discussion issue in Indiana

2014The Hicks opinion also includes a discussion of waiver, concluding that the defendant's "failure to timely ob-jeet waived any challenge based on [the magistrate's] authority." Id. at 231 .

2014The Hicks opinion also includes a discussion of waiver, concluding that the defendant’s “failure to timely object waived any challenge based on [the magistrate’s] authority.” Id. at 231 .

2006Discussion The issue on which the Court of Appeals reversed is the same as that we address today in J.D. v. State, No. 49S04-0508-JV-356, 2006 WL 2616305 , 853 N.E.2d 945 , (Ind. Sept.12, 2006).

2006Discussion The issue on which the Court of Appeals reversed is the same as that we address today in J.D. v. State, No. 49S04-0508-JV-356, 2006 WL 2616305 , 853 N.E.2d 945 , (Ind. Sept.12, 2006).

1977Co. v. Halleck, 78 Ind. App. 495 , 136 N.E; 39, where there is a discussion of the principle with authorities cited to sustain it.” In the case at bar, as was true in Hall, supra, the written comments made by a member of the jury did not render the verdict defective for two reasons.

1925Co. v. Halleck (1922), 78 Ind. App. 495 , 136 N. E. 39 , where there is a discussion of the principle, with authorities cited to sustain it.

2019For a discussion of these error doctrines and the scope of appellate review they embrace, see Durden v. State , 99 N.E.3d 645 , 651-53 (Ind. 2018).

2017Logan argues that the reasoning of Love v. Bolinger, 927 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D.

2014“An order of restitution is generally within the trial court’s discretion, and it will be reversed only upon a finding of an abuse of that discretion.” Gonzalez v. State, 3 N.E.3d 27, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied).

2013Generally, “[t]he purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 , 124 S. Ct. 1145 (2004).

2013In one of her first opinions on this Court, Justice Rush discussed the history behind the Grandparent Visitation Act in In re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d 583 (Ind.2013).

2013Generally, “[t]he purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 , 124 S. Ct. 1145 (2004).

2010In Giovanoni, 927 N.E.2d 906 , we hold that while it is permissible for an employer to utilize a "no-fault" attendance *915 policy, "[t]he existence of such a policy does not obviate the statutory mandate [in Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(3)] to analyze whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the employee's absenteeism is the result of circumstances beyond that employee's control." Id. at 912.

2010In Giovanoni, 927 N.E.2d 906 , we hold that while it is permissible for an employer to utilize a "no-fault" attendance policy, "Itlhe existence of such a policy does not obviate the statutory mandate [in Indiana Code § 224-15-1(d)(8)] to analyze whether, under the totality of the cireumstances, the employee's absenteeism is the result of cireumstances beyond that employee's control." Id. at 912.

2006As such, this case provides a neat companion to another case we decide today, Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358 , No. 29S04-0602-CR-58 (Ind.2006), where the question of whether a telephone tip to the police provided the reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify an investigatory stop was also at issue.

2006As such, this case provides a neat companion to another case we decide today, Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358 , No. 29S04-0602-CR-58 (Ind.2006), where the question of whether a telephone tip to the police provided the reasonably articulable suspicion of eriminal activity necessary to justify an investigatory stop was also at issue.

1995J.D. v. *173 E.W. (1993), Ind.App., 610 N.E.2d 289, 290 .

1993When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court, Department of Rev. v. Caylor-Nickel Clinic (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1311 , and we are not limited to reviewing the trial court’s reasons for granting summary judgment.

1986DISCUSSION Our standard of review of Williams's claim is that recently enunciated by our supreme court in White v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 893 : "A petitioner who claims that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent but can only establish that the trial judge failed to give an advisement in accordance with § 85-85-1-2 has not met his burden of proof.

1982The court observed: “Section 5 of the Act clearly contemplates that the discussion of the factors enumerated therein are to be on behalf of all members of the school employees’ bargaining unit.” 368 N.E.2d at 1168 .

1980The same limitation applies in the instant case.” (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Although that case was a condemnation action rather than a case of tortious injury to a crop, and, as the court said, was concerned with the value of the property at the time of taking, and not what the lessee might have made as a warehouseman of grain held for favorable market ( 143 F.2d 410 ), nevertheless, I believe that the court’s discussion of the rule as to measure of damages for tortious destruction of crops correctly states the rule, and that such rule should be applied here.

1980I am aware of the case of Lamoreaux v. Randall, (1926) 53 N.D. 697 , 208 N.W. 104 , wherein the court stated that sometimes in the case of conversion of crops the measure of damages could be computed upon the basis of the highest market value between the date of conversion and the date of verdict.

1980I am aware of the case of Lamoreaux v. Randall, (1926) 53 N.D. 697 , 208 N.W. 104 , wherein the court stated that sometimes in the case of conversion of crops the measure of damages could be computed upon the basis of the highest market value between the date of conversion and the date of verdict.