mens rea requirement in Maryland

2025We made that same point in Garnett v. State, a case that addressed the mens rea requirement for statutory rape. 332 Md. 571 (1993).

2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett

2008See McCallum, 321 Md. at 457 , 583 A.2d at 253 (stating that the possibility of incarceration for violating a statute suggests that the legislature intended it to have a mens rea requirement); Dawkins, 313 Md. at 651 , 547 A.2d at 1047 (evaluating the penalty, which includes up to four years in prison, a $25,000 fine or both and concluding, based partly on the nature of the penalty, that the offense was not a strict liability crime).

2008See McCallum, 321 Md. at 457 , 583 A.2d at 253 (stating that the possibility of incarceration for violating a statute suggests that the legislature intended it to have a mens rea requirement); Dawkins, 313 Md. at 651 , 547 A.2d at 1047 (evaluating the penalty, which includes up to four years in prison, a $25,000 fine or both and concluding, based partly on the nature of the penalty, that the offense was not a strict liability crime).

2022App. at 694 , 126 A.3d at 263 (“to satisfy the mens rea requirement for a violation of Section 5-133, the State was required to prove only that [the] defendant knew that he [or she] was in possession of a handgun[]”); McNeal v. State, 200 Md.

2019The doctrine of mens rea , or wrongful intent, requires that a defendant have a wrongful intent before he can be convicted of a criminal offense. 200 Md.

2025Even so, we have been “reluctant to read into criminal statutes an intent of the legislature to forego a mens rea requirement.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 499 (2013) (quoting Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 671 (1999)).

2017Therefore, we are “reluctant to read into criminal statutes an intent of the [Legislature to forego a mens rea requirement.” Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 671 , 724 A.2d 43 (1999).

2008See also Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 651 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1988) (concluding, based partly on the relevant statutory scheme, that knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of controlled paraphernalia, although not explicitly set forth in the statute); Garnett, 332 Md. at 585-88 , 632 A.2d at 804-05 (holding that silence as to mens rea for statutory rape stood in stark contrast to another crime codified in the same Section, that of having vaginal intercourse with an incapacitated or helpless person, which included a mens rea element, and co

2008See also Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 651 , 547 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1988) (concluding, based partly on the relevant statutory scheme, that knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of controlled paraphernalia, although not explicitly set forth in the statute); Garnett, 332 Md. at 585-88 , 632 A.2d at 804-05 (holding that silence as to mens rea for statutory rape stood in stark contrast to another crime codified in the same Section, that of having vaginal intercourse with an incapacitated or helpless person, which included a mens rea element, and co

2025Even so, we have been “reluctant to read into criminal statutes an intent of the legislature to forego a mens rea requirement.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 499 (2013) (quoting Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 671 (1999)).

2017Consequently, we apply the Dawkins factors to criminal statutes to determine whether “the Legislature intended to eliminate the requirement of mens rea and create a strict liability public *524 welfare offense.” McCallum, 321 Md. at 456 , 583 A.2d 250 ; see also Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 501-03 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (applying Dawkins analysis to criminal prohibition on hydraulic clam dredging in a protected area).

1999See Smith, 361 U.S. at 153 , 80 S.Ct. at 218 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 211 (interpreting an obscenity statute to include a mens rea requirement in order to avoid “imposing] a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature”); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78 , 115 S.Ct. at 472 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 385 (interpreting the term “knowingly” in a federal statute regulating child pornography to include knowledge that the materials involve minors).

1999See Smith, 361 U.S. at 153 , 80 S.Ct. at 218 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 211 (interpreting an obscenity statute to include a mens rea requirement in order to avoid “imposing] a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature”); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78 , 115 S.Ct. at 472 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 385 (interpreting the term “knowingly” in a federal statute regulating child pornography to include knowledge that the materials involve minors).

2021As the Supreme Court explained in Staples, “[t]here can be no doubt” that the concepts outlined in Morissette have “influenced [its] interpretation of criminal statutes.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 ; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start with the familiar proposition that ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (alteration in 24 original))).

2008See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 , 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1804 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 624 (1994) (“Silence does not suggest that Congress dispensed with mens rea for the element of § 5861(d) at issue here.”); Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 42 , 641 A.2d 870, 881 (1994) (noting that in certain cases, “the Legislature, despite an omission, intended to provide a mens rea requirement”).

2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett

2017We explained, “The Legislature’s omission of a mens rea requirement in [this provision] ... leads us to conclude that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make knowledge an element of the offense of maintaining the required security on an automobile.” Id. at 431-32, 952 A.2d 266 ; *521 see also Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 43 , 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (When the surrounding provisions contained a knowledge requirement, the “conspicuous absence” of such a requirement in the offense of photographing a minor engaged in sexual activity revealed an intent to impose strict liability.); Garnett

2022Safety §] 5-133, the State [is] required to prove only that the defendant knew that he [or she] [is] in possession of a handgun.” Id. at 694, 126 A.3d at 263 .

2022App. at 694 , 126 A.3d at 263 (“to satisfy the mens rea requirement for a violation of Section 5-133, the State was required to prove only that [the] defendant knew that he [or she] was in possession of a handgun[]”); McNeal v. State, 200 Md.

2021As the Supreme Court explained in Staples, “[t]here can be no doubt” that the concepts outlined in Morissette have “influenced [its] interpretation of criminal statutes.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 ; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start with the familiar proposition that ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (alteration in 24 original))).

2021As the Supreme Court explained in Staples, “[t]here can be no doubt” that the concepts outlined in Morissette have “influenced [its] interpretation of criminal statutes.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 ; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start with the familiar proposition that ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (alteration in 24 original))).

2021See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (outlining the “longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that [the legislature] intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.’” (quoting United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994))).

2018Requiring that the State prove corrupt intent in misfeasance cases shields public officers from liability for "the consequences of mistakes honestly made." Bevard v. Hoffman , 18 Md. 479 , 483 (1862) ; see also People v. Feerick , 93 N.Y.2d 433 , 692 N.Y.S.2d 638 , 714 N.E.2d 851 , 857 (1999) (explaining that the mens rea requirement protects officers from criminal liability for honest mistakes).

2018As the Court of Appeals explained in 1862, "the nature of our institutions equally demands, that public officers, acting faithfully and honestly in the discharge of their duties, and within the limits of their constitutional powers, shall be protected from liability for mistake or errors of judgment from which none are exempt; provided that they are unmixed with fraud or corruption ." Bevard , 18 Md. at 483 (emphasis added).

2018Requiring that the State prove corrupt intent in misfeasance cases shields public officers from liability for "the consequences of mistakes honestly made." Bevard v. Hoffman , 18 Md. 479 , 483 (1862) ; see also People v. Feerick , 93 N.Y.2d 433 , 692 N.Y.S.2d 638 , 714 N.E.2d 851 , 857 (1999) (explaining that the mens rea requirement protects officers from criminal liability for honest mistakes).

2018Requiring that the State prove corrupt intent in misfeasance cases shields public officers from liability for "the consequences of mistakes honestly made." Bevard v. Hoffman , 18 Md. 479 , 483 (1862) ; see also People v. Feerick , 93 N.Y.2d 433 , 692 N.Y.S.2d 638 , 714 N.E.2d 851 , 857 (1999) (explaining that the mens rea requirement protects officers from criminal liability for honest mistakes).

2017Therefore, as the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained, to hold a defendant liable for solicitation to commit murder, “the State must prove that [the] defendant counseled, enticed, or induced another to commit each of the following: (1) an unlawful killing; (2) with malice; (3) with the specific intent to kill formed after some measure of premeditation and deliberation.” State v. Crowe, 188 N.C.App. 765 , 656 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks' omitted).

2017Therefore, as the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained, to hold a defendant liable for solicitation to commit murder, “the State must prove that [the] defendant counseled, enticed, or induced another to commit each of the following: (1) an unlawful killing; (2) with malice; (3) with the specific intent to kill formed after some measure of premeditation and deliberation.” State v. Crowe, 188 N.C.App. 765 , 656 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks' omitted).

2011Coleman v. State, 196 Md.App. 634, 653 , 11 A.3d 326, 327 (2010) ("[T]he State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the intent to deceive the purchasers necessary to sustain a conviction for theft by deception.”).

2011Coleman v. State, 196 Md.App. 634, 653 , 11 A.3d 326, 327 (2010) ("[T]he State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the intent to deceive the purchasers necessary to sustain a conviction for theft by deception.”).

2007A specific intent crime “requires not simply the general intent to do the immediate act with no particular, clear or undifferentiated end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very specific and more remote result.” Shell, 307 Md. at 63 , 512 A.2d at 366 (citations omitted).

2007A specific intent crime “requires not simply the general intent to do the immediate act with no particular, clear or undifferentiated end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very specific and more remote result.” Shell, 307 Md. at 63 , 512 A.2d at 366 (citations omitted).

2001Furthermore, even if one were to hypothesize that the General Assembly had inadvertently or accidentally omitted the references to out-of-state offenses in the definitions of “sexually violent offense” and “sexually violent predator” in the final version of the legislation, we have held that this Court “could not invade the function of the legislature” by reading missing language into a statute thus rendering it incapable of correcting “an omission in the language of a statute even though it appeared to be the obvious result of inadvertence.” Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 547 , 380 A.2d 49, 5

2001Furthermore, even if one were to hypothesize that the General Assembly had inadvertently or accidentally omitted the references to out-of-state offenses in the definitions of “sexually violent offense” and “sexually violent predator” in the final version of the legislation, we have held that this Court “could not invade the function of the legislature” by reading missing language into a statute thus rendering it incapable of correcting “an omission in the language of a statute even though it appeared to be the obvious result of inadvertence.” Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 547 , 380 A.2d 49, 5