discussion principle in New Jersey

2019The Court began with a discussion of the principle that in a self-defense case, evidence of the victim's violent character . . . demonstrates the victim's propensity for violence, which tends to support an inference that the victim was the initial aggressor[.] [W]here the accused has knowledge of the victim's prior violent acts, it tends to show the reasonableness of the accused's belief that the use of self-defense . . . was necessary. [Id. at 457.] N.J.R.E. 405 prohibits specific instances of conduct from being presented "unless a trait of character is an essential element to a claim or defe

2009"A trial court... should not disturb an indictment if there is some evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a prima facie case." State v. Morrison, supra, 188 N.J. at 12 , 902 A. 2d 860 .

2009"A trial court... should not disturb an indictment if there is some evidence establishing each element of the crime to make out a prima facie case." State v. Morrison, supra, 188 N.J. at 12 , 902 A. 2d 860 .

2004Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous — and the ambiguity is not manufactured by the defendant — the construction must be drawn against the state. [ Id. at 18 , 519 A .2d 322 (citations omitted).] Our understanding of that statement is enhanced by an earlier discussion of the principle of strict construction of penal laws in In re Suspension of De Marco, 83 N.J. 25 , 414 A. 2d 1339 (1980).

2004Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous — and the ambiguity is not manufactured by the defendant — the construction must be drawn against the state. [ Id. at 18 , 519 A .2d 322 (citations omitted).] Our understanding of that statement is enhanced by an earlier discussion of the principle of strict construction of penal laws in In re Suspension of De Marco, 83 N.J. 25 , 414 A. 2d 1339 (1980).

2004Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous — and the ambiguity is not manufactured by the defendant — the construction must be drawn against the state. [ Id. at 18 , 519 A .2d 322 (citations omitted).] Our understanding of that statement is enhanced by an earlier discussion of the principle of strict construction of penal laws in In re Suspension of De Marco, 83 N.J. 25 , 414 A. 2d 1339 (1980).

2004Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous — and the ambiguity is not manufactured by the defendant — the construction must be drawn against the state. [ Id. at 18 , 519 A .2d 322 (citations omitted).] Our understanding of that statement is enhanced by an earlier discussion of the principle of strict construction of penal laws in In re Suspension of De Marco, 83 N.J. 25 , 414 A. 2d 1339 (1980).

1999Bahr v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 53 N.J.L. 233 , 240-41, 21 A. 190 (E. & A. 1890) (Beasley, C.J., dissenting).

1999Bahr v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 53 N.J.L. 233 , 240-41, 21 A. 190 (E. & A. 1890) (Beasley, C.J., dissenting).

1998See, e.g., Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 376-77 , 149 A. 2d 193 (1959); Molnar, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 20 , 471 A. 2d 1209 .

1998See, e.g., Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 376-77 , 149 A. 2d 193 (1959); Molnar, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 20 , 471 A. 2d 1209 .

1990Super. 1, 9 , 124 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1956). [4] The limitation provision as amended reads, "No person may sue under this section more than two years after the contract of sale, or within two years of the time when the person aggrieved knew or should have known of the existence of his cause of action, whichever is later." [5] In a discussion of the factors which affected the allowance of pre-judgment interest, the trial judge said: ... as I've indicated, while the jury was free to reach the result they did, this Court as an independent finder of fact, would have found the $283,000 figure, becau

1988The comments of the Appellate Division were in the context of a discussion of the factors to be considered in a court’s exercise of discretion to vacate a judgment of adoption. 219 N.J.Super. at 43 .

1964As stated in Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U.S. 302, 309 , 12 S.Ct. 922, 924 , 36 L.Ed. 713 (1892): "Defendant's [device] may be in [one] particular an improvement upon the other; but [defendant] has nonetheless succeeded in appropriating all that was of value in the [plaintiff's] device." In other words, if defendant has improved one element of Eisbein's invention, it is nevertheless still Eisbein's invention.

1964As stated in Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U.S. 302, 309 , 12 S.Ct. 922, 924 , 36 L.Ed. 713 (1892): "Defendant's [device] may be in [one] particular an improvement upon the other; but [defendant] has nonetheless succeeded in appropriating all that was of value in the [plaintiff's] device." In other words, if defendant has improved one element of Eisbein's invention, it is nevertheless still Eisbein's invention.

1962Co., 26 N.J. 445, 454 , at pp. 455, 460-461 (1958).

1950Saks & Co. v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 42 ( E. & A. 1932); Gimbel Bros., Inc., v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 63 ( E. & A 1932). *44 With this general background of the existing state of the law, we proceed to examine the statement of the evidence in the present case.

1950Saks & Co. v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 42 ( E. & A. 1932); Gimbel Bros., Inc., v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 63 ( E. & A 1932). *44 With this general background of the existing state of the law, we proceed to examine the statement of the evidence in the present case.

1891In Richards et al. v. Levin, 16 Mo. 596 , the decision is staled to be, that where a debtor in insolvent- circumstances assigns all his property for the benefit of certain preferred creditors, directing the surplus, if any, to be paid to the grantor, this does not make the deed fraudulent, where it is ■admitted that the whole property is insufficient to pay even the preferred debts.