrongs (actionable by private individuals against one another). 2008This court has recognized a mens rea requirement or criminal intent based on State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652 (La.1981), a case involving a virtually identical statute — unauthorized use of a movable, R.S. 14:68. [1] State v. Joseph, 05-368 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/17/06) , 921 So.2d 1060, 1063 . "[T]he `evil' state of mind of the actor normally distinguishes criminal acts (punishable by the state alone) from mere civil wrongs (actionable by private individuals against one another). | 2 | 2008–2016 |
State v. Cinel
green
2 sentences2016Finally, in granting the defendant’s motion, the district court erroneously relied upon this Court’s decision in State v. Cinel, 94-0942 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 309 . 2016Finally, in granting the defendant’s motion, the district court erroneously relied upon this Court’s decision in State v. Cinel, 94-0942 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So. 2d 309 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. White
neutral
1 sentence2016R.S. 14:68.4 as the “intentional taking or' use of a motor vehicle which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the motor vehicle permanently.” With respect to the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, this Court, in State v. White, 07-831 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08) , 982 So.2d 843, 846 , unit denied, 08-846 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 534 , stated: This court has recognized a mens rea requirement or criminal intent based on State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Ware
neutral
1 sentence2016R.S. 14:68.4 as the “intentional taking or' use of a motor vehicle which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the motor vehicle permanently.” With respect to the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, this Court, in State v. White, 07-831 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08) , 982 So.2d 843, 846 , unit denied, 08-846 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 534 , stated: This court has recognized a mens rea requirement or criminal intent based on State v. Bias, 400 So.2d 650, 652 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Balint
green
2 sentences1995As long as an accused is aware that he is in possession of or is dealing with the regulated item he "must be presumed to be aware of the regulation," United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1701-02 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971), and must "ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 , 42 S.Ct. 301, 303 , 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). 1995As long as an accused is aware that he is in possession of or is dealing with the regulated item he "must be presumed to be aware of the regulation," United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1701-02 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971), and must "ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 , 42 S.Ct. 301, 303 , 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
green
2 sentences1995As long as an accused is aware that he is in possession of or is dealing with the regulated item he "must be presumed to be aware of the regulation," United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1701-02 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971), and must "ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 , 42 S.Ct. 301, 303 , 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). 1995As long as an accused is aware that he is in possession of or is dealing with the regulated item he "must be presumed to be aware of the regulation," United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1701-02 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971), and must "ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 , 42 S.Ct. 301, 303 , 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Hardy
neutral
2 sentences1978La.R.S. 14:10 and 11; State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920 , 95 So.2d 499 (1957). 1978La.R.S. 14:10 and 11; State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920 , 95 So.2d 499 (1957). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Reynolds v. United States
green
2 sentences1961See American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 411 , 70 S.Ct. 674 , 94 L.Ed. 925, 950 .” See, Morissette v. United States of America, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 . 4 We conclude that the word “Intentional” and the phrase “With Inten *485 tion” in the Louisiana Obscenity Statute mean that knowledge is implied where one has criminal intent. 1961See American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 411 , 70 S.Ct. 674 , 94 L.Ed. 925, 950 .” See, Morissette v. United States of America, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 . 4 We conclude that the word “Intentional” and the phrase “With Inten *485 tion” in the Louisiana Obscenity Statute mean that knowledge is implied where one has criminal intent. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.