53 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ortegagreen2 sentences1999See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991). “[T]he felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico does not abandon the mens rea requirement for murder, nor does it create a presumption that a defendant had intended to kill whenever a homicide occurs during the course of a felony.” Campos, 1996-NMSC-043 , ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266 . 1999See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563 , 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991). “[T]he felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico does not abandon the mens rea requirement for murder, nor does it create a presumption that a defendant had intended to kill whenever a homicide occurs during the course of a felony.” Campos, 1996-NMSC-043 , ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266 . | 6 | 7 |
Santillanes v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Cf. Santilanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 222 , 849 P.2d 358, 365 (1993) (stating that when a crime is punishable as a felony, a higher mens rea requirement is appropriate). 2009Cf. Santilanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 222 , 849 P.2d 358, 365 (1993) (stating that when a crime is punishable as a felony, a higher mens rea requirement is appropriate). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Gonzalez, 2005-NMCA-031, ¶¶ 12-13 , 137 N.M. 107 , 107 P.3d 547 (reasoning that where criminal statute lacks a mens rea requirement, it is construed as requiring general criminal intent absent legislative intent to the contrary). 2013See State v. Gonzalez, 2005-NMCA-031, ¶¶ 12-13 , 137 N.M. 107 , 107 P.3d 547 (reasoning that where criminal statute lacks a mens rea requirement, it is construed as requiring general criminal intent absent legislative intent to the contrary). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Camposgreen2 sentences2015See id. ¶¶ 30-46 12 1 (discussing the mens rea requirement for second-degree murder, its interplay with 2 intoxication, and rejecting intoxication as a defense to second-degree murder). 3 {17} Further, for reasons set forth in this Court’s proposed disposition, we conclude 4 that the evidence presented at trial was otherwise sufficient to establish second-degree 5 murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 2005“The primary distinction between New Mexico’s felony-murder doctrine and those of other jurisdictions is that ... this Court impose[s] a mens rea requirement for felony murder.” State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043 , ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266 . | 3 | 7 |
State v. Moreygreen2 sentences2013We reasoned that there was no clear legislative intent to omit this mens rea requirement from the statute and that imposing liability on someone who did not know the victim’s identity defeated the “‘specific deterrent purpose expressed by the statute.’” Id. (quoting State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479, 483 (Me. 1981)). 2013We reasoned that there was no clear legislative intent to omit this mens rea requirement from the statute and that imposing liability on someone who did not know the victim’s identity defeated the “ ‘specific deterrent purpose expressed by the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479, 483 (Me. 1981)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Barbergreen2 sentences2018Cf. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 29-30 (explaining that even if the 3 jury instruction was “defectively ambiguous without the definition of possession,” the 4 jury instructions as a whole—which required the state to prove that the defendant 5 intended to transfer methamphetamine—cured the ambiguity because the jury could 6 not have convicted the defendant of intent to transfer, which it did, without also 7 finding that he possessed the drugs); Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036 , ¶¶ 14, 17, 34 8 (explaining that despite the district court’s omission of the mens rea requirement—an 9 essential element—from the f 2017Cf. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 29-30 (explaining that even if the 3 jury instruction was “defectively ambiguous without the definition of possession,” the 4 jury instructions as a whole—which required the state to prove that the defendant 5 intended to transfer methamphetamine—cured the ambiguity because the jury could 6 not have convicted the defendant of intent to transfer, which it did, without also 7 finding that he possessed the drugs); Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036 , ¶¶ 14, 17, 34 8 (explaining that despite the district court’s omission of the mens rea requirement—an 9 essential element—from the f | 2 | 2 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2018See State v. 2 Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14 , 306 P.3d 426 (“In applying the fundamental error 3 analysis to deficient jury instructions, we are required to reverse when the 4 misinstruction leaves us with no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was 5 not based on the lack of the essential element.” (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted)); cf. State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 53, 57 , 138 N.M. 365 , 120 P.3d 447 7 (explaining that even though the district court failed to give the “reckless disregard” 8 definitional instruction specifically for the child abuse charge, the err 2017See State v. 2 Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14 , 306 P.3d 426 (“In applying the fundamental error 3 analysis to deficient jury instructions, we are required to reverse when the 4 misinstruction leaves us with no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was 5 not based on the lack of the essential element.” (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted)); cf. State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 53, 57 , 138 N.M. 365 , 120 P.3d 447 7 (explaining that even though the district court failed to give the “reckless disregard” 8 definitional instruction specifically for the child abuse charge, the err | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2018See State v. 2 Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14 , 306 P.3d 426 (“In applying the fundamental error 3 analysis to deficient jury instructions, we are required to reverse when the 4 misinstruction leaves us with no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was 5 not based on the lack of the essential element.” (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted)); cf. State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 53, 57 , 138 N.M. 365 , 120 P.3d 447 7 (explaining that even though the district court failed to give the “reckless disregard” 8 definitional instruction specifically for the child abuse charge, the err 2018See State v. 2 Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14 , 306 P.3d 426 (“In applying the fundamental error 3 analysis to deficient jury instructions, we are required to reverse when the 4 misinstruction leaves us with no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was 5 not based on the lack of the essential element.” (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted)); cf. State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 53, 57 , 138 N.M. 365 , 120 P.3d 447 7 (explaining that even though the district court failed to give the “reckless disregard” 8 definitional instruction specifically for the child abuse charge, the err | 2 | 2 |
CITATION BINGO, LTD. v. Ottengreen2 sentences2015See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 1996-NMSC- 003, ¶ 21, 121 N.M. 205 , 910 P.2d 281 (“[When interpreting a statute] we presume that the 5 [L]egislature was aware of existing statutory and common law and did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law.”). {12} Our conclusion is reinforced by certain principles of statutory construction. 2015See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 1996-NMSC-003 , ¶ 21, 121 N.M. 205 , 910 18 P.2d 281 (“[When interpreting a statute] we presume that the [L]egislature was aware 9 1 of existing statutory and common law and did not intend to enact a law inconsistent 2 with existing law.”). 3 {12} Our conclusion is reinforced by certain principles of statutory construction. 4 First, the lack of a comma before the phrase “or who has in the person’s possession 5 any vehicle” is not dispositive because the Legislature’s use of the word “or” 6 indicates that a person who possesses a stolen vehicle is independent | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1997However, we also have said that our felony murder rule “serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” State v. Campos, 1996 NMSC 043, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 148, 154 , 921 P.2d 1266, 1272 ; see also State v. Lopez, 1996 NMSC 036, 122 N.M. 63, 66 , 920 P.2d 1017, 1020 (“[B]ecause of this mens-rea requirement, our felony-murder rule is best described as elevating the crime of second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed during the course of a dangerous felony.”). {36} An act of shooting at or fro 1997However, we also have said that our felony murder rule “serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony.” State v. Campos, 1996 NMSC 043, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 148, 154 , 921 P.2d 1266, 1272 ; see also State v. Lopez, 1996 NMSC 036, 122 N.M. 63, 66 , 920 P.2d 1017, 1020 (“[B]ecause of this mens-rea requirement, our felony-murder rule is best described as elevating the crime of second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed during the course of a dangerous felony.”). {36} An act of shooting at or fro | 2 | 2 |
State v. Noziegreen2 sentences2020See Nozie, 2009-NMSC-018, ¶ 29 (“Ultimately, we must determine whether there is a clear legislative intent to omit the mens rea requirement with respect to one or more essential elements of the crime.”). {28} Our Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to explicitly include scienter requirements for the crimes defined in Section 30-6A-3. 2013We reasoned that there was no clear legislative intent to omit this mens rea requirement from the statute and that imposing liability on someone who did not know the victim’s identity defeated the “ ‘specific deterrent purpose expressed by the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479, 483 (Me. 1981)). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences1997See generally State v. Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, ¶¶ 15-34, 122 N.M. 724, 727-34 , 931 P.2d 69, 72-79 (discussing the mens rea requirement for depraved-mind murder, State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277-78 , 694 P.2d 922, 925-26 (1985) and State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368 , 707 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Ct.App.1985)). 1997See generally State v. Brown, 1996 NMSC 073, ¶¶ 15-34, 122 N.M. 724, 727-34 , 931 P.2d 69, 72-79 (discussing the mens rea requirement for depraved-mind murder, State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277-78 , 694 P.2d 922, 925-26 (1985) and State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368 , 707 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Ct.App.1985)). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Padillagreen2 sentences2021The given instruction deviated from UJI 14-2202 NMRA 4 by omitting the deadly 3 Our Supreme Court’s cases demonstrate that an element may be “undisputed” if by “concession it is not at issue.” Padilla, 1997-NMSC-022, ¶ 8 ; see Lopez, 1996- NMSC-036, ¶ 18 (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he shot at a person while “knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm” “conclusively established the mens rea requirement for second-degree murder”). 2021See generally § 30-22-22(A)(1) (proscribing, in pertinent part, “unlawfully 3Our Supreme Court’s cases demonstrate that an element may be “undisputed” if by “concession it is not at issue.” Padilla, 1997-NMSC-022, ¶ 8 ; see Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036 , ¶ 18 (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he shot at a person while “knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm” “conclusively established the mens rea requirement for second-degree murder”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Griffingreen2 sentences1997State v. Griffin, 116 N.M. 689, 695 , 866 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1993). 1997State v. Griffin, 116 N.M. 689, 695 , 866 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1993). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Anayagreen1 sentence2022See Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 29 . | 1 | 1 |
| Virginia v. Blackgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen1 sentence2019See State v. Garcia, 2013-NMCA-005, ¶¶ 20-21 , 294 P.3d 1256 (stating that conduct that constitutes a true threat “is outside the realm of First Amendment protection”); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment permits a State to ban ‘true threats,’ which encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals[.]” (citations omitted)). {15} When a true threat is involved, the mens rea standard described above is what distinguish | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Consaulgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tollardogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Archiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Braley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Daygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fraziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Billingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gammillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jeffrey Meekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Amos Branchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Miniefieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mattisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lucerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rhea
green
2 sentences2022Uniform jury “[i]nstructions are sufficient if, considered as a whole, they fairly present the issues and the applicable law.” State 7 v. Rhea, 1974-NMCA-030 , ¶ 9, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 . 2022Uniform jury “[i]nstructions are sufficient if, considered as a whole, they fairly present the issues and the applicable law.” State 7 v. Rhea, 1974-NMCA-030 , ¶ 9, 86 N.M. 291 , 523 P.2d 26 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2022He points out that the criminal trespass statute requires that a person committing criminal trespass “knowingly enter[] or remain[] upon the unposted lands of another knowing that such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof,” § 30-14-1(B), whereas UJI 14-1402 requires only that “[t]he defendant knew or should have known that permission to enter . . . had been denied.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, he argues, UJI 14-1402 applies a lower mens rea requirement than that required by Section 30-14-1(B). {16} The “Court of Appeals has authority to question unifor 2022He points out that the criminal trespass statute requires that a person committing criminal trespass “knowingly enter[] or remain[] upon the unposted lands of another knowing that such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof,” § 30-14-1(B), whereas UJI 14-1402 requires only that “[t]he defendant knew or should have known that permission to enter . . . had been denied.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, he argues, UJI 14-1402 applies a lower mens rea requirement than that required by Section 30-14-1(B). {16} The “Court of Appeals has authority to question unifor | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2017The misstatement of the mens rea element misdirected the 13 jury, potentially allowing the jurors to convict Suazo based upon a finding that could 14 not support a second-degree murder conviction under the appropriate legal standard. 15 {31} It is tempting to agree with the dissent and the State that the intent to injure 16 element of aggravated battery satisfies the mens rea requirement for second-degree 17 murder because New Mexico criminalizes intent-to-injure battery, see State v. 18 Vasquez, 1971-NMCA-182 , ¶ 12, 83 N.M. 388 , 492 P.2d 1005 (recognizing that 24 1 aggravated battery requir 2017The misstatement of the mens rea element misdirected the 13 jury, potentially allowing the jurors to convict Suazo based upon a finding that could 14 not support a second-degree murder conviction under the appropriate legal standard. 15 {31} It is tempting to agree with the dissent and the State that the intent to injure 16 element of aggravated battery satisfies the mens rea requirement for second-degree 17 murder because New Mexico criminalizes intent-to-injure battery, see State v. 18 Vasquez, 1971-NMCA-182 , ¶ 12, 83 N.M. 388 , 492 P.2d 1005 (recognizing that 24 1 aggravated battery requir | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Armendarez
green
2 sentences2017As noted by the metropolitan court prior to its oral recitation of the 18 instructions to the jury, “You do not have to take notes on this, because this packet 12 1 that I’m going to read from will actually be given to you to take back to the jury 2 room.” 3 {25} In State v. Armendarez, 1992-NMSC-012 , ¶ 11, 113 N.M. 335 , 825 P.2d 1245 , 4 the prosecutor erroneously recited the mens rea requirement in a first degree murder 5 case. 2017As noted by the metropolitan court prior to its oral recitation of the 18 instructions to the jury, “You do not have to take notes on this, because this packet 12 1 that I’m going to read from will actually be given to you to take back to the jury 2 room.” 3 {25} In State v. Armendarez, 1992-NMSC-012 , ¶ 11, 113 N.M. 335 , 825 P.2d 1245 , 4 the prosecutor erroneously recited the mens rea requirement in a first degree murder 5 case. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Reese v. State
green
2 sentences2007As a majority of the Supreme Court recognized in Reese in the closely related context of the offenses of aggravated assault on a peace officer and battery on a peace officer, a mens rea requirement of knowledge attaches to the attendant circumstance of the victim’s status as a peace officer. 106 N.M. at 501 , 745 P.2d at 1149 . 2007As a majority of the Supreme Court recognized in Reese in the closely related context of the offenses of aggravated assault on a peace officer and battery on a peace officer, a mens rea requirement of knowledge attaches to the attendant circumstance of the victim’s status as a peace officer. 106 N.M. at 501 , 745 P.2d at 1149 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2000See Santillanes, 115 N.M. at 223 , 849 P.2d at 366 ; Jackson, 1996-NMSC-054 , ¶5, 122 N.M. 433 , 925 P.2d 1195 . 2000See Santillanes, 115 N.M. at 223 , 849 P.2d at 366 ; Jackson, 1996-NMSC-054 , ¶5, 122 N.M. 433 , 925 P.2d 1195 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Dennis v. United States
green
2 sentences1990“The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 244 , 531 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239 , 531 P.2d 1212 (1975) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)). 1990“The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 244 , 531 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239 , 531 P.2d 1212 (1975) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 , 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 , 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)). | 2 | 1975–1990 |
State v. Henley
green
1 sentence2026That 15 conclusion would be erroneous: “[I]nvoluntary manslaughter requires subjective 16 knowledge by the defendant of the danger or risk to others posed by his or her 17 actions.” Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 17 . 18 {38} We conclude the “should have known” language contained in UJI 14-231 19 misstates the mens rea requirement of involuntary manslaughter and could mislead 20 1 a jury. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Yarborough
green
1 sentence2026UJI 14-231 NMRA incorrectly uses language reflecting a civil negligence 9 standard and must be revised to reflect that involuntary manslaughter 10 requires a mens rea of recklessness 11 {34} In Yarborough, this Court established the mens rea standard for involuntary 12 manslaughter by carefully distinguishing ordinary civil negligence from criminal 13 negligence. 1996-NMSC-068, ¶¶ 10-20 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2024Finally, we determine whether the evidence is sufficient 5 to support the convictions. 6 A. Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Interpretation 7 {38} “Interpretation of a statute is a matter of law,” as is the “determination of 8 whether the language of a statute is ambiguous.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001 , 9 ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 768 , 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2024Finally, we determine whether the evidence is sufficient 5 to support the convictions. 6 A. Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Interpretation 7 {38} “Interpretation of a statute is a matter of law,” as is the “determination of 8 whether the language of a statute is ambiguous.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001 , 9 ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 768 , 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Erica, Inc. v. New Mexico Regulation & Licensing Department
green
2 sentences2022In contrast, where four separate acts are prohibited, as is the case in Section 60-7B-1(A), the Legislature attached the same mens rea requirement as in Section 60-7A-16 (1993), without redundant and potentially confusing drafting, by using the “knows or has reason to know” phrase to modify “violating the provisions of this section.” 14 Licensing Dep’t, 2008-NMCA-065, ¶ 2 , 144 N.M. 132 , 184 P.3d 444 (“Section 60- 7B-1 . . . requires that the seller of . . . alcohol ‘knows or has reason to know’ that the purchaser is a minor.”); State v. Aragon, No. A-1-CA-37809, mem. op. ¶ 3 (N.M. 2022In contrast, where four separate acts are prohibited, as is the case in Section 60-7B-1(A), the Legislature attached the same mens rea requirement as in Section 60-7A-16 (1993), without redundant and potentially confusing drafting, by using the “knows or has reason to know” phrase to modify “violating the provisions of this section.” 14 Licensing Dep’t, 2008-NMCA-065, ¶ 2 , 144 N.M. 132 , 184 P.3d 444 (“Section 60- 7B-1 . . . requires that the seller of . . . alcohol ‘knows or has reason to know’ that the purchaser is a minor.”); State v. Aragon, No. A-1-CA-37809, mem. op. ¶ 3 (N.M. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Almanzar
green
1 sentence2022In contrast, where four separate acts are prohibited, as is the case in Section 60- 7B-1(A), the Legislature attached the same mens rea requirement as in Section 60-7A-16 (1993), without redundant and potentially confusing drafting, by using the “knows or has reason to know” phrase to modify “violating the provisions of this section.” understood to refer to a defendant’s knowledge of the facts constituting the proscribed conduct, rather than a defendant’s knowledge of the illegality of that conduct. 6 {22} Since Section 60-7B-1 is arguably subject to two interpretations, we “proceed with furth | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. McDonald
green
2 sentences2020We have recognized that the crime of “conspiracy to commit second degree murder [has] a mens rea requirement that the accused must intend to commit the crime.” State v. McDonald, 2004-NMSC-033, ¶ 17 , 136 N.M. 417 , 99 P.3d 667 . 2020We have recognized that the crime of “conspiracy to commit second degree murder [has] a mens rea requirement that the accused must intend to commit the crime.” State v. McDonald, 2004-NMSC-033, ¶ 17 , 136 N.M. 417 , 99 P.3d 667 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Marquez
green
1 sentence2020“Our responsibility is to make certain that, consistent with legislative intent, first-degree murder is reserved only for the most reprehensible murders that are deserving of the most serious punishment under New Mexico law.” Marquez, 2016-NMSC-025, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Dowling green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Ramos green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Duran green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Ramos green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Vernon green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Lucero v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Harrison red | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Territory of New Mexico v. Church green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| State v. McKinley green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. Dotterweich green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Smith v. California green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.