discussion standard in Maryland

2005DISCUSSION The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 325 , 765 A.2d 97, 124 (2001); see Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 475 , 704 A.2d 904, 907 (1998); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , *86 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2005DISCUSSION The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 325 , 765 A.2d 97, 124 (2001); see Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 475 , 704 A.2d 904, 907 (1998); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , *86 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2005DISCUSSION The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 325 , 765 A.2d 97, 124 (2001); see Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 475 , 704 A.2d 904, 907 (1998); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , *86 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2005DISCUSSION The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 325 , 765 A.2d 97, 124 (2001); see Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 475 , 704 A.2d 904, 907 (1998); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , *86 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

2020Although the Court mentioned that the labor organization had pleaded a count alleging breach of fiduciary duty in addition to the negligence claim, the breach of fiduciary duty count was not part of this Court’s discussion or analysis, other than a footnote “point[ing] out” that, based on Kann, “Maryland does not recognize a separate tort action for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 727 n.1.

2016DISCUSSION Our analysis begins with the so-called “Whren-stop.” We observed in Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598, 601 , 753 A.2d 556 (2000): In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Supreme Court extended law enforcement officers a sweeping prerogative, permitting them to exploit the investigative opportunities presented to them by observing traffic infractions even when their primary, subjective intention is to look for narcotics violations.

2016DISCUSSION Our analysis begins with the so-called “Whren-stop.” We observed in Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598, 601 , 753 A.2d 556 (2000): In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Supreme Court extended law enforcement officers a sweeping prerogative, permitting them to exploit the investigative opportunities presented to them by observing traffic infractions even when their primary, subjective intention is to look for narcotics violations.

2016DISCUSSION Our analysis begins with the so-called “Whren-stop.” We observed in Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598, 601 , 753 A.2d 556 (2000): In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Supreme Court extended law enforcement officers a sweeping prerogative, permitting them to exploit the investigative opportunities presented to them by observing traffic infractions even when their primary, subjective intention is to look for narcotics violations.

2016DISCUSSION Our analysis begins with the so-called “Whren-stop.” We observed in Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598, 601 , 753 A.2d 556 (2000): In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Supreme Court extended law enforcement officers a sweeping prerogative, permitting them to exploit the investigative opportunities presented to them by observing traffic infractions even when their primary, subjective intention is to look for narcotics violations.

2015Pre-Trial Agreement At a pre-trial hearing in November 2010 — before a different, judge than the judge who ultimately presided over the trial— the prosecution and defense had agreed that defense counsel could ask Mr. Rose whether he expected to benefit from his testimony with respect to certain charges pending against him at the time of trial — in particular, an unspecified pending charge in Prince George’s County, a pending misdemeanor charge in Fairfax, Virginia, and an alleged violation of probation in Virginia. 7 The prosecutor and the hearing judge cited this Court’s then-recent decisions

2015Pre-Trial Agreement At a pre-trial hearing in November 2010 — before a different, judge than the judge who ultimately presided over the trial— the prosecution and defense had agreed that defense counsel could ask Mr. Rose whether he expected to benefit from his testimony with respect to certain charges pending against him at the time of trial — in particular, an unspecified pending charge in Prince George’s County, a pending misdemeanor charge in Fairfax, Virginia, and an alleged violation of probation in Virginia. 7 The prosecutor and the hearing judge cited this Court’s then-recent decisions

2014Id. at 261 , 863 A.2d 297 (“[T]he purpose of the [Maryland] Tort Claims Act’s immunity is to insulate state employees generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence.” (emphasis added)).

2014Id. at 261 , 863 A.2d 297 (“[T]he purpose of the [Maryland] Tort Claims Act’s immunity is to insulate state employees generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence.” (emphasis added)).

2010“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and ‘the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 294 , 936 A.2d 343 (2007) (quoting Md.

2010“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and ‘the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 294 , 936 A.2d 343 (2007) (quoting Md.

2008(Emphasis added.) DISCUSSION The issue here is whether the court erred in concluding that appellant did not acquire title to the disputed area by adverse possession. 14 This Court recently discussed the doctrine of adverse possession in Yourik v. Mallonee, 174 Md.

2008App. 415, 422 , 921 A.2d 869 (2007): “Adverse possession is a method whereby a person who was not the owner of property obtains a valid title to that *323 property by the passage of time.” Md.

2007Stern v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 700 , 846 A.2d 996, 1001 (2004) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in actions against the State of Maryland and its official representatives.”); Maryland State Highway Admin, v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 333 , 726 A.2d 238, 248 (1999) (“We have recognized, and continue to note that, in Maryland, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable not only to the State itself, but also to its agencies and instrumentalities, unless the General Assembly has waived the immunity either directly or by necessary implication.”); ARA

2005As the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998): [O]ur concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial “that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d 336 ).

2005As the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998): [O]ur concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial “that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d 336 ).

2005As the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998): [O]ur concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial “that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d 336 ).

2005The Court of Appeals held in State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 698-99 , 521 A.2d 1193 (1987) (footnote omitted), that necessity is a valid defense to the crime of unlawful possession of a handgun when five elements are present: (1) the defendant must be in present, imminent, and impending peril of death or serious bodily injury, or reasonably believe himself or others to be in such danger; (2) the defendant *133 must not have intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) the defendant must not have a

2005The Court of Appeals held in State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 698-99 , 521 A.2d 1193 (1987) (footnote omitted), that necessity is a valid defense to the crime of unlawful possession of a handgun when five elements are present: (1) the defendant must be in present, imminent, and impending peril of death or serious bodily injury, or reasonably believe himself or others to be in such danger; (2) the defendant *133 must not have intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) the defendant must not have a

2004The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion and noted that to grant the motion when made would have required the trial court to interrupt the trial and excuse the jury, causing an “interference with the orderly process of the case [that] was certainly not required or even prudent.” Odom, 736 F.2d at 110 . 4 While it is clear that there is a vast difference between thirty witnesses (as in Odom) and one witness (as in the case *147 at bar), the Court’s discussion of the rule is instructive.

2004Discussing Fed.R.Evid. 104 and quoting the accompanying Advisory Committee’s Notes, the Court said that “ ‘[m]uch evidence on preliminary questions, though not relevant to jury issues, may be heard by the jury with no adverse effect .... [a] great deal must be left to the discretion of the judge who will act as the interests of justice require.’ ” Odom, 736 F.2d at 110 .

2002The court subordinated the latter to the others because it was "inherently more political." Johnson, v. Miller, 922 F.Supp. at 1564-65. [30] Indeed, in Legislative Districting of State, supra, 299 Md. at 691 n. 22, 475 A.2d at 445 n. 22, we acknowledged this historical fact: "H.J.R. 32's maintenance of the city's boundaries represents a continuation of a long practice of preserving the city's integrity as a discrete and insular jurisdiction—a practice which cannot be faulted on constitutional grounds so long as it does not impair equality in apportionment, or violate principles of compactness

2002The court subordinated the latter to the others because it was "inherently more political." Johnson, v. Miller, 922 F.Supp. at 1564-65. [30] Indeed, in Legislative Districting of State, supra, 299 Md. at 691 n. 22, 475 A.2d at 445 n. 22, we acknowledged this historical fact: "H.J.R. 32's maintenance of the city's boundaries represents a continuation of a long practice of preserving the city's integrity as a discrete and insular jurisdiction—a practice which cannot be faulted on constitutional grounds so long as it does not impair equality in apportionment, or violate principles of compactness

2001Maryland Dep’t of Educ. v. Shoop, 119 Md.App. 181, 196 , 704 A.2d 499 (citing Dept. of Human Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md.App. 175, 188 , 652 A.2d 1183 (1995)), cert. denied, 349 Md. 495 , 709 A.2d 140 (1998).

2001Maryland Dep’t of Educ. v. Shoop, 119 Md.App. 181, 196 , 704 A.2d 499 (citing Dept. of Human Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md.App. 175, 188 , 652 A.2d 1183 (1995)), cert. denied, 349 Md. 495 , 709 A.2d 140 (1998).

2001Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. Of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000).

2001Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. Of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000).