mens rea rule in Vermont

2020While we did not expressly adopt this provision, we found that “[t]his method of construction align[ed] with our own presumption in favor of requiring an element of mens rea in criminal statutes,” citing cases for the proposition that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Id. (citing State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (additional citation omitted)).

2020While we did not expressly adopt this provision, we found that “[t]his method of construction align[ed] with our own presumption in favor of requiring an element of mens rea in criminal statutes,” citing cases for the proposition that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Id. (citing State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (additional citation omitted)).

2013The purpose of a criminal trespass statute “is to punish those who willfully or without a bona fide claim of right commit acts of trespass on the land of another.” Woods v. State , 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant’s “belief and bona fide claim of right defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal trespass statute and render her conviction erroneous.”).

2013The purpose of a crimin.1 trespass statute “is to punish those who wilfully or without a bona fide claim of right commit acts of trespass on the land of another.” Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant’s “belief and bona fide claim of right defeat the mens rea requirement of the crimin.1 trespass statute and render her conviction erroneous.”).

2016State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 307 , 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[M]ere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.”).

2016State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 307 , 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[M]ere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.”).

2016State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 307 , 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[M]ere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.”).

2016State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 307 , 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[M]ere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.”).

2015Stat. Ann. § 161.115 (1) (“If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”); Commonwealth v. Scolieri, 813 A.2d 672, 678 (Pa. 2002) (explaining that “where the [legislature] sets forth the mens rea requirement for a crime with several elements, the requirement generally applies to all elements”); cf. Rambin v. Allstate Ins.

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence!,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature, ... a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence!,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature, ... a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015See State v. Bourn, 2012 VT 71, ¶ 10 , 192 Vt. 270 , 58 A.3d 236 (“When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea requirement for a particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); State v. Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528 , 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993) (stating that we consider several factors in determining Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability crime when statute is silent, including severity of punishment, seriousness of harm to public, defendant’s opp

2015See State v. Bourn, 2012 VT 71, ¶ 10 , 192 Vt. 270 , 58 A.3d 236 (“When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea requirement for a particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); State v. Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528 , 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993) (stating that we consider several factors in determining Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability crime when statute is silent, including severity of punishment, seriousness of harm to public, defendant’s opp

2015See State v. Bourn, 2012 VT 71, ¶ 10 , 192 Vt. 270 , 58 A.3d 236 (“When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea requirement for a particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); State v. Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528 , 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993) (stating that we consider several factors in determining Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability crime when statute is silent, including severity of punishment, seriousness of harm to public, defendant’s opp

2015See State v. Bourn, 2012 VT 71, ¶ 10 , 192 Vt. 270 , 58 A.3d 236 (“When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea requirement for a particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); State v. Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528 , 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993) (stating that we consider several factors in determining Legislature’s intent to impose strict liability crime when statute is silent, including severity of punishment, seriousness of harm to public, defendant’s opp

2015See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523 , 573 A.2d 286, 290 (1990) (explaining that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence[,] . . . [and] unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature,… a crime is composed of an act and an intent, which concur at a point in time” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 135 , 605 A.2d 527, 528 (1992) (observing that we often have “implied guilty intent as an element when none was expressly provided by the statute”). 4 Altho

2015Co., 852 N.W.2d 34, 40 (Mich. 2014) (recognizing that “presumption in favor of a criminal intent or mens rea requirement applies to each element of a statutory crime”). 5 provides: “When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provisions shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(4).4 Applying this method of construction to § 658(a)(2), we would distribute the term “knowingl

2013It is not enough for the State to show merely that defendants entered upon and refused to leave the subject property when requested to do so; rather, “it is also incumbent to prove that [defendants’] presence on the land constituted a trespass in the sense that [defendants] invaded another’s exclusive right of [lawful] possession.” People v. Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1977). ¶ 48.