7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rainoldigreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., State v. Rainoldi, 236 Or App 129 , 235 P3d 710 (2010) (setting out controlling analysis). 2010See, e.g., State v. Rainoldi, 236 Or App 129 , 235 P3d 710 (2010) (setting out controlling analysis). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schodrowgreen1 sentence2008Cf. Schodrow, 187 Or App at 230-31 (holding that where legislature included a “knowingly” mens rea in an unlawful possession of a firearm statute, state was required to prove that defendant both knowingly possessed an object and knew the object was a firearm). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Engen
green
2 sentences2013Citing State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000), defendant acknowledged that, “if you say, *** ‘Oh, it — I thought it was cocaine and it’s really meth,’ that’s not a defense.” 2 Defendant argued, however, that the facts of this case differed because “what [defendant] thought it was a — not a crime.” Later in the discussion, defendant again explained that his theory related to “knowledge — as far as the specific controlled substance.” Defendant argued that the general rule — i.e., that a defendant need not have known the exact nature of the controlled subs 2013Citing State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000), defendant acknowledged that, “if you say, *** ‘Oh, it — I thought it was cocaine and it’s really meth,’ that’s not a defense.” 2 Defendant argued, however, that the facts of this case differed because “what [defendant] thought it was a — not a crime.” Later in the discussion, defendant again explained that his theory related to “knowledge — as far as the specific controlled substance.” Defendant argued that the general rule — i.e., that a defendant need not have known the exact nature of the controlled subs | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Holman Transfer Co. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences2013In support of the argument that a civil statute with penal consequences must include a heightened mens rea requirement, defendant relies primarily on Holman Transfer Co. v. PNB Telephone Co., 287 Or 387, 394 , 599 P2d 1115 (1979). 2013In support of the argument that a civil statute with penal consequences must include a heightened mens rea requirement, defendant relies primarily on Holman Transfer Co. v. PNB Telephone Co., 287 Or 387, 394 , 599 P2d 1115 (1979). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Hirsch/Friend
green
2 sentences2012It contends that we ought to hold the ordinance constitutional under Boyce because "[t]he only difference between [ former PCC 14.32.010] and PCC 14A.60.010, under which defendant here was convicted, is that the latter now includes a mens rea requirement, that the failure to remove the ammunition be `reckless.'" In my view, this court's reasoning in Boyce has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or. 622 , 114 P.3d 1104 (2005). 2012It contends that we ought to hold the ordinance constitutional under Boyce because "[t]he only difference between [ former PCC 14.32.010] and PCC 14A.60.010, under which defendant here was convicted, is that the latter now includes a mens rea requirement, that the failure to remove the ammunition be `reckless.'" In my view, this court's reasoning in Boyce has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or. 622 , 114 P.3d 1104 (2005). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Peter S. Dimas and Ramon Roman
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Dimas, 3 F3d 1015 (7th Cir 1993); United States v. Lewin, 900 F2d 145 (8th Cir 1990); United States v. Holland, 810 F2d 1215, cert den 481 US 1057 (DC Cir 1987); United States v. Falu, 776 F2d 46, 50 (2d Cir 1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bruno v. United States
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Dimas, 3 F3d 1015 (7th Cir 1993); United States v. Lewin, 900 F2d 145 (8th Cir 1990); United States v. Holland, 810 F2d 1215, cert den 481 US 1057 (DC Cir 1987); United States v. Falu, 776 F2d 46, 50 (2d Cir 1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Springer v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences1979In Springer v. Jenkins, 47 Or 502 , 84 P 479 (1906), we held that a statute providing for recovery of double damages from a person who had embezzled, aliened or *397 converted the property of a deceased person (B & C Comp § 1152) was evidently intended to punish wrongdoers and was only applicable to a defendant who was an "intermeddler, and acted from wrong motives or in bad faith.” 47 Or at 508 . 1979In Springer v. Jenkins, 47 Or 502 , 84 P 479 (1906), we held that a statute providing for recovery of double damages from a person who had embezzled, aliened or *397 converted the property of a deceased person (B & C Comp § 1152) was evidently intended to punish wrongdoers and was only applicable to a defendant who was an "intermeddler, and acted from wrong motives or in bad faith.” 47 Or at 508 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.