mens rea requirement in District of Columbia

2024See Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 317 (D.C. 2017) (en banc) (“We now hold that the government must prove the defendant’s mens rea to utter the words as a threat, and that it may do so by establishing that the defendant acted with the purpose to threaten or with knowledge 13 A. Instructional Error The gravamen of Mr. Keerikkattil’s first claim on appeal—at least if interpreted generously—appears to be that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was either nonexpressive conduct or conduct that fell within the narro

2022See generally Carrell, 165 A.3d at 324 (explaining that, with regard to the “result element” of our threats statutes — which lack an explicit mens rea requirement, “the government may carry its burden of proof by establishing that the defendant acted with the purpose to threaten or with knowledge that his words would be perceived as a threat”).

2017Instead, the mens rea requirement ―is satisfied if the defendant transmit[ted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.‖ Id. at 2012 .

2017Instead, the mens rea requirement “is satisfied if the defendant transmitted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Id. at 2012 .

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 F. App‘x 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which ―satisfie[s]‖ the ―mental state requirement‖); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Supreme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 , 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792 F.

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 Fed.Appx, 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which "satisfiefc]” the "mental state requirement”); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Sur preme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 F. App‘x 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which ―satisfie[s]‖ the ―mental state requirement‖); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Supreme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 , 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792 F.

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 Fed.Appx, 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which "satisfiefc]” the "mental state requirement”); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Sur preme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 F. App‘x 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which ―satisfie[s]‖ the ―mental state requirement‖); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Supreme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 , 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792 F.

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 Fed.Appx, 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which "satisfiefc]” the "mental state requirement”); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Sur preme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792

2010See Hicks-Bey v. United States, 649 A.2d 569, 583 (D.C. 1994) ("[E]ven improperly admitted evidence may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence." (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988)). [26] See generally D.C.Code § 22-2103 (2009); see also Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C.2000) (articulating the standard mens rea instruction for second-degree murder to include "act[ing] in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to decedent").

2010See generally D.C.Code § 22-2103 (2009); see also Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C.2000) (articulating the standard mens rea instruction for second-degree murder to include "act[ing] in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to decedent)..

2012See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 (“[A] severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.”).

2012See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 (“[A] severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.”).

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 F. App‘x 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which ―satisfie[s]‖ the ―mental state requirement‖); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Supreme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 , 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792 F.

2017See United States v. Choudhry, 649 Fed.Appx, 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction where evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant under a purpose or knowledge standard, either of which "satisfiefc]” the "mental state requirement”); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting, on remand from the Sur preme Court, that the Court declined to address recklessness); United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement is unresolved); United States v. Houston, 792

2008We apply this most strict standard in this case, even though *639 the issue has not been raised by appellant, because we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “[a]ny impartial trier of fact who credited the prosecution’s evidence would, in our view, be bound to conclude that [appellant] intended to kill the decedent, tried to kill [him], and succeeded in doing so_” Wilsom-Bey, 903 A.2d at 846-47 (footnote omitted).

2007ANALYSIS Mr. Kidd contends that the trial court’s aiding and abetting instruction to the jury concerning the mens rea requirement of the charged crime was constitutional error under our decisions in Wilson-Bey, supra, and Kitt v. United States, 904 A.2d 348 (D.C.2006).

2025In short, the majority’s exception is not actually for proven criminal threats, but for any communications that could be deemed to possibly constitute a threat and will include communications that are not ultimately proven to be threats. 44 In re PDS grounded its probable cause standard in the fact that testimony was being sought before a grand jury, see 831 A.2d at 904, but it is unclear whether the same standard would suffice to deem testimony unprivileged in trial proceedings. 121 Third, this exception is not tailored to any real-time or even future public safety objective.

2021The mens rea standard that is applicable in criminal tax cases requires proof “that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 , 200–01 (1991); see also Stedman v. District of Columbia, 12 A.3d 1156 , 1157 n.1 (D.C. 2011) (noting that “[a]lthough the District’s tax code 8 United States v. Frei, No. 3:17-cr-00032, 2019 U.S. Dist.

2017See United States v. Pickar, 616 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2010) (in interpreting federal bank-robbery statute, which requires that defendant took money “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” court holds that “The intimidation element of bank robbery is satisfied if an ordinary person in the bank teller’s position could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm from the bank robber’s words and actions.

2017See United States v. Pickar, 616 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2010) (in interpreting federal bank-robbery statute, which requires that defendant took money “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” court holds that “The intimidation element of bank robbery is satisfied if an ordinary person in the bank teller’s position could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm from the bank robber’s words and actions.

2017See, e,g., Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194 , 857 A.2d 101, 129 (2004) (“[R]ob-bery does not require that the defendant’s violence-or-intimidation acts be done for the very purpose of the taking of the victim’s property.

2017See, e.g., Allen v. State, 857 A.2d 101, 129 (Md.

2015Because “malice” is defined as a subjective awareness that one’s conduct creates an extreme risk of death or serious bodily harm, see Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 39 (D.C.1990), the committee revising D.C.’s model jury instructions chose to remove the language “extreme indifference to human life” from the previous pattern instruction and replace it with *206 “was aware that his/her conduct created an extreme risk of serious bodily injury ... but engaged in that conduct nonetheless.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.103.

2012For instance, in McNeely , we noted that “the relative severity of the punishment, a fine of up to $20,000 and imprisonment of up to two years, favors the imposition of a mens rea requirement,” but we held that owning a pit bull was a strict liability crime. 874 A.2d at 390 ; see also United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C.Cir.2012) (en banc) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(B)(ii), which imposes a mandatory thirty-year sentence for any person who carries a machine-gun while committing a crime of violence, does not require proof that the defendant knew the weapon he was carrying could

2010Moreover, as the Board asserts, since Maryland does not recognize “reckless misappropriation,” if it had decided that Mr. Mba-Jonas’s conduct displayed “conscious indifference” (the mens rea requirement for reckless misappropriation in the District), see In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 339 (D.C.2001), in managing his client trust account, it would have found intentional misappropriation on his part, as it has in the past.

2010See Hicks-Bey v. United States, 649 A.2d 569, 583 (D.C. 1994) ("[E]ven improperly admitted evidence may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence." (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988)). [26] See generally D.C.Code § 22-2103 (2009); see also Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C.2000) (articulating the standard mens rea instruction for second-degree murder to include "act[ing] in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to decedent").

2010See Hicks-Bey v. United States, 649 A.2d 569, 583 (D.C. 1994) ("[E]ven improperly admitted evidence may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence." (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988)). [26] See generally D.C.Code § 22-2103 (2009); see also Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C.2000) (articulating the standard mens rea instruction for second-degree murder to include "act[ing] in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to decedent").

2010See Hicks-Bey v. United States, 649 A.2d 569, 583 (D.C. 1994) ("[E]ven improperly admitted evidence may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence." (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-42 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988)). [26] See generally D.C.Code § 22-2103 (2009); see also Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C.2000) (articulating the standard mens rea instruction for second-degree murder to include "act[ing] in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to decedent").

2010See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700 , 831 A.2d 1042, 1057 (2003) (“Respondent’s ‘conscious indifference’ in the use and management of the client trust account constitutes intentional misappropriation under Maryland law.”).

2010See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700 , 831 A.2d 1042, 1057 (2003) (“Respondent’s ‘conscious indifference’ in the use and management of the client trust account constitutes intentional misappropriation under Maryland law.”).

2010See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 977 A.2d 973 , 987 n. 34 (D.C.2009); Lancaster v. United States, 975 A.2d 168 (D.C.2009).