156 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1905–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.green2 sentences2001See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). 1999See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). | 11 | 11 |
Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co.green2 sentences2009Farmer, 907 S.W.2d at 496 (“[w]hen a judgment is interlocutory because unadjudicated parties or claims remain before the court, and when one moves to have such unadjudicated claims or parties removed by . . . nonsuit, the appellate timetable runs from the signing of a judgment or order disposing of those claims or parties”). 2009Farmer, 907 S.W.2d at 496 (“[w]hen a judgment is interlocutory because unadjudicated parties or claims remain before the court, and when one moves to have such unadjudicated claims or parties removed by . . . nonsuit, the appellate timetable runs from the signing of a judgment or order disposing of those claims or parties”). | 4 | 4 |
Probus Properties v. Kirbygreen2 sentences2008See Probus Props. v. Kirby, 200 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (concluding "that the discussion of the doctrine of disproportionate forfeiture was not necessary to the decision in Jones because the commission concluded the evidence established the administrator had directed the payment be made to the creditor of the estate"). 23 to exercise the option to purchase.4 At the expiration of the lease period, Cattle Feeders sent a letter to the Jordans in which it tendered the first purchase payment for the land pursuant to the terms set out in the option agreement, a payment w 2008See Probus Props. v. Kirby , 200 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (concluding "that the discussion of the doctrine of disproportionate forfeiture was not necessary to the decision in Jones because the commission concluded the evidence established the administrator had directed the payment be made to the creditor of the estate"). 4. | 4 | 4 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp.green2 sentences2007Discussion The doctrine of res judicata "does not bar a former defendant who asserted no affirmative claim for relief in an earlier action from stating a claim in a later action that could have been filed as a . . . counterclaim in the earlier action, unless the claim was compulsory in the earlier action." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp. , 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1999). 2007Discussion The doctrine of res judicata “does not bar a former defendant who asserted no affirmative claim for relief in an earlier action from stating a claim in a later action that could have been filed as a ... counterclaim in the earlier action, unless the claim was compulsory in the earlier action.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex.1999). | 4 | 4 |
Anders v. Californiagreen2 sentences2013Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 . 2013Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 . | 3 | 8 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen2 sentences2012See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875 ; Pacha, 2008 WL 2837560 , at * 7. 2012See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875 . | 3 | 4 |
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perezgreen2 sentences1994Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex.1991); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985); Hernandez v. Kasco Ventures Inc., 832 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no writ). 1994Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex.1991); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985); Brown v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, writ denied). | 3 | 3 |
In Re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass'ngreen2 sentences2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[ajlthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus”); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass’n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). . 2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[a]lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus"); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass'n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g., Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex.2002) (noting that a retroactive statute v | 2 | 3 |
Hamamcy v. Texas State Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences2019Exam’rs, 900 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) (concluding that doctor’s motion for rehearing consisting entirely of statement that “the presentation of the discussion at the hearing will be done from the charts of the patients and from the records on file with the Board” constituted no motion for rehearing at all); Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 398-99 (concluding that teacher’s motion for rehearing failed to preserve error because it did not point to any particular finding of fact or conclusion of law, did not identify legal principles referred to, and complained of Board’s action t 2015That was sufficient.'°2 NWF could also have challenged findings about the administrative completeness determination made by the Executive Director in 2004 but it would have been pointless and there is no requirement to have done so. '0' District’s Brief at pp 31-34. "32 The District cites Hamamcy v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners in support of its argument but that case dealt with a Motion for Rehearing which “stated, in its entirety, that ‘[t]he presentation of the discussion at the hearing will be done from the charts of the patients and from the records on file with the Board.”’ 900 S.W. | 2 | 2 |
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., Del Monte Corporation, Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.green2 sentences2015See 928 S.W.2d at 296 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., 10 F.3d at 757-58 ; J.J. 1999See id. at 296 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., 10 F.3d at 757-58 ; J.J. | 2 | 2 |
Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P.green2 sentences2012Discussion The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction provides that "when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other case should be abated." Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P. , 366 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.). 2012Discussion The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction provides that “when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other case should be abated.” Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P., 366 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.green2 sentences2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[a]lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus"); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass'n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g., Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex.2002) (noting that a retroactive statute v 2008Ctr., Inc. , 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n.3 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that “[a] lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom . . . for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus”); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass’n , 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g. , Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc ., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 ( Tex. 2002) (noting that a retroactive | 2 | 2 |
Tiller v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2006Tiller v. Martinez, 974 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). 2006Tiller v. Martinez, 974 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Dunngreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar , 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor , 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor, 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
McKanna v. Edgargreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar , 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor , 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor, 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co.green2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar , 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor , 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor, 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasorgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar , 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor , 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 2005See, e.g., Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.1990); Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965); All Commercial Floors, Inc. v. Barton & Rasor, 97 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Testoni v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.green2 sentences1995Testoni v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992); Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397 . 1995Testoni v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992); Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397 . | 2 | 2 |
Leal v. Stategreen2 sentences1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, supra; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion); Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). 1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, 367 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1963) ; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) ; Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion) ; Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). | 2 | 2 |
Carey v. Stategreen2 sentences1972See also Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Carey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). 1972See also Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) ; Carey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Stategreen2 sentences1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, supra; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion); Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). 1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, 367 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1963) ; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) ; Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion) ; Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). | 2 | 2 |
| Hart v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Burke v. Central Education Agencygreen2 sentences2019Exam’rs, 900 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) (concluding that doctor’s motion for rehearing consisting entirely of statement that “the presentation of the discussion at the hearing will be done from the charts of the patients and from the records on file with the Board” constituted no motion for rehearing at all); Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 398-99 (concluding that teacher’s motion for rehearing failed to preserve error because it did not point to any particular finding of fact or conclusion of law, did not identify legal principles referred to, and complained of Board’s action t 1995Testoni v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992); Burke, 725 S.W.2d at 397 . | 1 | 3 |
Walker v. Packergreen2 sentences2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[a]lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus"); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass'n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g., Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex.2002) (noting that a retroactive statute v 2008Ctr., Inc. , 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n.3 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that “[a] lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom . . . for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus”); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass’n , 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g. , Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc ., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 ( Tex. 2002) (noting that a retroactive | 1 | 2 |
| Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Patient Advocates of Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., LCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Keller v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Jerry Aldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scally v. Texas State Board of Medical Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buckeye Retirement Co., LLC, Ltd. v. Bank of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Houston Pipeline Co. v. Bank of America, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| McQuarrie v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Blakeneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Galveston v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shuttlesworth v. City of Birminghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Georgetown, Texas v. Lower Colorado River Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gates v. City of Dallasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Sipriano , 1 S.W.3d at 77 . 14. 2004Si-priano, 1 S.W.3d at 77 . 14 . | 4 | 2003–2004 |
Stafford v. State
green
2 sentences2002As required by Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. 2002As required by Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 2001–2002 |
Ford v. State
green
2 sentences2012Instead, we refer the litigants to Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. 2012Instead, we refer the litigants to Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
in Re Hendrick Medical Center John Frank White, III, M.D. Norman J. Dozier, M.D. And Abilene Anesthesia Group, P.A.
neutral
2 sentences2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[ajlthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus”); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass’n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). . 2008Ctr., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 773 , 775 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 30-day grace period, but noting that "[a]lthough we do not reach the question of whether Relators have an adequate remedy at law, see In re Collom ... for a discussion of this requirement for a writ of mandamus"); In re Collom & Carney Clinic Ass'n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding). [39] See, e.g., Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex.2002) (noting that a retroactive statute v | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Meraz v. State
green
2 sentences2004This standard was first used in a criminal case in Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), which adopted the standard that is used in civil law when the jury fails to find affirmatively on an issue on which the appealing party had the burden of proof. 2004This standard was first used in a criminal case in Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Stone v. State
green
2 sentences2004DISCUSSION The standard for factual sufficiency review developed in Clewis was derived from Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed), which stated that “the court views all the evidence without the prism of ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ... [and] should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. at 381 . 2004DISCUSSION The standard for factual sufficiency review developed in Clewis was derived from Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed), which stated that “the court views all the evidence without the prism of ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ... [and] should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. at 381 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Dover v. State
green
2 sentences1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, supra; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion); Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). 1972For a discussion and analysis of the interrelationship between the two rules, see, e. g., Sewell v. State, 367 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1963) ; Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) ; Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (concurring opinion) ; Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) (concurring opinion). | 2 | 1972–1972 |
| Harris v. State green | 2 | 1965–1965 |
| Morgan v. Employees' Retirement System green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Benton v. Maryland green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Brick v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Layman v. Atwood green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wood v. Moss green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Black v. Shor green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Gables Realty Ltd. Partnership v. Travis Central Appraisal District green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Insurance Co. of North America v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Royal Insurance Company of America v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Reynolds-Penland Co. v. Hexter & Lobello green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Gutierrez v. Walker green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| County of Bexar v. Garcia green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.