mens rea requirement in Arizona

2025State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 54, ¶ 20 (2009) (“The defendant’s intent is not an element of the strict liability offense of driving while intoxicated.”); State v. Parker, 136 Ariz. 474, 475 (App. 1983) (The DUI offense “does not require proof of a culpable mental state.”).

2025State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, 54, ¶ 20 (2009) (“The defendant’s intent is not an element of the strict liability offense of driving while intoxicated.”); State v. Parker, 136 Ariz. 474, 475 (App. 1983) (The DUI offense “does not require proof of a culpable mental state.”).

2024See Clancy v. State, 313 P.3d 226, 230 (Nev. 2013) (noting that a hit-and-run statute’s purpose “is not served where the driver is unaware of the event requiring him to stop and provide identifying information and render assistance”). ¶44 We further agree with Foster that the mens rea instruction was deficient.

2024See State v. Lee, 53 Ariz. 295, 301 (1939) (holding that a driver cannot be criminally liable for leaving the scene of an accident unless the State alleges and proves that the driver “knew that the collision had occurred”); State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 493 (App. 1980) (holding that a driver cannot be criminally liable for leaving the scene of an accident unless the State proves a defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge that the accident caused injury to another). ¶41 The court gave the following mens rea instruction: The State must prove that the defendant actually knew of the

2024See State v. Lee, 53 Ariz. 295, 301 (1939) (holding that a driver cannot be criminally liable for leaving the scene of an accident unless the State alleges and proves that the driver “knew that the collision had occurred”); State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 493 (App. 1980) (holding that a driver cannot be criminally liable for leaving the scene of an accident unless the State proves a defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge that the accident caused injury to another). ¶41 The court gave the following mens rea instruction: The State must prove that the defendant actually knew of the

2022Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). ¶20 Dr. Batty argues that “[w]ithout a specific mens rea requirement, a [physician] is not able to discern exactly what behavior the statute prohibits.” He contends that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot discern whether the statute prohibits any conduct that may be perceived as sexual, or if it only prohibits conduct “sexually motivated or intended for a sexual purpose.” Noting the opposing positions pressed by counsel at oral argument and the significant time spent addressing statutory interpretation

2022We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo but “presume that the statute is constitutional and must construe it, if possible, to give it a constitutional meaning.” State v. McMahon, 201 Ariz. 548, 550, ¶ 5 (App. 2002).

2022To avoid unconstitutional vagueness, a statute need not “be drafted with absolute precision,” and must only “convey a definite warning of the proscribed conduct.” McMahon, 201 Ariz. at 551 , ¶ 8 (quoting Fuenning v. Super.

2020Id.; see also State v. Moore, 218 Ariz. 534, 535, ¶ 8 (App. 2008) (“The mens rea requirement of felony murder . . . is supplied by the culpable mental state required for the underlying felony.”) (internal quotation omitted).

2016See State v. Rios, 225 Ariz. 292, ¶ 12 , 237 P.3d 1052 , 1056 (App. 2010) (we avoid deciding constitutional issues when appeal can be resolved on narrower grounds).

2016See State v. Rios, 225 Ariz. 292, ¶ 12 , 237 P.3d 1052 , 1056 (App. 2010) (we avoid deciding constitutional issues when appeal can be resolved on narrower grounds).

2016See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 41 , 170 P.3d 266, 276 (App. 2007) (explaining the knowledge requirement may be proven either through “actual physical possession or constructive possession with actual knowledge of the presence of the narcotic substance” (citation omitted)). 7 STATE v. STRAIT Decision of the Court “comment” on Strait’s “silence” and her argument that Strait knew “that speed means meth.” The prosecutor countered that she was not commenting on Strait’s silence, but was instead referring to his voluntary responses in a police interview.

2016See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 41 , 170 P.3d 266, 276 (App. 2007) (explaining the knowledge requirement may be proven either through “actual physical possession or constructive possession with actual knowledge of the presence of the narcotic substance” (citation omitted)). 7 STATE v. STRAIT Decision of the Court “comment” on Strait’s “silence” and her argument that Strait knew “that speed means meth.” The prosecutor countered that she was not commenting on Strait’s silence, but was instead referring to his voluntary responses in a police interview.

2008A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2), (B) (2007). 2 The mens rea requirement of felony murder under § 13-1105(A)(2) “is supplied by the culpable mental state required for the underlying felony.” State v. Cabanas-Salgado, 208 Ariz. 195, 197, ¶ 12 , 92 P.3d 421, 423 (App. 2003); A.R.S. § 13-1105(B). *536 ¶ 9 Our attempt statute, however, requires that a defendant have the intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.

2008A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2), (B) (2007). 2 The mens rea requirement of felony murder under § 13-1105(A)(2) “is supplied by the culpable mental state required for the underlying felony.” State v. Cabanas-Salgado, 208 Ariz. 195, 197, ¶ 12 , 92 P.3d 421, 423 (App. 2003); A.R.S. § 13-1105(B). *536 ¶ 9 Our attempt statute, however, requires that a defendant have the intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

2008A.R.S. § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); see also State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 370 , 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 627 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1137 (App. 1996) (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); State v. Miller, 123 Ariz. 491, 493 , 600 P.2d 1123, 1125 (App.1979) (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt there must be proof of a specific in

1997Justice Ginsberg concurred in reversing the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment only because she believed that by forbidding the use of voluntary intoxication as a defense the Montana legislature had simply redefined the mens rea element of the offense, “‘extract[ing] the entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry,’ and thereby rendering evidence of voluntary intoxication logically irrelevant to proof of the requisite mental state.” Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2024 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in the judgment). 13 Here, however, we are not dealing with a statute prohibiting batter

1997Justice Ginsberg concurred in reversing the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment only because she believed that by forbidding the use of voluntary intoxication as a defense the Montana legislature had simply redefined the mens rea element of the offense, “‘extract[ing] the entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry,’ and thereby rendering evidence of voluntary intoxication logically irrelevant to proof of the requisite mental state.” Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2024 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in the judgment). 13 Here, however, we are not dealing with a statute prohibiting batter