43 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1914–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howson v. Dept. of Children and Familiesgreen2 sentences2008See Axilrod, 799 So.2d at 1108 (once the petitioner is found to not be able to perform his former occupation the order must discuss or analyze what specific jobs the petitioner is able to perform in light of his condition); see also Howson, 743 So.2d at 567 (finding that petitioner is fit for sedentary work is insufficient without identification of specific jobs and a discussion or analysis as to how petitioner can perform those jobs). 2001See, e.g., Howson, 743 So.2d at 567 . | 2 | 2 |
Hall v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Hall, 187 So. at 408-09 ; Koontz, 204 So. 2d at 226-27 . | 1 | 1 |
Neil J. Samuels v. Robert Leon Tankel and Kingdom Management Inc.green1 sentence2016Koo moved for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the district court denied, stating “our decision is consistent with any existing precedent[,]” because “[t]he letter does not contradict the victim’s trial testimony, and it does not provide any information that would tend to rebut any of the elements of the convicted crime.” Koo v. State, 162 So. 3d 156, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). -2- DISCUSSION The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that a post-trial, pre-sentencing letter written by the victim, purporting to offer a possible explanation for the de | 1 | 1 |
Fell v. Carlingreen1 sentence2014Fell v. Carlin, 6 So.3d 119, 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.green1 sentence2013This form is now rarely used because most lawyers use the language of rule 1.442 and the phrase “proposal for settlement.” Under this older form, the Durandos were not requiring that Mr. Cobb pay them; they simply offered full settlement in exchange for entry of judgment. 1 I recognize that the supreme court requires this court to construe section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2011), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 strictly because they are in derogation of the common law. 2 Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Parkway Bank v. FORT MYERS ARMATURE WORKgreen1 sentence2013DISCUSSION Our standard of review in a cer-tiorari proceeding requires this court to determine whether the trial court’s order is: “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” See Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Gracegreen1 sentence2013Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Grace, 794 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.green1 sentence2013Kelly v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 69 So.3d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). | 1 | 1 |
STATE, DEPT. OF HWY. SAFETY v. Degrossigreen1 sentence2011First, the discussion of rule 9.310(a) in Begley was dicta because our decision upholding the statute at issue in that case (which prohibited the trial court from staying the suspension of a driver’s license during judicial review) was based on our agreement with the Third District that “the determination of whether a party may drive pending a decision related to the suspension of the driver’s license is a decision which may be made by the legislature.” Id.; see also id. (“Since mandatory suspension is not a criminal penalty, but instead a civil sanction unrelated to an appeal of the criminal | 1 | 1 |
Minor v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Axilrod, 799 So.2d at 1108 (once the petitioner is found to not be able to perform his former occupation the order must discuss or analyze what specific jobs the petitioner is able to perform in light of his condition); see also Howson, 743 So.2d at 567 (finding that petitioner is fit for sedentary work is insufficient without identification of specific jobs and a discussion or analysis as to how petitioner can perform those jobs). | 1 | 1 |
Basse v. Stategreen1 sentence2007In Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2006), the supreme court recognized that district courts "may impose reasonable page limits on petitions for extraordinary writs." Id. at 575-76 ; see also Basse v. State, 740 So.2d 518 (Fla.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Straughn v. O'RIORDANgreen1 sentence1997Obviously, the court's discussion of the exception was immaterial to its decision in that the court had already decided that the agency's policy statements never met the initial statutory definition of rule. [2] Judge Benton's opinion refers to Straughn, 338 So.2d at 833, n. 2 , where it is stated that the standards under challenge had been communicated to the agency's area supervisors via telephone, memoranda and seminar discussions, thereby suggesting a distinction between the facts in Straughn and those at bar, where the Department's policies had been conveyed entirely by oral means. [3] Th | 1 | 1 |
Blair v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See Blair v. State, 559 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Southeast Bank, NA v. Gilbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parkway General Hospital, Inc. v. Sterngreen | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Gilbertgreen1 sentence1988See also the discussion of that doctrine in Gilbert v. Gilbert, 447 So.2d 299, 306-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (Lehan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), approved, 463 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Ferm v. Sabagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States of America Ex Rel. Rogelio Nieves Negron v. The State of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weathersbee Et Ux. v. Deklegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Temple Terrace Assets Co. v. Wasongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Money v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Randolph C. Fernon, Jr., Etc. And Susanna F. Fernongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cleveland Trust Company v. Fostergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Banner Construction Corporation v. Arnoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Nielsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rupp v. Bryant
green
2 sentences1985A discussion of immunity for the government and its employees is contained in our recent decision in Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla.1982) (supervision of public 'school students held not to be a discretionary function). 468 So.2d at 921 . 1985A discussion of immunity for the government and its employees is contained in our recent decision in Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1982) (supervision of public school students held not to be a discretionary function). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Koontz v. State
green
1 sentence2019See Hall, 187 So. at 408-09 ; Koontz, 204 So. 2d at 226-27 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Aventura Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condominium Ass'n
green
1 sentence2019Much of the discussion at the hearing focused on the Third District’s Aventura Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean Condominium Association, Inc., 105 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), line of cases interpreting the 2013 version of the statute. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. v. Feller
green
1 sentence2015As the facts and issues are the same in this case as in Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., v. Feller, 163 So.3d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), we adopt the discussion and analysis set forth in Sedgwick. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Washington v. Recuenco
green
2 sentences2009As for the error Knight raises, any question as to whether it is, or ever was, per se reversible was answered by the supreme court in Galindez : Finally, in [Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ], the Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000),] error. 2009As for the error Knight raises, any question as to whether it is, or ever was, per se reversible was answered by the supreme court in Galindez : Finally, in [Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ], the Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000),] error. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2009As for the error Knight raises, any question as to whether it is, or ever was, per se reversible was answered by the supreme court in Galindez : Finally, in [Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ], the Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000),] error. 2009As for the error Knight raises, any question as to whether it is, or ever was, per se reversible was answered by the supreme court in Galindez : Finally, in [Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ], the Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000),] error. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Canakaris v. Canakaris
green
1 sentence2008Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). a. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Henry v. State
green
2 sentences2007In Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2006), the supreme court recognized that district courts "may impose reasonable page limits on petitions for extraordinary writs." Id. at 575-76 ; see also Basse v. State, 740 So.2d 518 (Fla.1999). 2007In Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2006), the supreme court recognized that district courts "may impose reasonable page limits on petitions for extraordinary writs." Id. at 575-76 ; see also Basse v. State, 740 So.2d 518 (Fla.1999). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Ratner
green
1 sentence2007DISCUSSION The issue before this Court involves the jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal and the interplay of article V, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution with section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4), 9.030(c)(1)(B), and 9.140(c). [1] *703 As the district court correctly points out, "our constitution grants the power to authorize non-final appeals to district courts of appeal to our supreme court." Ratner, 902 So.2d at 269 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Whren v. United States
green
2 sentences2006"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 2006"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York v. Cope
green
1 sentence2001Cope involved a bad-faith action brought by an injured party against an insurance company after the injured party had released the insured tortfeasor from all liabilityincluding liability in excess of the policy limits. 462 So.2d at 459 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. Markey
green
1 sentence2000The court would suggest that the legislature make this statute applicable to insurance policies generally. [4] In the next-to-last full paragraph of Service Fire there is a discussion of the presumption that an item properly mailed is received by the addressee. 83 So.2d at 856 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Womack v. Fenton
green
2 sentences2000This occurs in the court's discussion (and paraphrase) of Womack v. Fenton, 28 N.J.Super. 345 , 100 A.2d 690 (Ct.App.Div.1953), and is unnecessary to the decision. 2000This occurs in the court's discussion (and paraphrase) of Womack v. Fenton, 28 N.J.Super. 345 , 100 A.2d 690 (Ct.App.Div.1953), and is unnecessary to the decision. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter
neutral
1 sentence1994As to the validity of the zoning scheme excluding automobile dealerships itself we rest our decision on the discussion and analysis in Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 845 F. Supp. 1540 (S.D.Fla. 1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hemphill Et Ux. v. Nelson
green
1 sentence1991The leading case on this issue is Hemphill v Nelson, 95 Fla. 498 , 166 So. 498 (Fla. 1928), wherein the court stated that “a conveyance by the mortgagee of all his right, title, and interest in the land passes nothing unless the debt be assigned . . . [A]n assignment of a mortgage to be effectual must either be formal, or it must appear from the instrument that it was intended to operate as such.” Id. 95 Fla. at —, 166 So. at 500 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Roberts v. Lower Coast Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1991The leading case on this issue is Hemphill v Nelson, 95 Fla. 498 , 166 So. 498 (Fla. 1928), wherein the court stated that “a conveyance by the mortgagee of all his right, title, and interest in the land passes nothing unless the debt be assigned . . . [A]n assignment of a mortgage to be effectual must either be formal, or it must appear from the instrument that it was intended to operate as such.” Id. 95 Fla. at —, 166 So. at 500 . 1991The leading case on this issue is Hemphill v Nelson, 95 Fla. 498 , 166 So. 498 (Fla. 1928), wherein the court stated that “a conveyance by the mortgagee of all his right, title, and interest in the land passes nothing unless the debt be assigned . . . [A]n assignment of a mortgage to be effectual must either be formal, or it must appear from the instrument that it was intended to operate as such.” Id. 95 Fla. at —, 166 So. at 500 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Trianon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeah green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. SUNRISE LAKES PHASE II SPECIAL REC. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| cluster 384395 green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| US Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Smith v. Urquhart green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. TT Watson, Inc. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| James v. Keene green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Yousko v. Vogt green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Beasley v. United States green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Scott v. Sites neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Tenny v. the Hilton Corp. neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Jones Trustee Etc. v. Carpenter green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Leslie v. . Lorillard green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Diamond Match Co. v. . Roeber green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Wilson v. State green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Atlanta Consolidated Bottling Co. v. Hutchinson & Sons green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.