discussion defendant in Massachusetts

2013“A party moving for summary judgment . . . has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mass.RCiv.P. 56(c); Community Nat’lBank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 713-14 (1991).

2013“A party moving for summary judgment . . . has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mass.RCiv.P. 56(c); Community Nat’l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 713-14 (1991).

2013“A party moving for summary judgment . . . has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mass.RCiv.P. 56(c); Community Nat’lBank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 713-14 (1991).

2013“A party moving for summary judgment . . . has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mass.RCiv.P. 56(c); Community Nat’l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 713-14 (1991).

2004As support for her ruling, the judge cited to the discussion of claim preclusion set out in Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23-24 (1988). 2.

2004For a discussion of the doctrine of claim preclusion as it relates to parties’ consent to separate litigation of related claims, see Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 (1988); Diversified Mort.

1997Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1997The Miranda safeguards are applicable to statements given during “custodial interrogations.” In the Miranda decision itself, the Court defined a “custodial” interrogation as follows: “By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted).

2016“Many States have enacted longarm statutes authorizing courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over... [defendants] when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred within the forum state.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011).

2013The test for determining whether a search has occurred for constitutional purposes is the two-pronged one set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).

2012In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 168 Mass. 488, 492 (1897), where a husband voluntarily transferred real property to his wife with the oral condition that the land be held in trust, the wife’s rights were defined by the deed itself, unrestricted by the oral condition.

2010For a discussion of factors relevant to determining an appropriate allocation of costs for restoring and searching electronically stored information from backup tapes, see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

2010For a discussion of factors relevant to determining an appropriate allocation of costs for restoring and searching electronically stored information from backup tapes, see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

2010See G.L.c. 258, §2 (public employ ers shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment); Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 559 (1992) (post-judgment interest not recoverable under MTCA because G.L.c. 258 contains no provision permitting the award of post-judgment interest either expressly or by necessary implication); Ware v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91-93 (1991) (denying recovery of costs in a MTCA action because the language of G.L.c. 258 neither expressly nor impliedly indicates that costs are recoverable).

2010See G.L.c. 258, §2 (public employ ers shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment); Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 559 (1992) (post-judgment interest not recoverable under MTCA because G.L.c. 258 contains no provision permitting the award of post-judgment interest either expressly or by necessary implication); Ware v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91-93 (1991) (denying recovery of costs in a MTCA action because the language of G.L.c. 258 neither expressly nor impliedly indicates that costs are recoverable).

2008DISCUSSION The standard for addressing a motion for reconsideration is fairly discretionary and it has been stated that “[t]hough there is no duty to reconsider a case, an issue, or a question of fact or law, once decided, the power to do so remains in the court until final judgment . . .” King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 707 (1987), quoting Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 601 (1940).

2008At the first stage of the analysis, the moving party must show that the challenged claim is based solely on petitioning activity, and has “no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Id.; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 550 (2001); Dwacraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998).

2008DISCUSSION The standard applicable to a special motion to dismiss under the SLAPP Act, G.L.c. 231, §59H, is well known, and has been reiterated recently by the Supreme Judicial Court in Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 5 (2008).

2008At the first stage of the analysis, the moving party must show that the challenged claim is based solely on petitioning activity, and has “no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Id.; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 550 (2001); Dwacraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998).

2008DISCUSSION The standard for addressing a motion for reconsideration is fairly discretionary and it has been stated that “[t]hough there is no duty to reconsider a case, an issue, or a question of fact or law, once decided, the power to do so remains in the court until final judgment . . .” King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 707 (1987), quoting Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 601 (1940).

2005“Whether an advance should be treated as a capital contribution to, rather than creating a debt of, the [company] depends to some extent on the objective intention of the contributor, and in part on whether in particular circumstances, equitable considerations require treatment of the advance as a capital contribution.” Yankee Microwave, Inc. v. Petricca Communications Systems, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 497, 522 (2002), quoting Friedman v. Kurker, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 152, 159-60 (1982).

2005The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has articulated the “cardinal rule” governing election officials: “if the intent of the voter can be determined with reasonable certainty . . . effect must be given to that intent and the vote counted in accordance therewith, provided the voter has substantially complied with the requisites of election law.” O'Brien v. Board of Election Commissioners, 257 Mass. 332, 338 (1926).

2005“Whether an advance should be treated as a capital contribution to, rather than creating a debt of, the [company] depends to some extent on the objective intention of the contributor, and in part on whether in particular circumstances, equitable considerations require treatment of the advance as a capital contribution.” Yankee Microwave, Inc. v. Petricca Communications Systems, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 497, 522 (2002), quoting Friedman v. Kurker, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 152, 159-60 (1982).

2005A plaintiff (or a plaintiff-in-counterclaim) “need only surmount a minimal hurdle to survive a motion to dismiss.” Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 184 (1985).

2004See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-46 (1970); Commonwealth v. Allain, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 595, 597 (1994); Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 503-05 (1980).

2004See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-46 (1970); Commonwealth v. Allain, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 595, 597 (1994); Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 503-05 (1980).