16 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Hoch v. Stifelgreen2 sentences2024See Estate of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 41 , 16 A.3d 137 . 2024See Estate of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 41 , 16 A.3d 137 . | 1 | 1 |
L'HEUREUX v. Michaudgreen2 sentences2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. 2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Ouellettegreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Lynch v. Ouellette, 670 A.2d 948 (Me. 1996); see also Hodgkins v. New Eng. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Human Services Ex Rel. Boulanger v. Comeaugreen1 sentence2014"The doctrine of res judicata bars re-litigation if: ( 1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action." Dep't of Human Servs. on Behalf of Boulanger v. Comeau, 663 A.2d 46, 48 (Me. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
McAfee v. Colegreen1 sentence2012McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463, 465 (Me. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Rutland v. Mullengreen2 sentences2007To prove that an easement was extinguished by abandonment, the moving party must show "(1) a history of 3 nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a clear intent to abandon (emphasis added), or (2) adverse possession by the servient estate." Rutland v. Mullen, 2002 ME 98 , enen 8-9, 798 A.2d 1104, 1109 (citations omitted). 2007To prove that an easement was extinguished by abandonment, the moving party must show "(1) a history of 3 nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a clear intent to abandon (emphasis added), or (2) adverse possession by the servient estate." Rutland v. Mullen, 2002 ME 98 , enen 8-9, 798 A.2d 1104, 1109 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Centamore v. Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence2004Centamore v. Dep’t of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Davric Maine Corp. v. Maine Harness Racing Commissiongreen1 sentence2002In considering an appeal, the standard of review is whether the hearing officer abused his discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C) (1989); Davric Maine Corp. v. Maine Harness Racing Comm'n, 732 A.2d 289, 293 (Me. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Camps Newfound/Owatonna Corp. v. Town of Harrisongreen2 sentences2001Camps v. Newfound/Qwatonna v. Harrison, 1998 ME 20 , {] 11, 705 A.2d 1109, 1113 (quoting Machias Sav. 2001Camps v. Newfound/Qwatonna v. Harrison, 1998 ME 20 , {] 11, 705 A.2d 1109, 1113 (quoting Machias Sav. | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Mid Maine Medical Centergreen1 sentence2001Baker _v. Mid Maine Medical Centef, 499 A.2d 464, 467 (Me. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sauciergreen2 sentences1988In State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me.1980), cited in State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251 (Me. 1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). 1988In State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me.1980), cited in State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251 (Me. 1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Piercegreen2 sentences1988In State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me.1980), cited in State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251 (Me. 1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). 1988In State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me.1980), cited in State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251 (Me. 1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heber v. Lucerne-In-Maine Village Corp.
green
2 sentences2002Heber v. Lucerne-in-Maine Village Corp., 2000 ME 137 , J 7, 755 A.2d 1064, 1066 . 2002Heber v. Lucerne-in-Maine Village Corp., 2000 ME 137 , J 7, 755 A.2d 1064, 1066 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Euphrem Manirakiza v. Department of Health and Human Services
green
2 sentences2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. 2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lorraine Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. 2021Servs., 2018 ME 10 , ,r 8, 177 A.3d 1264 , but only if"the plain language of the statue is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," Id. ( quoting Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41 , ,r 14, 157 A.3d 223 ); see also L 'Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149 , ,r 7, 938 A.2d 801 ("Statutory language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations."). 7 DISCUSSION The hearing officer's Recommended Final decision was detailed, comprehensive and well-reasoned. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Fitzgerald Carryl v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2020(Pet. 1.) DISCUSSION The standard of review on a Rule 80C appeal is a familiar one: the Court reviews the agency's decision "for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by substantial 3 evidence in the record." Carry! v. Dep't of Corr., 2019 ME 114 , ~ 5, 212 A.3d 336 (quotation marks omitted). 2020(Pet. 1.) DISCUSSION The standard of review on a Rule 80C appeal is a familiar one: the Court reviews the agency's decision "for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by substantial 3 evidence in the record." Carry! v. Dep't of Corr., 2019 ME 114 , ~ 5, 212 A.3d 336 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Creamer v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2013Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, "the court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory order that is not now appealable." Creamer v. Bishop, 2006 ME 95 ~ 2, 902 A.2d 838 . 2013Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, "the court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory order that is not now appealable." Creamer v. Bishop, 2006 ME 95 ~ 2, 902 A.2d 838 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kennedy v. Hedberg
neutral
1 sentence1947In Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn., 76 , the court said: “The act of the owner and driver in leaving the motor running is not the proximate cause in an injury to a pedestrian, inflicted, when the person in attendance wrongfully attempted to move the automobile from the place where the owner left it, and that it was unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the doctrine that legal responsibility for an accidental injury cannot be fastened upon a man unless his act or failure to act was the proximate cause of the injury. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
In Re the Estate of Pettigrew
neutral
1 sentence1947If his act or omission only became injurious through the distinct wrongful act of another, the last act is the proximate cause of the injury and will be imputed to it.” In Brecker v. Lakewood Water Co., 174 A., 478 , the supreme court of New Jersey said: “Defendant’s negligence is too remote to constitute the proximate cause where the independent, illegal act of a third person which could not reasonably have been foreseen and without which such injury would not have been sustained intervenes.” In Illinois Central R. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.